Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 37
Issue 1 January 2004

Article 1

2004

The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information
Age
Adeno Addis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Communications Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information Age, 37 Vanderbilt Law
Review 1 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol37/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL
of TRANSNATIONAL

VOLUME 37

JANUARY 2004

LAW

NUMBER 1

The Thin State in Thick Globalism:
Sovereignty in the Information Age
Adeno Addis*
ABSTRACT
Looking at the astonishing technological developments in
mass communication over the past several decades, Professor
Addis explores whether and how the resulting communication
revolution has undermined the notion of territorialsovereignty.
Specifically, he argues that (1) although the territorialstate has
faced serious challenges from the communication revolution, the
question is not whether state sovereignty will survive, but how
thick or thin that sovereignty will (or should) be; (2) even if it
were true that the territorial state is giving way to other
institutional arrangements, those arrangements may not be a
decentralized system of governance in that the communication
revolution is leading to institutional arrangements that are
increasingly more centralized and distant from the individuals
whose lives they affect; and finally that (3) the various
institutional and conceptual responses that have been offered to
deal with the challenges of the communication revolution-the
statist, the proceduralist, and the liberal internationalist
responses-misapprehend the nature of the communication
revolution and consequently fail to suggest institutional
structures that fully address the tension between the
technological reality of routine transborder information flows
and the institutionalclaims of the territorialstate.

William Ray Forrester Professor of Public and Constitutional Law, Tulane
University. This is part of a large work designed to rethink the idea of state
sovereignty in the light of the communication revolution.
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Drawing from the works of prominent political
philosophers and communication theorists, Professor Addis
sketches an outline of "thin statism" as a more defensible
response to the communication revolution. Organized by two
principles (the notion of plurality (internalpluralism) and the
idea of subsidiarity (external pluralism)), thin statism will
allow us to reconcile the reality of transbordercommunication
with the need for a version of a state system as a check on thick
globalism.
This thin state will also accommodate two
commitments that are generally viewed as incompatible:
universalism and the pursuit of the "politics of difference." Just
like any other boundaries, territorial boundaries "both foster
and inhibit freedom." The institutionalarrangementssuggested
by the notion of the thin state understand and respond to this
ambiguity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago a masthead on a cyber site proclaimed:
"National borders are just speedbumps on the information
superhighway."1 The astonishing developments in the last few
decades in information technologies and infrastructure have made it
easier to generate, package, and transmit information across the
globe at an increasing speed and falling costs. 2 Indeed, the

1.
Information and Infrastructure, at http://akebono.stanford.eduyahoo/, cited
in Harold M. White, Jr. & Rita Lauria, The Impact of the New Communication
Technologies on InternationalCommunication Law and Policy, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2
(1995).
2.
See Martin Wolf, Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 181-82; see generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE
NETWORK SOCIETY (1996).
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communication revolution 3 in general and the Internet in particular
have reduced cost and distance nearly to zero.
One "victim" of this dramatic decrease in distance and
transaction costs, the message of the cyber enthusiast suggests, is the
idea of the territorial state that has defined, and has been central to,
international relations for a considerable time, at least since
Westphalia. 4 Indeed, it is now almost a clich6 to announce that the
nation-state is on its final legs. 5

3.
Some may question the use of the term "revolution" to refer to current
communication developments as being inaccurate. But I believe the "revolution"
designation is entirely appropriate. If by revolution is meant the sudden and wide
transformation of social and institutional life, then we have a revolution at hand. The
emergence of new communication technologies is clearly transforming how we organize
and govern ourselves both locally and globally, and even how we view ourselves and
others. As I shall show later, central concepts such as national sovereignty have to be
rethought and with them a large body of public international law itself. Even widely
accepted propositions as to what constitutes democratic governance might have to be
rethought in the light of the emergence and proliferation of communication
technologies. As to the suddenness of the transformation, of course the notion of
suddenness is relative. But to understand how sudden all this has been one need only
compare events of the last few decades with what took place in all previous years of
human history. Arthur Clarke puts the changes into the context of the larger human
history with this observation: "When Queen Victoria came to the throne in 1837, she
had no swifter means of sending messages to the far parts of her empire than had
Julius Caesar or, for that matter, Moses.... The galloping horse and the sailing ship
remained the swiftest means of transport, as they had for five thousand years."
ARTHUR C. CLARKE, HOW THE WORLD WAS ONE: BEYOND THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 2-3
(1992). Compare that to the fact that in the last few decades we have quickly moved
from satellite communication to transborder data flow to the Internet.
4.
"For three or four centuries, and certainly by the time of the Peace of
Westphalia, ending the Thirty Years War, state sovereignty has been the guiding
principle of international relations." KURT MILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EMERGING
GLOBAL ORDER: A NEW SOVEREIGNTY? 9 (1998); see also KALEVI J. HOLSTI, PEACE
AND WAR: ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 1648-1989 25 (1991) ("The
Peace of Westphalia organized Europe on the principle of particularism. It represented
a diplomatic arrangement-an order created by states, for states-and replaced most of
the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the Pope and the Holy
Roman Empire."); Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF. Jan-Feb. 1997, at
50. The Westphalia thesis, the idea that the state system was essentially created after
Westphalia, is not universally endorsed. Christian Reus-Smit writes, "[ilt was not until
the middle of the nineteenth century, when a new set of constitutional values had
emerged to justify the authority of [a] sovereign state, that fundamental institutions of
multilateralism and contractual international law took off." CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT,
THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE STATE: CULTURE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND
INSTITUTIONAL RATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 88 (1999); see also
Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, InternationalRelations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55
INT'L ORG. 250, 268 (2001) ("[Tihe prevalence of the Westphalian Myth... is the result
of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians adopting a certain standard
account of 1648, influenced by ideas that can be traced to anti-Habsburg propaganda of
the Thirty Years' War.").
5.
'The system of sovereign states is .. .in gradual decay." David Jacobson,
Conclusion to The Global Future, in OLD NATIONS, NEW WORLD: CONCEPTIONS OF
WORLD ORDER 212 (David Jacobson ed., 1994). At another point Jacobson makes a
similar observation: "The classical framework of state sovereignty, national self-
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For many enthusiasts of the communication revolution and other
critics of the state system, the demise of the system could not come
sooner. 6 Their enthusiasm is based on the belief that the state system
has been an impediment to international human solidarity and
human flourishing. 7 They offer a number of reasons to back this
claim. First, in the name of protecting the integrity of the territorial
border, many wars have been fought and many more tense situations
exist.8 As one author put it: "territorial disputes have been the major
cause of enduring interstate rivalries, the frequency of war and
intensity of war."9 The historically drawn territorial border gets
transformed into an almost transcendental boundary whose integrity
is seen to define the integrity of the community itself. Resources that
could be utilized for attending to basic needs are spent on defending,
or preparing to defend, the border, "the motherland," or "the
fatherland."'10

determination and the nation state is crumbling in the core of the world order." Id. at
217. "[T]he 'state centric' system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is, if not at
an end, at a minimum undergoing a deep reconfiguration." SEYLA BENHABIB, THE
CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA 179 (2002)
(citations omitted). Actually, even as far back as 1964, scholars were announcing the
obsolescence of national sovereignty. Hans J. Morgenthau proclaimed that "the
sovereign nation-state is in the process of becoming obsolete." Hans J. Mogenthau, The
Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations, in THE
ROLE OF THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16 (H. V. Harrison ed., 1964).
6.
Many globalists who may not be cyber literate, let alone defenders of the
communication revolution, feel the same way. "[T]he 'withering away' of national
sovereignty is a positive development." G. B. Madison, Globalization and
Opportunities, available at http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/-global/global.htm
(last visited Dec. 26, 2003).
7.
Id.
8.
See Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International
Boundariesand the Use of Force, 55 INT'L ORG. 215, 215-16 (2001).
9.
Id. John Vasquez has written: "Of all the issues over which wars could
logically be fought, territorial issues seem to be the ones most often associated with
wars. Few interstate wars are fought without any territorial issue being involved in
one way or another." JOHN VASQUEZ, THE WAR PUZZLE 151 (1993), quoted in Zacher,
supra note 8, at 216; see also Michael Hechter & Elizabeth Borland, National SelfDetermination: The Emergence of an International Norm, in SOCIAL NORMS 35
(Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) ("[L]ess than four percent of the
world's population lives in seven countries that have had no recent border disputes:
Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal." Id.,
citing WALKER CONNOR, MEXIAN AMERICANS CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1985).
10.
Chaim Gans observes that the notion of "the father land" is present in
many languages. 'Many languages have a term for the concept of the fatherland."
Chaim Gans, Historical Rights: The Evaluation of Nationalist Claims to Sovereignty,
29 POL. THEORY 58, 66 (2001). Gans analogizes the tie between peoples and "their
formative territories [to] that of the ties between children and their parents." Id at 6667; see also Gary R. Johnson, In the Name of the Fatherland:An Analysis of Kin Term
Usage in Patriotic Speech and Literature, 8 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 165, 168-71 (1987)
(exploring the use of terms such as "motherland" and "fatherland" "to inspire in the
listener or reader a feeling of unity with his or her fellow citizens").
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, the idea of the territorial
border makes it difficult, if not impossible, to treat all people as
individuals and to make them the focus of our moral concern. The
state system starts with the state, rather than the individual, as the
unit of analysis. An individual is a citizen of this nation or that
nation. He or she is within the jurisdiction and care of this or that
country. One's moral (and certainly legal) obligation is informed and
constrained by the often arbitrarily drawn territorial boundary.
Therefore, to the extent that the state system makes one's moral,
political and social obligations correspond largely to the limits of the
physical boundary that defines the nation-state, it becomes that much
more difficult to pursue international justice that takes the individual
as one's point of departure and international human solidarity as
one's objective. The assumption behind this position is, of course, that
international justice would best be achieved if we took the individual,
rather than the territorial state, as a point of departure for our
analytical as well as prescriptive endeavors.
Third, the world organized into numerous nation-states with as
numerous jurisdictional and regulatory setups is viewed as not very
conducive to the development of technologies (and the worldwide
benefits that would accrue from such developments), such as
communication technologies. This third point is paradoxical. On the
one hand, people acknowledge and rejoice in the fact that the
technological revolution in the area of communication has had serious
and salutary impact on the nation state, but, on the other hand, they
view the decline or even disappearance of the nation-state as
conducive, even necessary, for the development of the technology. The
territorial state is too small to deal with the myriad global issues that
face us, but it is big enough to have a negative impact on the
development of alternative ways of organizing that communication
technologies suggest.
The communication revolution has had two interrelated impacts
on the current international scene with its emphasis on the state
system. On the one hand, it is seriously undermining the hold that
the notion of the territorial state has had on the international system
and on our imagination. This can be referred to as the deconstitutive
dimension of the communication revolution. By using the term
"deconstitutive" I mean to suggest that the revolution is undermining

As to the cost of defending the "fatherland", the recent destructive border wars
between two of the poorest nations in the world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, could be cited as
an example. While their people were dying from hunger as a result of a devastating
famine, the leaders of the two nations spent billions on arms and sacrificed tens of
thousands of their citizens to "defend" a border that did not even exist a decade or so
beforehand. And even more bizarrely, the leaders of the two countries come from the
same ethnic group. The Ethio-Eritrean war is an example of how territorial borders can
be a source of destructive and insane war.
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the regulatory and administrative characteristics that give the
territorial unit its coherence. Under the pressure of the
communication revolution, the argument goes, the territorial state is
increasingly ceasing to be an indivisible unit of analysis. It is perhaps
ironic that at the dawn of the twenty-first century the imminent
demise of the state (its "withering away," in Marxian terms n1 ) is
being announced and celebrated not by followers of Marx and Lenin,
as was the case at the dawn of the twentieth century, but mostly by
12
their ideological opposites.
But the communication revolution is also seen to have had,
simultaneously, a constitutive, constructive, formational aspect to it.
At the same time as it is curtailing the power of the nation-state, the
13
communication revolution is also helping cultivate a "global village"
of cosmopolitan individuals and an increasingly vibrant international
civil society. Although the point is often made in relation to the
Internet, the general point is that the communication revolution is
heralding a new world order, an order that is defined by the
and
seemingly contradictory tendencies of decentralization
interconnection. I shall refer to this as the constitutive dimension of
the communication revolution. For the enthusiast of the
communication revolution, and for globalists generally, this is a time
streets," to borrow a phrase
for celebration, a time "for dancing in the
14
from Harry Kalven in another context.
The purpose of this Article is to puzzle out the impact of the
communication revolution on the notion of territorial sovereignty and
to suggest that a more defensible way of conceiving of state
sovereignty in the light of this revolution. The Article will make and
defend three interrelated claims. First, though territorial sovereignty
has faced serious challenges from the communication revolution, the
claim of its imminent demise is highly exaggerated. As I shall
indicate later, the territorial state may in fact have various resources
to deploy to fight off the pressure from the communication revolution.
The state may often try, and even succeed, "to design its commands
into the very technologies that, collectively, are supposed to spell its
demise."'15 Indeed, a new generation of communications scholars is

See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 131 (1987). Indeed, now
11.
socialists and those generally on the left tend to be defenders of the state and the state
system.
12.
Here I have leaders of multinational corporations and free traders in mind.
The term "global village" was coined (at least, popularized) by Marshall
13.
McLuhan. See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, WAR AND PEACE
IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE (1968).
Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of
14.
the FirstAmendment, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125.
See James Boyle, Foucault and Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
15.
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 204 (1997); see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
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increasingly recognizing this fact. 16 Furthermore I shall argue that
the communication revolution is, in fact, not entirely uncongenial to
the territorial state and to its survival. Thus, for example, with
current communication technologies it is becoming much easier for
government authorities to keep tabs on their citizens and to have full
and instant information on those who seek to enter their borders or to
keep strong surveillance on those foreigners who have entered on a
temporary basis. 17 As communication technologies expand and as the
anxiety of the state rises, the mechanisms of surveillance will likely
intensify.18 In this age of uncertainties and terrorist threats, the state
may use the communication revolution to reassert itself with a
vengeance. The real question, therefore, is not whether state
sovereignty will survive the communication revolution, but rather
how thin or thick it is or should be and what would be the most
defensible way of thinking of state sovereignty in the era of the
information superhighway.
Second, I shall claim that even if it were true that the territorial
state is giving way to other institutional arrangements, those
arrangements may not be what the communication enthusiast or
other globalists imagine or desire, i.e. a decentralized system of
governance. The Article will show that it is more likely to be the case
that the (unregulated) communication revolution will lead to
institutional arrangements, private as well as public, that are
increasingly more centralized and distant from the individuals whose

AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 44 (1999) ("[I]f the government regulates the
architecture of the Net, [the Net] could be regulated in the future."). For a newspaper
account of how states are attempting to apply "geographical zoning online that mirrors
geographical offline," see Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web. Passport, Please?:
InformationMay Want to be Free, but Courts and New Software Could Impose National
Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at Gi (quoting Michael Geist, University of
Ottowa law professor).
16.
See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
1199, 1201 (1998).
17.
Thus, for example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has
apparently developed "a web-based system to track hundreds of thousands of foreign
students ....
The system will link every U.S. consulate with every INS port of entry
and all 74,000 educational institutions eligible to host foreign students." Suzanne
Gambo, INS to Track ForeignPupils Via Web, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 2002; Daina
Jean Schemo, Electronic Tracking System Monitors Foreign Studens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2003, at All. See generally, Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
PatriotAct: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607 (2003).
18.
See, e.g., John Markoff & John Schwartz, Electronic: Surveillance: Bush
Administration to Propose System for Wide Monitoring of Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2002, at A16 ("The Bush Administration is planning to propose requiring Internet
service providers to help build a centralized system to enable broad monitoring of the
Internet and, potentially, surveillance of its users."). Indeed, as I shall show later, it is
not only public, but private surveillance that grows along with what the late Ithiel de
Sola Pool, more than two decades ago, called 'technologies of freedom,' (referring to the
new communications technologies). See generally ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL,
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
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lives are daily affected by their actions. The enthusiasts of the
communication revolution and globalization generally may be
mistaking the privatization of power for decentralization, but that
has been a common mistake. 19
Third, the last section will develop a notion of state sovereignty
that I shall refer to as "thin statism," and will then set out to defend
that version of sovereignty on moral and instrumental grounds. The
argument is that liberty and internationaljustice, the twin values
that many critics of the state system contend will be better served by
the erosion of the power of the state system, will in fact need "a state
of a certain kind." 20 The "thin state" is the kind of state we need, and
the kind of state likely to be available, in the information age and in
the context of thick globalism if we are to promote and protect the
twin values of liberty and justice. Two principles organize the
institutions of the thin state: the notion of plurality (internal
pluralism) and the idea of subsidiarity (external pluralism). I shall
develop those principles in the last section of the article.
Part II presents the general context within which the challenge
of the communication revolution to territorial sovereignty is best
understood, making two points in particular. First, the impact of the
communication revolution on state sovereignty is part of the general
challenge that the nation-state has faced from a process that is
referred to as globalization. 2 1 Globalization in the economic realm,
especially the role of multinationals, and the continuing
universalization of human rights norms and standards have
increasingly reduced the domain of authority that the nation-state
had traditionally exercised.
The section argues that the communication revolution is,
however, not simply another aspect of globalization, but a principal
reason for it. This is a point worth emphasizing. Economic
globalization is crucially assisted by the presence of new
communication technologies that have enabled multinationals and
others to move information and data from one operation in one
country to another operation in another country with speed and
efficiency. In the human rights area, the communication revolution

19.
See generally RICHARD BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS:
IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1994); RICHARD FALK,
PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (1999); James Tully, The Unfreedom of the

Modern in Comparison to Their Ideals of ConstitutionalDemocracy 65 MOD. L. REV.
204 (2002) (arguing that apparent decentralization supports rather than counters
global and regional centralization of power).
20.

See LESSIG, supra note 15, at 5.

21.

For the various understandings of globalizations see SUSAN STRANGE, THE

RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY xiii

(1996); Fredric Jameson, Globalization and Political Strategy, NEW LEFT REV. No. 4,
July-Aug. 2000, (2d ser.), at 49.
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has made it easier both to monitor a state's violation of the human
rights of its citizens, and has increased the odds that other states and
the international community will respond to such violations. The
graphic depictions of brutality that the electronic media can often
provide worldwide almost instantaneously increases the probability
that some governments, especially democratic ones, may be pressured
by their constituents to respond to such brutalities and tragedies. The
interventions by the international community and individual states
in the Bosnian, Somalian, and Yugoslavian conflicts were greatly
assisted and facilitated by those horrific pictures and images
appearing on television screens worldwide from those places which
22
otherwise would have seemed rather remote.
Part III explores in some detail the manner in which
communication technologies have affected (constrained or enabled)
state sovereignty. The section gives an account of the direct impact
that each medium of mass communication-print, transnational radio
communications, satellite broadcasting, remote sensing by satellites,
transborder data flow, and the Internet-has had on the notion of
territorial sovereignty. The purpose here is to explore the various
ways in which the communication revolution might be said to have
undermined the claim of the state to be "the ultimate agency of selfconscious political action," to use a description of William
Connolly's. 23 Part of the purpose of reviewing the impact of the entire
range of communication technologies on the idea of territorial
sovereignty is also to indicate what, in my view, seems to have been
overlooked in our total preoccupation with the Internet. Although it is
more profound and deep-cutting, it is wrong to assume that the
challenge the Internet poses to the coherence of the territorial state is
unique.24 Some of the electronic media that preceded the Internet
posed the challenge in remarkably similar ways. 25 If we are to make

22.
A decade ago, James Schlesinger, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense,
made the argument that, to his regret, U.S. policies in Kurdistan and Somalia at that
time were driven by television images of the tragedies in those places, a tendency he
decried and equated with emotionalism. See James Schlesinger, Quest for a Post-Cold
War ForeignPolicy, FOREIGN AFF. [America and the World] 1992-93, at 17. To be sure,
there have been challenges to the view that the television coverage of events inclines
governments, such as the U.S. government, to intervene. See generally, e.g., Steven
Livingston & Todd Eachus, HumanitarianCrisis and U.S. ForeignPolicy: Somalia and
the CNN Effect Reconsidered, 12 POL. COMM. 413 (1995). But it seems plausible to
assume that democratic regimes are more likely to be pressured by their citizenry to
intervene when the citizenry is exposed to disturbing images than when there is no
such reporting.
23.
WILLIAM
E. , CONNOLLY,
IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE:
NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 201 (1991).

DEMOCRATIC

24.
I think Jack Goldsmith is correct in reminding us not to be swept away by
the supposed uniqueness of the Internet for jurisdictional purposes. Goldsmith, supra
note 16, at 1205-10; see also Kerr, supra note 17, at 327-28.
25.
See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.). The High
Court of Australia, the highest court in the country, made the point thus:
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defensible and workable policy choices we must guard against the
temptation of thinking of the uniqueness of the present. Neglect of
the past often leads people to an exaggerated belief of the uniqueness
of the present. If the current U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in
the First Amendment area is an indication, perceiving every new
26
medium as unique is a recipe for doctrinal and policy incoherence.
Part IV describes and critically examines the institutional and
conceptual responses that are offered to deal with the challenges that
are described in Part III. This section is, therefore, about the
strengths and weaknesses, the virtues and vices, of the various
suggestions that have been offered, sometimes explicitly but often
implicitly, to deal with the tension between the technological reality
of the routine transborder flow of information that seems increasingly
to reduce territorial borders to speedbumps, on one hand, and the
traditional and persistent claim of the territorial state that it has
exclusive prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction over
actors and actions within the territorial limit, on the other. At the
risk of doing violence to the subtle differences among authors, I group
the various responses into three broad categories-the statist (status
quo), the proceduralist, and the liberal sovereignist (liberal
internationalist) responses. After setting out the arguments of the
various responses, the section then examines each response to see
how it deals with the tension and what version of sovereignty is
implied by its approach.
After exploring the nature and reach of these responses, I
conclude that they misapprehend the nature of the communication
revolution and consequently fail to suggest institutional structures
that deal fully and coherently with the tension between the

In the course of argument [before the court] much emphasis was given to the
fact that the advent of the World Wide Web is a considerable technological
advance. So it is. But the problem of widely disseminated communications is
much older than the Internet and the World Wide Web. The law has had to
grapple with such cases ever since newspapers and magazines came to be
distributed to large numbers of people over wide geographic areas. Radio and
television presented the same kind of problems as was presented by widespread
dissemination pf printed material, although international transmission of
material was made easier by the advent of electronic means of communication.

Id. at

38.

26.
The U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence has been rather
incoherent in that the Court has been attempting to treat each new medium as being
unique and raising qualitatively different First Amendment concerns. Radio and
television are different from print. Cable is yet different from radio and television. And
the Internet is still different from cable. As we understand each new technology and
medium better, however, we realize that the concerns are not qualitatively different
and the regulatory schemes should perhaps not be very different either. For more
discussion, see infra Part III.D.
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technological reality and the institutional claims of the territorial
state. I then sketch the outline of what I have referred to as "thin
statism," as a more defensible alternative. I argue that thin statism
will allow us to reconcile the reality (and to acknowledge and defend
the importance) of transborder communication, on one hand, and the
need for a version of a state system as a check on thick globalism, on
the other. The version of the thin state that I defend here is also
meant to accommodate two commitments that are generally viewed
as incompatible, a notion of universalism sitting side by side with the
'27
pursuit of the "politics of difference.
Some might argue that what is needed to counter thick globalism
is in fact a thick, not a thin, state. The argument may go this way:
only a sufficiently strong state will provide the necessary counter to
an increasingly imperial globalization which has been dislocating
people both by weakening the bonds and cultures that have defined
and sustained them and by reducing the conditions for genuine
deliberative process and self-government. I have sympathy with that
argument, but in the end I argue that the thick state (strong statism)
is neither attractive nor even sustainable.
Part V serves two purposes. It offers a backward glance to
highlight and restate the major themes of the article. And perhaps
more importantly, it makes a plea that we cease to view territorial
borders with the certainty that the cyber enthusiasts and the
traditional statists seem to view them. While the former views
territorial borders and the state system as stumbling blocks to the
achievement of liberty and international justice and thus their
demise as a cause for celebration rather than mourning, the latter
views them as unambiguous good that must be protected from the
threat of unrestrained and unauthorized flow of information across
national boundaries. My plea is that we abandon the certainties that
are represented by these two positions, for they misunderstand the
ambiguous and even paradoxical nature of territorial boundaries, how
they can simultaneously foster and inhibit freedom. In this sense,
territorial boundaries are not any different from other boundariessuch as gender and cultural boundaries-that can "provide
preconditions of identity, individual agency, and collective action; but
'28
they also close possibilities of being that might otherwise flourish.
This is perhaps what Russell Hardin meant when he observed:
"Nation-states are contingently morally good for what they can
achieve-although they are also contingently morally bad for what

27.
For a description of "the politics of difference" see CONNOLLY, supra note
23, at 201.
28.
WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION 163 (1995).
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they can achieve. '29 Once this ambiguity is recognized then the task
becomes one of imagining institutional arrangements that will
minimize the sacrifices and violence associated with territorial
sovereignty without sacrificing the advantages, constitutive and
instrumental, that territory based communities provide.

II. CHALLENGES TO STATE (TERRITORIAL) SOVEREIGNTY: THE
GENERAL CONTEXT
A. Globalization:General
The nation-state has come under pressure from two processes
that seem to lead in two different directions. One challenge seems to
lead to political fragmentation whereas the other seems to indicate in
the direction of larger economic, political and cultural unions. The
first of these two challenges has come from within, in the form of a
and ethnic
and intensification of nationalistic
resurgence
consciousness, calling for the breaking up of empires, republics, and
autocracies. 30 Political divorce or, as it is formally known, session or
self-determination, is the rallying cry under which the pressure is
pursued and sustained. 31 This first development, though a challenge
to the state, is not really a challenge to the state system. In fact, it is a
resounding affirmation of it. Political divorce is about multiplying
32
territorial states, not ending them.
The second challenge comes from above. The globalization of
economic, social, and cultural life has put into question the defining

29.
Russell Hardin, Group Boundaries, Individual Barriers, in BOUNDARIES
AND JUSTICE: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 276, 290 (David Miller & Sohail H.
Hashmi eds., 2001).
30.
I explore that issue in another article. Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and
Political Unity: The Politics of Language in Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719,
722 n.7 (2001); see also Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration,
in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 112 (Ian Shaprio & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997).
31.
Addis, Cultural Integrity, supranote 30, at 733-34.
32.
In 1979 there were 150 nations, now there are 190. See HASTINGS DONNAN
& THOMAS M. WILSON, BORDERS: FRONTIERS OF IDENTITY, NATION AND STATE 3
(1999). All of these new states were carved out of existing states. Some, such as
Eritrea, emerged after long and protracted war against the central government.
Others, such as the Czech Republic and Rumania, did so as a result of mutual and
peaceful agreement of divorce. And most of the new states emerged as a result of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the latter with considerable violence. If
we compare the number of states that existed at the turn of the last century with the
current numbers we realize that the increase has been more than three fold. See Wade
Davis, The Roots of Disaffection: For a Global Declaration of Interdependence, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. July 6-7, 2002, at 8.
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features of state sovereignty. 33 Conventionally, state sovereignty has
been understood to imply that the territorial unit we call the state is
an indivisible locus of political power, at least in its relation to
outsiders.3 4 This indivisibility is premised on the notion that the unit
has power to legislate as the final authority on all matters that arise
within its territorial borders. 35 That is, it has full prescriptive
jurisdiction. The state is also thought to possess a monopoly of
legitimate violence that cannot be questioned or overridden by an
external authority. That is, it has full adjudicative and enforcement
power. 36 Described this way, state sovereignty has often been
understood to be synonymous with the idea of self-determination. 37 A
political unit was said to have exercised the right to selfdetermination to the extent that it was immune from interference
8
from entities that are located outside its territorial boundaries.3
Under the conventional theory, therefore, self-determination is

33.
"Globalization at its core refers to worldwide networks of interdependence.
A network is simply a series of connections of points in a system..." JOSEPH S. NYE,
JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER
CAN'T GO IT ALONE 91 (2002). For an interesting exploration of the ambiguity of the
term globalization and the various senses in which the term is invoked-technological,
political, cultural, economic and social-see Jameson, supra note 21, at 49. For my
purpose, I mean to use the term in its territorial dimension. In this sense, globalization
is to refer to the phenomenon when social and economic interactions and transactions
defy the limits of territorial or state boundaries and thereby supersede national, and
often regional, governmental decision-making processes. See also Jost Delbrfick,
Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A
EuropeanPerspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993).
[G]lobalization as distinct from internationalization denotes a process of
denationalization of clusters of political, economic and social activities.
Internationalization, on the other hand, refers to cooperative activities of
national actors, public or private, on a level beyond the nation-state but in the
last resort under its control.
Id. For a rather skeptical view of "globalization" see STRANGE, supra note 21, at xiii
("The worst of them all is 'globalisation' a term which can refer to anything from the
Internet to a hamburger. All too often, it is a polite euphemism for the continuing
Americanisation of consumer tastes and cultural practices.").
34.
"Externally, a state is sovereign if the exercise of power internally to the
state is not subject to external superior power." Neil MacCormick, Beyond Soverignty,
56 MOD. L. REV. 1, 56 (1993).
35.
JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD 16 (1992).
36.
"[W]hat distinguishes the state from other institutions is its coercive
authority, or as others have labeled it, supreme coercive power." CAMILLERI, supra note
35, at 17.
37.
Id.
38.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 2(7) (prohibiting Member States and the
United Nations respectively from interfering in the internal affairs of a state); see also
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25th Sess., 1883rd mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2625 (XXV) (1970) [hereinafter Declarationon Principles].
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viewed generally in external terms only. 39 That is, while outsiders
are prohibited from interference with the external and internal
affairs of a state, the rights of individuals and citizens for selfdetermination vis-A-vis their government or rulers was said not to be
40
a concern of international law and international relations.
There are three corollaries to the conventional story of interborder relations. First, it was states, not individuals or other entities
within their territories, that were to be the bearers of international
rights and obligations. 4 ' Since it was states that were parties to the
constitution of international institutions, it can only logically be the
case that they would be the bearers of rights and responsibilities
under these institutions.4 2 Second, although states do lose parts of
their autonomy by agreeing to abide by international law, they
ultimately remain autonomous, for they can withdraw from, or refuse
to be part of, an agreement that they believe not to be in their
interest. 43 A state is bound only by those norms to which it has given
its consent. Indeed, the primary sources of international law-as set
out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justiceare the result of the action of states. 44 And third, in relation to their

39.

See Declarationon Principles,supra note 38.

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State ....
Each State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and
cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.
Id. at 123.
40.
A well known international law scholar argues that state sovereignty
"represents the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations" and that sovereignty
is defined as that state of affairs when the state has "(1) a jurisdiction prima face
exclusive, over a territory and permanent population living there; (2) a duty of nonintervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the dependence
of obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor."
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1990); see
also PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND THE LAW BEYOND
STATES 418-49 (2002). Allott summarizes what he refers to as the "old regime" and
what I have been calling the traditional conception of interstate relations and the legal
regime regulating that relationship.
41.
ALLOTT, supra note 40, at 418 ("International law is made by and for the
states and international organizations which are the only legislators and only subjects
of international law.").
42.
The classical statement is perhaps found in the Lotus case where the
Permanent Court of Justice observed: "International law governs relations between
independent states." S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18.
43.
ALLOTT, supra note 40, at 419 (noting that states are thus inherently free,
equal and independent sovereignties,
and observing that "International law is
accordingly conceived as an act of sovereignty by which a state chooses to accept limits
on ... its freedom").
44.
Customary law and treaties, the two most important sources of
international law, are meant to be reflective of the consent of states.
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sovereignty, states are equal. 45 No state is any more autonomous (or
sovereign or legitimate) than any other state. 46 Although as an
empirical matter, the idea of equality of states is, to say the least,
erroneous; it is an important normative proposition and a central
feature of international relations.
Central to conventional theories of international relations,
international law, and international institutions is, therefore, the
idea that the autonomous territorial state is the central mode of
political organization. A 1989 statement by the President of Brazil,
Jos6 Sarney, about the Amazon makes clear the strong hold that
territoriality has on the notion of sovereignty and on our
imagination. 47 In a defiant speech about the international
community's concern about the fate of the tropical rain forest of the
Amazon River Valley, the president is said to have declared, "The
Amazon is ours. After all it is in our territory. '48 For the President of
Brazil as well as for most people that think about state sovereignty,
49
territoriality is the defining feature.
In the conventional story, the constitution of "international
society" is viewed as analogous to the constitution of the nation-state
itself.50 In the same way that sovereign and autonomous individuals
within a defined territorial unit are said to come together through a
social contract (such as a constitution and the institutions established
through it) to regulate and define their relationships, so is
international society constituted by autonomous entities called states.
States enter into a contract to regulate their interactions among

45.

ALLOTT, supra note 40, at 418.

46.
In fact, this principle is enshrined in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter. It
reads: "The Organization [the United Nations] is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
47.
THOM KUEHLS, BEYOND SOVEREIGN TERRITORY: THE SPACE OF
ECOPOLITICS ix (1996) (citing Brazil Angrily Unveils Plan for Amazon, WASH. POST,

Apr. 7, 1989, at Al).
48.
Id.
49.
As Chief Justice John Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court put it in a case
decided at the turn of the nineteenth century, "the jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute." Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,
11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
50.
Erik Ringmar observes that modern European man and the modern state
were born at the same time and grew up together. See Erik Ringmar, On the
Ontological Status of the State, 2 EUR. J. INT'L AFF., 439, 439-66 (1996); see generally

Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, The Analogy Between Natural Persons and International
Persons, 26 YALE L.J. 564 (1917). It is very interesting to note that almost the entire
literature on collective identity formation, such as the state, revolves around an
anthropomorphization of human collectivities. And the human being that is being
emulated is very much the Renaissance Man. For the proposition that the Western
concept of the person has shaped international relations and world politics see
generally THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL

Watson eds., 1984).
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themselves.5 1 In the same way that individuals in a nation-state are
seen to be ultimately autonomous and sovereign, so are states in
international relations. 52 In the same way that only the parties to the
social contract, individuals, can be the bearers of rights and
responsibilities in the nation-state, the bearers of rights and
responsibilities on the international plane are the parties to the
contract, sovereign states. 53 Just as the formal equality of the
sovereign individuals (regardless of class, creed, color and gender) is
asserted by liberal theory, so do international relations theories
declare the sovereign equality of states (regardless of size, region, and
wealth).54 In the same way that the liberal theory of individual
sovereignty was originally adopted as a progressive egalitarian
principle, so was state sovereignty adopted as a way to challenge
domination by other states or empires.5 5 The notion of sovereignty is
a central myth to theories of both the nation-state and of interstate
relations, the former takes individual sovereignty as its point of
56
departure and the latter with state sovereignty.
The conventional story that maintains that, as part of the
attribute of sovereignty, states have exclusive jurisdictions within
their territories, has not always been in accord with reality,5 7 in the
same way that the liberal notion of the autonomous individual has

51.
The social contract theory has recently been applied to the constitution of
international society. John Rawls, whose version of the social contract has dominated
political theory in the domestic context for about three decades, has in a recent book
explicitly applied it to the constitution of international society and what he calls the
Law of Peoples (international law). See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES;
WITH 'THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED' (1999). Later in this Article I will
examine Rawls' view more closely.
52.
'Viewed as products of modernity, the sovereign individual and the
sovereign state can be seen as mutually reinforcing constructs ...." Tony Porter,
Postmodern Political Realism and International Relations Theory's Third Debate, in
BEYOND POSITIVISM: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 113
(Claire Jurenne Sjolander & Wayne S. Cox eds., 1994); see generally IVER B.
NEUMANN, USES OF THE OTHER: 'THE EAST' IN EUROPEAN IDENTITY FORMATION
(1999).
53.
See discussion infra Part IV.
54.
Dickinson, supranote 50, at 564.
55.
Id. at 566.
56.
Of course, the analogy between the sovereign state and the autonomous
individual could be extended in the opposite direction. If the fully sovereign state is
analogous to the self-directed, mature, individual, then there must be some states,
quasi-sovereign states, which may be analogized with "individual[s] who [are] not
inner-directed, not yet fully developed as individual[s]." ROXANNE LYNN DOTY,
IMPERIAL ENCOUNTERS: THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION IN NORTH-SOUTH
RELATIONS 150 (1996). I shall not explore that aspect of the analogy here, but suffice it
to point out that aspects of the international process treat many countries from the
third world as not fully sovereign, as not fully grown ups.
57.
See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY (1999); Stephen D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, 20 INT'L
SECURITY 115 (1995).
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been, more often than not, a myth. Technological advance has made
states more interdependent 58 and has thus tended to reduce the
domain of autonomy that states were said to enjoy. Thus, for
example, the economic interdependence that has evolved during the
last few decades and defines the current world has reduced a state's
capacity, even that of a relatively powerful state, to develop
59
autonomously its economic and fiscal policies.
Among developing countries it has been a well-known fact for a
considerable time that their power to devise economic policies is
highly conditioned and limited by what others do (mainly developed
countries and international financial institutions which are by and
large dominated by developed countries). 60 Indeed, that was what led
developing countries to push with varying degrees, of intensity in the
1970s and early 1980s for what they called a new international
economic order (NIEO), an order that was supposed to correct what
developing countries saw as an unfair international economic
arrangement. 6 1 What is different now is that more and more leaders

58.
By using the word "interdependent" I only mean to suggest that states have
become more interconnected. I do not mean to imply, as some that use the word seem
to do, that the constituent parts of international society are mutually dependent,
meaning that all relevant actors rely on some others for support, or rather satisfaction,
of basic needs. What is erroneous about this view is that it tends to ignore the stratified
nature of international relations where the achievement of optimal outcome desired by
some actors requires an infinitely greater appropriate behavior than would be the case
in relation to some other actors' pursuit of desired outcomes. So, by "interdependence" I
do not mean "mutual dependence" but simply "interconnectedness," for it would be, to
put it mildly, erroneous to claim that there is mutual dependence between the United
States and Haiti; France and Senegal; Europe and Africa; or North and South America,
and so on. In each of the above pair of relationships the interactive process is highly
stratified and the wishes and needs of the second of each pair are infinitely more
constrained and conditioned by the first than vice versa. I think Kenneth Waltz was
right when he observed that interdependence as mutual dependence "subtly obscures
the inequalities of national capabilities; pleasingly points to a reciprocal dependence
and strongly suggests that all states are playing the same game." Kenneth Waltz, The
Myth of Interdependence,in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 220 (C. Kindleberger
ed., 1970); see also STRANGE, supra note 21, at xiii (noting that the term
interdependence "hides the truth behind a persuasive euphemism for asymmetric
dependence"). In fact, Strange's observation that the world could best be described as a
relationship of "asymmetrical dependence" was made more powerfully and eloquently
in the 1970s by scholars writing from the periphery of the world system. See generally,
e.g., SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY
OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1974); FERNANDO CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO,
DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1979).
59.
Waltz, supra note 58, at 216.
60.
Id. at 218-19.
61.
See The Declarationon the Establishment of a New InternationalEconomic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, 29 U.N. GAOR, 6th Special
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M.720 (1974).
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of developed countries are also coming to realize that their capacity to
devise economic policies autonomously is very limited.
Even more prominent in this regard is the role of multinationals.
Technological developments have not only allowed multinationals to
establish business networks across traditional boundaries and hence
link various parts of the world in one coherent governance, but they
have also allowed them to evade regulation by the state. Often they
can even transfer data and information without the knowledge of
62
state authorities.
It is not only in the economic but in the security realm as well
where interconnectedness and mutual vulnerabilities define the
current world. As a result of the spectacular advance in technologies
(military and non-military), it is now increasingly the case that the
safety and health of citizens of a state might be affected by what
other states do within their territorial borders. Thus, for example,
what one state does in terms of its environmental policy might
seriously affect other states, and not only bordering states. 63 The

62.
The disjunction between systems of economic and political governance that
are rooted in territoriality and the functioning of the international markets that are
increasingly conducted in cyberspace is going to grow wider. One article illustrates this
with electronic commerce such as the use of ATM cards to pay for merchandise which
allows the transfer of funds from the customer's account to the merchant's and the use
of credit cards to make payments on the Internet. See Stephen J. Korbin, Electronic
Cash and the End of National Markets, 107 FOREIGN POL'Y (Summer 1997), at 65.
Korbin observes: "Digitalization is cutting money and finance loose from its geographic
moorings ....

Territorial sovereignty implies a world ...

where economic and political

control arise from control over territory ....
[Electronic commerce] is constructed in
cyberspace rather than geographic space." Id. at 74-75. For Korbin, one of the problems
this disjunction poses is how to control the money supply, for "[t]he very idea of
controlling the money supply ... assumes that geography provides a relevant means of
defining the scope of the market." Id. at 75. Another problem is determining the source
of taxable income, traditionally defined in terms of the geographic location of the
economic activity that produced the income, when "many important economic
transactions cannot be located, and may not even take place, in geographic space." Id.
For developing countries, it is not only the power of developed countries or that of
the multinational companies that has continually reduced them to less than full
sovereignties, but also the power and action of multilateral economic institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. See Shannon Stimson,
Rethinking the State: Perspectives on the Legibility and Reproduction of Political
Societies, 28 POL. THEORY 822, 827 (2000) ("[Sjtates are now more or less impotent in
the face of the IMF, the World Bank and the regulatory and 'homogenizing' demands of
competitive capitalism.").
63.
This is, for example, the claim in the Nuclear Tests Case. In that case
Australia and New Zealand argued that French nuclear tests conducted in French
colonial possessions in Polynesia damaged their environment within their territory and
hence violated their sovereignty, and, even more, there was nothing they could do
unilaterally to protect themselves from the radioactive fall-out which violated their
sovereignty. The Australian application to the ICJ made the following observation: the
radio-active fall-out "infringed Australian sovereignty and compromised its capacity to
decide for itself what . . . it would permit in the territory under its sovereignty."

20

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37..1

affected states might neither have the capacity nor the authority to
do anything about the source or the effects of those problems
unilaterally. Or, alternatively, a state may be required, contrary to its
desire, to control activities within its borders that may have some
impact on other states, again challenging the traditional sovereign
rights of that state. Both when a state becomes the victim of the
environmental policy of another state and when a state is required to
curtail or abandon activities within its territory on the ground that
those activities will have an impact on other states, the notion of
state sovereignty as outlined in the conventional story is strongly
64
challenged.
Human rights, as I noted earlier, is another area where the
notion of state sovereignty appears severely restricted. Increasingly,
the way a state treats its citizens is becoming the concern of the
international community, even when a state may not have agreed to
cede that authority to an outside entity, be it international or
imperial. This is so for a number of reasons. First, there is a great
deal of human rights law that has developed as part of international
customary law which quite often is viewed as binding on states, even
those states that may not have had a role in the development of the

Nuclear Test (Aust. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 433; see also Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.),
1974 I.C.J. 457, 511 (Dec. 20).
Observing that the activities of nation-states are increasingly having transborder
consequences, Christopher D. Stone gives the following examples: "the recent
awareness that burning fossil fuels in Boston may someday inundate Bangladesh,
[and] that sulfur from Russian nickel plants rains out in Scandinavia." Christopher D.
Stone, Locale and Legitimacy in International Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1279, 1280 (1996) (citing James Broadus et al., Resisting Sea Level and Damming of
Rivers: Possible Effects in Egypt and Bangladesh, in 4 EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
STRATOSPHERE OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE: SEAL LEVEL RISE 165, 171-86 (James
G. Titus & U. S. E.P.A. eds., 1986)); see also Valdmir Kotov & Elena Nikitna, Russia in
Transition: Obstacles to Environmental Protection, ENV'T, Dec. 1993, at 10, 17; Henry
Shue, Eroding Sovereignty: The Advance of Principle, in THE MORALITY OF
NATIONALISM 69 (Robert McKim & Jeff Mcmahan eds., 1997).
[Tihere ought to be external limits on the means by which domestic economic
ends may be pursued by states, limits that ought to become binding on
individual sovereigns irrespective of whether those sovereigns wish to
acknowledge them, just as sovereigns are already bound by both legal rights
and moral rights against the domestic use of torture whatever their own
opinions on the subject of torture may be-the sovereigns own opinion about
torture is of no consequence legally or morally. The same should be true of
some particular means of pursuing economic ends.
Id.
64.
"What is needed is recognition of the reality that in many fields, especially
environmental issues, it is simply not feasible for sovereignty to be exercised
unilaterally by the individual nation-states ..
" Maurice F. Strong, ECO '92: Critical
Challenges and Global Solutions, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 287, 298 (1991); see also Geoffrey
Palmer, New Ways to Make InternationalEnvironmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,
259 (1992) (noting that the world simply lacks "institutional and legal mechanisms to
deal effectively with transboundary and biospheric environmental degradation").
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norm or who may have even expressed reservations about it. This is
done either by denominating the norm as jus cogens or by disallowing
any significance to the state's continuous and consistent violation of
the norm.65 Second, even if the norm is part of a treaty to which the
state is signatory, the interpretation of the norm upon which the
intervention and criticism are based might be expansive. A state
might be expected to comply with a norm that it did not believe to be
implied by the agreement that it signed. 66 Third, and perhaps more
importantly, the increasing willingness of states, regional groupings,
and the international community to intervene militarily in other
states in the defense of human rights in those states (referred to as
humanitarian intervention) has posed the most profound challenge to
the notion of state sovereignty. 67 Military intervention is perhaps the
most visible challenge to the idea of territorial sovereignty.
To summarize, developments in the last few decades have
started to destabilize the conventional, or, as David Held called it, the

65.
See, e.g., 1993 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Cuba, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/39,
83 (1993). Even though Cuba had not ratified the ICCPR and
ICESCR, the Special Rapporteur who was appointed to report on allegation of a wide
range of violations of civil and political rights in the country concluded that Cuba was
in violation of international human rights norms. He reached that conclusion by
reviewing the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
he concluded had been "universally recognized and now represent[ed] a minimum
standard, regardless of the social or ideological situation prevailing in a given country."
Id. Interestingly, not only did the report apply the Declaration as customary
international law, but it also reviewed the relevant provisions of the Cuban
Constitution! How more intrusive can an international organ get than to require a
country to live up to the norms enunciated in its constitution. A glance through the
report indicates that what the Special Rapporteur was asking Cuba to do was to
basically to restructure its political and social system.
66.
Perhaps a good example is the privacy provision in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 17 provides: "No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy .... " International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The
article has been read (interpreted) by the ICCPR Committee as including a prohibition
against the state from criminalizing (or otherwise burdening) consensual homosexual
relationships. Id.; see Toonan v. Austl., U.N. Human Rights Comm. No. 488, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No 40, at 226, 235, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994). A similar
privacy provision in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) has been read by the European Court of Human
Rights to include the rights of homosexuals to have and develop consensual
relationships without interference from the government. See Norris v. Ireland, 142
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). Irish buggery and gross indecency laws applied to adult
private consensual activities violated Art. 8(s) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222;
Lustig-Prean and Becket v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548 (1999).
67.
The United Nations intervention in Somalia, Haiti, and NATO's
intervention in Kosovo (or more correctly, NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia) are
examples of military interventions on behalf of human rights.
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classical notion of state sovereignty. 68 The idea that states have
ultimate and total authority over their economic and fiscal policies,
over what rights and duties their citizens are to have, over how
secure and healthy their citizens will be is, given the nature of the
current international economic and human rights systems and the
transnational nature of current environmental and security concerns,
rather disconnected from the reality.
B. Globalization:The Role of the CommunicationRevolution
The communication revolution has facilitated the economic,
social, and cultural globalization that I claim has challenged or, to
use a term employed by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,
"redefined" the traditional notion of state sovereignty.6 9 Take the
human rights area for example. First, as a general matter, states can
no longer violate the rights of their citizens without the rest of the
world being aware of those violations. Whether it is individual and
group communications through the Internet or the media's use of
satellite communications to gather and tell stories about the
conditions of citizens of this or that country, a state's human rights
violations will, more often than not, be exposed instantaneously to
the outside world. I think Henry Kissinger was correct when he
observed: "the brutality of the repression at Tiananmen Square
witnessed on television by the entire world stigmatized China as a
''70
repressive regime.
Second, not only is the communication revolution making it
increasingly easier to find out how a state is treating its citizens, but
is also increasing the odds that other states and international
organizations will respond to such violations. Such interventions
may, as I indicated earlier, include military intervention, the
ultimate challenge to territorial sovereignty. 71 When citizens of other
nations see on their television screens pictures of brutality, with
great visual impact, they are more likely to put pressure on their
governments and the international community generally to respond
to such violations. 72 Put simply, the communication revolution is

68.
See David Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples, 8 LEGAL THEORY 1, 2-3
(2002); see generally DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE
MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995).
69.
"[S]tate sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined ... by the
forces of globalisation and international co-operation." Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of
Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49.
70.
HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A
DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 144 (2001).
71.
See Nude Dancers Don Union Label, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1996, available
at 1996 WL 10729094.
72.
KISSINGER, supra note 70, at 144 (coinciding with a period of increased
emphasis on human rights).
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making it easier to detect human rights violations and to mobilize
sanctions.
It is not only in relation to the human rights system but also in
relation to other globalizing phenomena that I noted earlier, such as
the international economic system, that the communication
revolution has played an important role. 73 Part of the story of
economic globalization is the story of multinational companies being
able to move a great deal of information from one part of the world to
another quickly and efficiently. The ability of a multinational
company to function efficiently on a global scale would require it to
have the capacity to move data between the parent company and its
subsidiaries located in other countries with speed and with little
constraint. Economic globalization, just like globalization in the
human rights area, requires, and is facilitated by, the easy and rapid
movement of information across national boundaries. In many
instances the movement of such data across national boundaries is
accomplished without the knowledge of the government of the
74
particular state from which the data are transferred.
As it is clear from the observation in the last two paragraphs, the
communication revolution has facilitated globalization in the various
fields of human endeavor and consequently has challenged the
conventional notion of territorial sovereignty. But the challenge has
also been more profoundly and directly presented by the
communication revolution than the indirect effects that I outlined in
the preceding paragraphs. The ease with which information can now
be moved across national boundaries has seriously and directly
challenged the claim of the nation-state that it is the final authority
on matters that concern activities and people within its own
territorial borders. This aspect of the information superhighway is
what I shall explore in the next section.

III. NATIONAL BORDERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE
A. Introduction
Imagine the following: A small democratic country, call it
Puritania, has, after long deliberation, determined that alcohol and
cigarettes are harmful to the health of its citizens who consume them.
It has also concluded that the consumption of alcohol and cigarettes is
harmful to the larger economy since the public will end up paying the

73.
See id.
74.
Frank Bajak, As Police Turn up the Heat, Neo-Nazis Build an Electronic
Shield, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 26, 1995, availableat 1995 WL 4394533.
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expenses of those who will have suffered serious illness (or who would
have injured others) as a result of consuming the items. Assume also
that the state has determined that banning the advertising of alcohol
and cigarettes on electronic media will curtail the consumption of
those items and has thus adopted a law prohibiting such advertising.
Let us further assume that there is a large neighboring country, call
it Laxenberg, which does not have such a law. In Laxenberg people
are allowed to advertise on electronic media without any restrictions.
Many citizens of Puritania can and do receive much of Laxenberg's
television with all the advertisement that is prohibited by Puritania
law, all they need are small dishes on which to receive the television
signals.
Take another case, this time involving a real country and real
law. Canada has a law that makes it illegal to circulate racially
offensive literature, 75 unlike the United States where the First
Amendment is read by the courts to make impermissible such a
prohibition. 76 Assume that there is a computer bulletin board
operated on the Net by one of the white supremacist groups in the
United States that spread racial hatred and advocate the
extermination of certain groups. Those Canadians who wish to have
77
access to this sort of material will have no problem doing so.
In both cases, what becomes clear is that an important aspect of
state sovereignty is seriously challenged. If a state cannot enforce its
laws within its territorial borders, or if a state cannot protect the
moral and physical health of its citizens, as it has deemed them
necessary, then clearly the conventional story of state sovereignty is
destabilized. The state does not have "undivided and untrammeled
power to make and enforce the law"78s as classical sovereignty

75.
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319(2) (1985) (Can.); see R. v. Keegstra
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) [hereinafter Canada's Criminal Law]. Many other countries
have similar laws. For example, in Germany several provisions of the criminal code are
directed at expressions that are inconsistent with the "dignity of the human
personality developing freely within the social community," a right that has its basis in
Article 1 of the German Constitution. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 370 (1989). Section 130 of

the Criminal Code prohibits expressive attacks that incite hatred and Section 131
proscribes the production and dissemination of hate speech. Id.
76.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
77.
Similar things are apparently taking place in relation to German antiSemitic groups. Because German law prohibits the importation and distribution of
Nazi propaganda and the denial of the Holocaust, many anti-Semitic groups are
turning to Internet bulletin boards to have access to the sort of information to which it
is illegal to have access in Germany. See §§ 86, 86a, 103(3), 220a(1) Nr.1 StGB
(German Penal Code); see also Bajak, supra note 74. Indeed, "[t]he number of home
pages operated by German right-wing extremists-usually posted anonymously on
U.S.-based Internet servers to escape the reach of German law-soared to about 200 in
1998." Paul Gertner, Germans Fight Neo-Nazis in Roosting in Cyberspace, TIMESPICAYUNE, Sept. 17, 2000, at A-31.
78.
Held, supra note 68, at 3.
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suggests. The issue here is not whether the particular laws are good
or desirable, but whether a nation that cannot enforce its laws, a
nation whose laws can be overridden by the laws of other countries,
79
can properly be regarded as a sovereign nation.
The
above
two
examples-satellite
and
Internet
communications-pose, perhaps in the starkest of ways, the issue of
how the communication revolution is challenging the concept of
territorial sovereignty. But the challenge that is posed to territorial
sovereignty by the communication revolution is more comprehensive
and more ubiquitous. It is also not a sudden or a recent occurrence.
This last point needs to be emphasized. There is a tendency now
among those working in the area of communication to view
cyberspace and the challenges it poses to territorial sovereignty as so
unique that they require a special legal regime, an almost
autonomous and self-regulating legal landscape.80 For the purposes of
developing sensible policies in the communications area-by which I
mean policies that are coherent and effective-I think it may be very
helpful to see cyberspace as part of the general communications
revolution, which it is, rather than as a unique phenomenon
requiring special response. 8 ' As I noted earlier, if the experience of
First Amendment jurisprudence in U.S. courts is any guide, the
consequence of viewing every new development as unique will lead to

79.
As I shall show later, the state, even under these circumstances, is not
without the means to respond to those challenges. But those responses are likely to be
either ineffective or too costly.
80.
See, e.g., David Johnson & David Post, And How Shall the Net be
Governed? A Meditation on the Relative Virtue of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in
COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62, 68 (Brian Kahn & James Keller eds., 1997); David
Johnson & David Post, Symposium: Surveying Law and Borders: Law and BordersThe Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-79 (1996); David Johnson
& David Post, The New 'Civic Virtue' of the Internet, at http://www.cli.org/paper4.htm
(last visited Dec. 26, 2003); David G. Post, Of Black Holes and Decentralized LawMaking in Cyber Space, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70 (2000); David G. Post, The
"Unsettled Paradox'"The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the Governed, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521 (1998); see also RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL FOR
ILLEGAL AND HARMFUL CONTENTS IN THE INTERNET (1999) (The Bertelsmann
Foundation Report). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering,97 NW. U. L.
REV. 319 (2002), for the variety of forms that private ordering could take.
81.
A well-known member of the U.S. federal judiciary has argued on a number
of occasions that many activities and transactions that occur on the Internet are not
much different from similar activities and transactions that take place in the physical
world. Given that, the judge has argued, the same legal regimes should regulate the
transactions or activities in the two worlds. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (arguing that contracts on the Internet are
like any other contract and that there should not be a special regime that applies to
those concluded on the Internet). Judge Easterbrook has also challenged in other fora
the general notion that the Internet is unique and that special legal regimes should be
applied to it. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208 (1996).
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incoherent and indefensible legal regimes. 82 Writing over a decade
ago about the problem of the trifurcated system of legal regimes-for
print, broadcast, and cable-one author observed, quite correctly in
my view, that as a result of the convergence of the media it was
"cracking very badly." 83
In the rest of this section I shall explore the direct impact that
each medium of mass communication has had on the idea of
territorial sovereignty so as to prepare the ground for the policy
choices that I shall suggest and for the notion of state sovereignty
that those policy choices imply.
B. PrintMedia and the Imagining of the State
Let us start with the first form of mass communication: print
media. Although print media diffused information more widely and
hence made likely internal challenges to the authority of the
sovereign, it did not pose a serious challenge to the notion of
territorial sovereignty. True, the emergence of print media increased
the capacity, and probability, of organized challenge within the
territory to the rulers in the name of a more legitimate and
enlightened leadership. The capacity to communicate with more
people in a short period of time significantly increased people's ability
to organize and sustain opposition to the rulers. But the emergence of
print did not significantly increase the vulnerability of the rulers
from external sources or challenges. If the sovereign state did not
wish its citizens to receive a printed item from the outside world, it
simply prohibited the importation of that item. Thus, for example, if
Saudi Arabia believed that sexually explicit material, such as that
carried by Playboy or Hustler, is morally corrosive to its citizens or
inconsistent with the teachings of Islam, it can simply ban the
importation and circulation of such material. 84 The capacity of print
media to evade the state's regulatory power is often very limited.
True, there are material and civic expenses associated with
enforcing such a ban. And there is a possibility that some of those
items might slip through the censorship process. But on the whole a
state determined to censor printed items at its territorial borders is
likely to do it reasonably effectively. Printed mass communication did

82.
See S. Nadel, Electrifying the First Amendment, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 531,
531-32 (1984).
83.
See id.
84.
Such power of the sovereign is apparently affirmed in international
documents. Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that in agreeing to be parties to the Covenant sovereign states have retained
the power to restrict free flow of information "[flor the protection of national security or
of public order (orderpublic), or of public health and morals." ICCPR, supra note 66,
art. 19(3); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 77, art. 29, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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not, therefore, pose a serious challenge to the idea of territorial
(external) sovereignty, though it might have had an impact on the
notion of internal sovereignty.
In fact, in many ways print media served to consolidate the
personality and identity of the territorial state. It became a means
through which the idea of the state was imagined and consolidated.
While rulers found it easy to exclude or suppress undesirable printed
information, they also found it easy to utilize (and did utilize) the
media to shape and cultivate a certain identity for the territorial
state.8 5 This was one of the important means through which diverse
constituents were shaped to form a state or a nation. Benedict
Anderson emphasizes the role of print media in the formation of
nations, what he calls "imagined communities. ''8 6 The printing press
allowed millions of people to wake up in the morning and to read
about the same events and in the process to tie themselves into an
imagined community, though very few of them actually knew each
other. This is especially the case with developing countries. Print
media, which were invariably owned or controlled by the state, served
the purpose of forging a national identity from the disparate entities
that the colonial authorities had put together to rule as their colonial
87
possessions.
The emergence of print media was, then, congenial to the
territorial state in two senses. It provided the rulers with a powerful
means through which to cultivate a sense of nationhood and
territorial integrity while not denying those rulers the power to
restrict the importation of information that they believed to be
inconsistent with the interest of the nation-state. Indeed, the two
purposes seem to assume one another. To shape disparate linguistic
and ethnic entities into one nation required that the medium by
which such shaping is done be strictly controlled. And the power to
control information in printed form did not pose much challenge to
nation-states, including those in the developing world.

85.
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 37-46 (rev. ed. 1991).

86.
Id. at 46 ("[T]he convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal
diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined
community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation"). For
his description of the nation as an "imagined community," see id. at 5-7. "I propose the
following definition of the nation," he says, "it is an imagined political community-and
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." Id. at 5-6.
87.
Eli Noam has observed that "the single and unified nation-state, the main
unit of government around the globe, was matched and served by its national monopoly
communication network, usually owned and operated by the state as a public service,
like the road system." Eli M. Noam, Beyond Territoriality:Economic and Political in
Telesociety, Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, Working Paper No. 690 2 (1992),
cited in MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY 8 (1995).
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C. InternationalRadio Communications: The Challenge to Territorial
Sovereignty From Incoming Information
The emergence of electronic communication, especially that of
radiotransmission, however, posed a more serious challenge to the
notion of the territorial state and to the conventional idea of
sovereignty. This was especially so in relation to the state in
developing countries.
To be sure, most radio broadcasting did not pose problems for, or
challenges to, other countries. FM and AM signals cannot realistically
be used for other than regional and national broadcasting. They
cannot carry very far. Of course, there could be, in some
circumstances, a spillover to border regions of other countries. Radio
signals are in that sense oblivious to geographical constraints.
However, those are often unintended and cover very limited border
regions with rather (comparatively) minimal impact. The major
problem arises in relation to high frequency (HF) shortwave
transmission, the purpose of which is often to reach audiences in
other countries and which can, with a strong enough transmitter,
travel far and cover a wide area, threatening what a state may
perceive to be its national security and cultural integrity as well as its
88
jurisdictional and administrative authority.
A territorial state is not entirely without the means to respond to
unwanted radio communication from external sources. It can jam the
radio communication, as, in fact, do some states.8 9 Jamming is a
technique that involves the transmission of radio signals on the same
frequency as the contested broadcast so as to render the signals
unintelligible. 90 There are two types of jamming: skywave and
groundwave. 91 In the case of the former what the jamming party does
is use powerful transmitters which are placed equidistant from the
targeted audience and the broadcaster. The jammer can then radiate

88.
Id.
89.
There are other methods a state could employ to discourage the
transmission of unwanted communication, but they all tended to be even more
impractical than jamming. A state, for example, could forbid its citizens listening to
certain broadcasts. Communist Albania did that. But this clearly will be difficult to
enforce in most circumstances, unless the government has a way of controlling the
nature of the receiving sets used by the population, which I think will be impossible.
Nazi Germany tried to do that by manufacturing "cheap receiving sets that [were]
permanently set to fixed frequencies" which were "much cheaper to buy than rival
models that could be turned to a wider variety of stations." James G. Savage & Mark

W. Zacher, Free Flow Versus Prior Consent: The Jurisdictional Battle Over
InternationalTelecommunication, 42 INT'L J. 342, 345-46 (1987).

90.

See Adeno Addis, InternationalPropagandaand Developing Countries, 21

VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 491, 520-27 (1988), for an extended discussion of jamming as
a method of response to unwanted radio transmission. The observations on jamming in
the text track the discussion in that article.
91.
Id.
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signals into the ionosphere, which will reflect the signals across the
path of the broadcast. 92 Skywave jamming is effective in shielding a
large area from the broadcast signals. However, the method is
ineffective if there are changes in the ionosphere, such as the sun
setting in the area to which the signals are directed while still
shining in the area where the broadcasting originates.
Groundwave jamming uses transmitters that are less powerful
than those used in skywave jamming. 93 The transmitters are placed
near the intended audience and the jamming signals are radiated
directly at the audience. 94 The intent of this form of jamming is
primarily to block signals to large urban areas since the jamming
signal can cover a twenty-mile area. 95 The jamming signal can be
anything from an irritating "noise," to music, to a distorted voice
96
transmitted at the same frequency as the offending broadcast.
Since it started to be utilized in the 1930s as a method of
response to unwanted radio communication emanating from outside
the borders of a nation-state, jamming's popularity has risen and
fallen. 9 7 The two periods during which it was regularly used were
98
World War II, when it was employed by both sides of the conflict,
and the long Cold War period, when the Soviet Union and its East

92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
The earliest major attempt to jam international radio broadcast was in
1931 when a number of countries tried to block broadcasts from the Vatican. But by the
end of the 1930s, and certainly once WWII broke out, jamming was prevalent
throughout Europe. Julian Hale, Radio Power 128, 136 (1975); see also DAYA KISHAN
THUSSU, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 26-31 (2001).
98.
"The Second World War saw an explosion in international broadcasting as
a propaganda tool on both sides." Thussu, supra note 97, at 27. The emergence of the
Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy had already led to the conception of radio
as a means of propaganda.
By the time the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, radio broadcasting
had become an extension of international diplomacy. The head of Hitler's
Propaganda Ministry, Joseph Goebbels, believed in the power of radio
broadcasting as a tool of propaganda. 'Real broadcasting is true propaganda.
Propaganda means fighting on all battlefields of the spirit, generating,
multiplying, destroying, exterminating, building and undoing. Our propaganda
is determined by what we call German race, blood and nation.
Id. at 27.
In Fascist Italy Under Benito Mussolini, a Ministry of Print and Propaganda
was created to promote Fascist ideals and win public opinion for colonial
campaigns such as the invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, and support for
Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39).
Id. at 27-28.

30

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37-.1

European allies jammed radio broadcasts from the West. 99 During the
Cold War the Soviet Bloc regularly jammed, or at least attempted to
jam, broadcasts by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the
Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe,1 00
broadcasts that were viewed as being hostile to the socialist system
and socialist countries. Currently, very few countries resort to
jamming as a means of insulating their citizens from unwanted
communication. 10 1 This is partly because of the availability of
alternative media such as satellite broadcasting and the Internet that
would enable the communicator to send his messages even if his radio
broadcast were to be jammed. Indeed, as I shall indicate later, the
communicator may, as some do, make the broadcast itself available
on the Internet, hence making the traditional technique of jamming
unavailable. Of course, given the unavailability of Internet
connections to much of the world, especially parts of the developing
world, the availability of radio broadcast on the web is not going to be
a viable alternative for many people in the event that the government
of the receiving nation desired and were able to jam the broadcast
itself.
The legality of jamming under international law is a
controversial and unsettled issue. Those who contend that it is
proscribed under existing international law invoke the freedom of
expression articles of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 2 as
well as Article 35 of the International Telecommunication Convention
0 3
and a number of other international documents and statements.

99.
Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of
Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 628-29 (1997).
100.
Although the United States has consistently and publicly denounced the
jamming of its radio broadcasts, such as ones from Radio Free Europe and Radio Marti,
it actually "developed the world's most sophisticated jamming equipment for combat
and psychological warfare use. This technology was used with great success in the 1991
Persian Gulf war and the 1994 Haiti operation." Id. at 628.
101.
Cuba does manage to jam Radio Marti that broadcasts from the United
States. See Omar Javier Arcia, War over the Airwaves: A ComparativeAnalysis of U.S.
and Cuban Views on International Law and Policy Governing Transnational
Broadcasts,5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 199, 201-05 (1996).
102.
See ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19; see also UDHR, supra note 84, art. 19.
103.
Article 35 of the International Telecommunication Convention (ITC)
prohibits emissions intended to jam, or in any way unlawfully interfere with,
authorized frequency which has met and continues to meet ITC's technical standard.
International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 35, 28 U.S.T. 2495.
The International Telecommunication (ITU) Radio Regulations provide for similar
proscriptions. For example, Article 15.1 which prohibits all stations form engaging in
"unnecessary transmissions," the transmissions of superfluous signals and
correspondence, and "the transmission of signals without identification .... " Geneva
Radio Regulations, Dec. 6, 1979, art. 15.1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 21; see also Report
Economic Social Council, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/209
(1948); G.A. Res. 424(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess, Supp. No. 20, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/1755
(1950).
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Those who argue that the practice is legal under international law
rely on two alternative but complementary arguments. One view
holds that jamming of unwanted information is permitted simply as
an aspect of the sovereign's right to have full control of its
territory. 0 4 In his widely cited treatise on international law,
Oppenheim advanced this particular view. 10 5 Under this view the
right to exclude is an unqualified right and inheres in the principle of
territorial sovereignty.1 0 6 An alternative theory holds that jamming
may be legally sanctioned as a legitimate means of self-defense when
a nation is targeted with hostile propaganda.' 0 7 Those who hold the
latter view argue that though it may not be legal in all circumstances,
the jamming of information that threatens and seriously impinges
upon a nation's capacity to run its affairs and set its priorities is a
legitimate exercise of self-defense.10 8 Indeed, if the radio broadcast is

104.
See, e.g., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 (Hersh Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955).
105.
Id.
106. The principle of exclusive sovereignty in the air space for the subjacent
State, which has received general approval . . . enables that State to
prohibit the disturbance of the air space over its territory by means of
Herzian waves caused for the purpose of wireless communication and
emanating from a foreign source.
Id. The strong deference to state sovereignty is textually provided for in Article 2 of the
U.N. Charter. Article 2(1) provides that "the principle of the sovereign equality of
states" is to guide the United Nations and Member States. Under Article 2(4) all
Member States are to refrain from undermining the "political independence" of other
Member States. And Article 2(7) of the United Nations itself is proscribed, except when
the Security Council is invoking its Chapter VII authority, from interfering in the
internal affairs of other states. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
1, 4, 7.
107.
Perhaps the most prominent defender of this position is Derrick Bowett
who argued that
Where the delict involves the broadcasting of propaganda the state may have
recourse to 'jamming', which may be illegal prima facie but justifiable as selfdefence. Thus, the decision of the British government to 'jam' the broadcast
from Athens Radio in January, 1956, was justifiable as a measure of selfdefence against delictual conduct by Greece ....
DERRICK BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (1958); see also IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 435 (1963)
("States need not submit to subversion ... but may take all possible counter-measures
on their territory and commit acts of lawful reprisal.. .Thus jamming of propaganda
broadcasts would be lawful reprisal"). The Polish delegate at the 1950 meeting of the
Sub-Commission on Freedom of Communication expressed a similar view in his
defense of jamming: "each country had... the sovereign right to defend itself against
this form of aggression [i.e. propaganda], just as it had the right to prevent opium
smuggling, the sale of pornographic literature or the traffic in persons." DONALD R.
BROWNE, INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING: LIMITS OF THE LIMITLESS
MEDIUM 23-24 (1982).
108.
A very interesting, and rather amusing, rationale for jamming was offered
in 1948 by the then minister of foreign affairs of the then Soviet Union, Andrei
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denominated as war propaganda, it is clearly outlawed under Article
20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.10 9
Whether jamming is legal or not is, however, not my primary
concern here. Nor am I concerned with the issue of what kinds of
information, if any, should reasonably be excluded through the
process of jamming. I have explored elsewhere both the legal and
normative issues relating to jamming.1 10 Rather, my purpose here is
to indicate that though external radio broadcast posed a much more
significant challenge than printed mass communication to the notion
of territorial sovereignty, the sovereign was not totally without power
to deal with that threat. It could utilize jamming as the functional
equivalent of stopping undesirable printed messages at the border.
However, on closer examination it becomes clear that the power
of the territorial state to stop unwanted communication is far less
effective here than it is when the means of communication is printed
material. For most nations, especially many developing countries, the
process is simply beyond their financial and technological capacity.'1 1
Most countries cannot even reach a third of their citizens much less
be able to jam powerful transmitters used by radio stations from
other, powerful, countries.11 2 Uganda may be able to stop Playboy at
its borders, but is unlikely to possess either the technological or
financial capacity to jam a broadcast from the BBC or VOA that it
may consider as inimical to its security and sovereignty. Put simply,
the emergence of transnational radio communication put more
pressure on the idea of territorial sovereignty. It made the territorial
state more vulnerable. The claim that the sovereign had full control
over its territory and the power to legislate, adjudicate and enforce as
the final authority on all matters that arise within its territorial
boundary, an authority that cannot be questioned or overridden by an

Vyshinsky. Speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations and admitting
for the first time that the Soviet Union indeed resorted to jamming of certain radio
broadcasts went on to defend the practice this way: "the Russian people had to be
prevented in the name of world peace from rising up in wrath to attack the United
States as they assuredly would if they were to hear the American broadcasts." Ranjan
Borra, The Problem of Jamming InternationalBroadcasting, J. BROAD., Fall 1967, at
358.
109.
"Any Propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law." ICCPR, supra note
66, art. 20(1).
110.
See Addis, supra note 90, at 520-27.
111. When Poland ceased direct jamming in 1956, the government admitted
that its limited jamming efforts had cost it US $17.5 million a year, a
figure then equal to the annual budget of the worldwide operations of the
Voice of America (VOA) . . . [A] former official of the United States
Information Agency has observed that it costs five times as much to jam a
given programme as it does to transmit it.
Savage & Zacher, supra note 89, at 346-47.
112.
Id.
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external authority, was now being more effectively challenged. The
state was incapable, whether for financial or technological reasons,
effectively to deal with that challenge. That being the case, one can
safely say that transborder (shortwave) radio broadcast heightened
the vulnerability of the conventional story of sovereignty.
D. Satellite Broadcasting:The Challenge to TerritorialSovereignty
From Incoming Information
What transnational radio communication effectively removed as
a practical possibility, other and newer forms of electronic
communication are threatening to remove even as a theoretical
matter. Take, for example, satellite broadcasting, especially direct
broadcast satellite (DBS) communication.11 3 It is now possible for a
broadcaster to relay signals across a national border. Intended
recipients of the signals need only have small dishes to receive those
signals.1 1 4 To take our example at the beginning of this section,
Puritania's citizens would be able to receive Laxenberg's television
signals with all the advertisements that were supposed to be illegal
under Puritanian law. There is probably very little that Puritania
could do about it unilaterally. Of course, in the same way that a
country could theoretically prohibit the manufacturing or importation
of radio sets so as to make sure that citizens do not receive radio
broadcasts from outside the country, so could Puritania forbid all
home reception by banning the manufacturing or importation of home
reception dishes. But that would be too costly for the state. First, the
cost of enforcing that prohibition might be very high, especially if the
country is large in territory and the population is distributed over the
entire territory. Even if it were possible for the government to enforce
the prohibition, it would be at enormously high cost to civil liberty
and the idea of a civil society. To do it effectively, the state would
have to turn itself into a police state. Second, DBS has been (and will
continue to be) important for countries with large territories and
scattered population settlement patterns to communicate with their
own citizens about things like health, education, literacy, and

Three kinds of satellite broadcasting are often identified by those that are
113.
familiar with the technology. The first is what is referred to as "point-to-point"
broadcasting which involves a situation where an earth station transmits a message to
a satellite and the satellite in turn transmits the message to a single ground station.
The second is referred to as "distribution-type broadcasting" which involves community
receivers. The third is direct broadcasting satellite (DBS) where the television signal is
directly received by individual television sets from the satellite without the mediating
function of a ground station. See CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 606 (1982).

114.

Id.
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security. 115 Without the availability of DBS those governments are
likely to be unable to communicate with large segments of their
populations. That might be a cost many governments will be (and
should be) unwilling to bear.
The type of broadcast transmitted by satellites across national
boundaries could cover a wide range of issues with varying degrees of
seriousness in terms of the challenge they pose to the conventional
notion of sovereignty. Thus, for example, we could imagine a satellite
broadcast from one big nation that is beamed regularly to the citizens
of another small nation for the purpose of getting citizens of the small
nation to overthrow the regime.1 1 6 Or, we could imagine an ethnic
community that has been divided among many nation-states, such as
the Kurdish minority, using satellite communication to cultivate its
national identity, to create a sort of diasporic community. 117 Such a
community, of course, challenges the claim of the nation-state to be
the highest point of political obligation and authority.

115.
An Ethiopian-American is, for example, using satellite communications to
broadcast educational programs everyday of the week in rural parts of various regions
of Africa. The recipients of the broadcast, apparently, only need to strap "the small
WorldSpace [the broadcasting company] antenna to the roof a car" to receive the
broadcast. See Associated Press, Ethiopian-American Radio to Spread Information,
available at http://www.hindustantimes.com.news/181_209891,001100050003.htm. In
countries such as Ethiopia, where most of the population lives in rural areas and where
educational opportunities and communication infrastructure are minimal, such
communication apparatus as that of WorldSpace will clearly and increasingly play an
important role in the process of modernization. On the other hand, such technology
also clearly poses a challenge to the capacity of governmental authorities to regulate.
116.
This, of course, is the situation in relation to TV Marti which broadcasts
from the United States to the citizens of Cuba. See Television Broadcasting to Cuba
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-246, 104 Stat. 15 1990 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 1465); see also J. H. Castro Villalobos, The DBS Declarationof 1982: The TV Marti
Case, in PROC. 37th COLLOQUY L. OUTER SPACE 6 (1994).
117.
The Kurds established MED-TV, their own satellite television, that has
enabled them to broadcast to Kurds "living in Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq
and Syria and those of Kurdish diaspora in Europe." See THUSSU, supra note 97, at
201. Operating from London MED-TV "took its name from Medes, the ancient people
from whom the Kurds are descended." Id.; see also E. Ryan, Television Nation, Wired,
Mar. 1997, at 42-48, 88-93.
William Connolly makes the general point about the emergence of transborder
communities as a result of the new communication technologies.
[Tihe speed and global scope of communication make it difficult to avoid the
question of indigenous peoples in 'settler societies.' Vigorous movements by
indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
are magnified by the ability of these constituencies to combine their efforts
through Internet connections and international conferences and to reach
audiences and agencies stretching beyond the states in which they are
contained.
William E. Connolly, Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism, 28 POL.
THEORY 596, 610 (2000).
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As this last example shows, it is not only in terms of neighboring
states that DBS can be effectively used to undermine territorial
sovereignty. Indeed, DBS can be used to beam signals from one end of
the globe to another. For example, a DBS over the Pacific Ocean could
transmit signals from the West Coast of the United States to the
home television sets of the citizens of Indonesia. In fact, if one has
three of those satellites in what is referred to as the geostationary
orbit one could cover the entire globe with the signals coming from
the station on the West Coast of the United States. 118 Given the huge
areas of DBS service and the prohibitive cost of the necessary
technology, jamming is unlikely to be even remotely possible.
It is not only the prohibitive cost of jamming that makes DBS
more effective than radio in terms of its challenge to territorial
sovereignty, but also the fact that television broadcasting is not
limited as much by linguistic frontiers as is radio broadcasting. Even
when the language of the broadcast is different from the language of
the audience, viewers may still watch the broadcast. And in many
cases they will be able to follow the plot or the story even without any
knowledge of the language in which the message is transmitted. The
pictures and gestures of the event or plot are often sufficient to
convey the message. This applies to the broadcast of news events as it
does to the broadcast of cultural shows such as those exported by the
United States-soap operas such as Dallas and Dynasty, or sitcoms
such as Cosby and Friends,119 or other entertainment programs such
120
as Star Trek, Baywatch, ER, and The XFiles.

118.
The geostationary orbit (GSO) is a circular orbit that is about 36,000
kilometers (22,300 miles) above the earth and is located directly above the equator. If a
satellite is placed in this orbit that satellite will take exactly one day (23 hours 56
seconds) to go around the Earth. This means that the satellite is synchronous with the
Earth's rotation-the satellite revolves at the same rate at which the earth revolvestherefore appearing to be stationary (geostationary). Such a satellite will be able to
cover about 40 percent of the Earth's surface at a given moment of time. So, if one
desired to cover the entire globe one would only need to place three satellites in the
GSO. See ITU, Radio Regulations, art. 1, ITU Doc. No. ISBN 92-61-01221-3 (1982).
The GSO, like the radio frequency spectrum, is regarded as a limited natural
resource. The estimates are that the orbit can perhaps accommodate about 1800
satellites without the risk of collision between satellites. The number is arrived at with
the assumption that it would be reasonably safe to position the satellites spaced out at
0.2 degree apart. See Efficient Use of the Geostationary Orbit, Jan. 16, 1981, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.101/BP/7 12 (1981). As of 1998 the number of geostationary satellites is said
to be 192 and 67 on order. See THUSSU, supra note 97, at 100.
Of course, communication satellites can be put on orbits other than on the GSO,
but under those circumstances one would need to have more than three satellites to
cover the Earth and one would need to continually adjust those satellites. The lower
the orbit the more satellites one would need to cover the same area size.
119.
It is remarkable how many Ethiopians, who have just come for a visit to
this country and who do not speak or read English, I have met and talked to that tell
me how they regularly watch U.S. and British programs (films, sports, sitcoms, etc.)
and have no difficulty following the stories or plots in those shows. A newspaper article
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To summarize, satellite broadcasting has more effectively
challenged state sovereignty than did transborder radio broadcasting.
This is so for three reasons. First, satellite broadcasting reaches
wider areas than shortwave radio broadcasts. Second, the financial
and technological cost of stopping such broadcasts is prohibitive for
almost any nation, but especially for developing countries. Third,
unlike radio broadcasts, for satellite broadcasting to be effective the
language of the broadcast does not necessarily have to be understood
by the population to which the broadcast is beamed. The picture often
carries its own message, whether the picture accompanies a news
item or whether it is part of an entertainment program. The linguistic
handicap that may accompany radio broadcasting is less salient here.
E. Remote Sensing: Challenges from Outgoing Information
The impact that satellites have on national sovereignty has
another dimension. This is a dimension that is not fully explored in
the literature. In the last section I explained how satellites could be
utilized to undermine the authority of a nation-state by broadcasting
television programs into the territory. But satellites could also be
used to gather from, and take information out of, the territory
without the knowledge and consent of the authorities of that country.
Territorial sovereignty can be undermined by outflow of information
as it can be by inflow of information. Indeed, in many ways the
outflow of information without the knowledge of the legitimate
authorities of that country is perhaps the gravest threat to that
nation's sovereignty.
The process by which information is gathered by satellites on or
about other countries, without the knowledge or consent of the target
countries, is referred to as remote sensing. Technically, remote
sensing refers to satellite reconnaissance and the detection by
satellites of geological or other features on, above, and below the
earth's surface. Often those satellites are stationed outside the
airspace of the sensed country such that the sensed country cannot
legitimately complain that those satellites illegally invaded its
airspace. 121 The information gathered by such satellites could range

makes the same point about people in another part of the world. The writer reports
that some years ago he came upon Bedouin tents in the Negev Desert, Israel, that were
equipped with small antennas. The antennas were "attached to battery-operated
televisions, many of which were tuned to the American prime-time soap opera 'Dallas'."
Edward Rothstein, Why American Pop Culture Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2001, at
Bl.
120.
THUSSU, supra note 97, at 133.
121.
"The satellites have the ability to sense and photograph nations from a sunsynchronous orbit of 705 km without the knowledge and permission of the nations
being sensed." HAMID MOWLANA, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE

END OF DIVERSITY? 43 (Robert A. White ed., 1996).
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from military movements to information about mineral deposits or
crop production, information that could be used to the economic and
security disadvantage of the sensed nation. There is perhaps very
little that the sensed nation can do unilaterally to protect itself from
this phenomenon. The analogy here is being photographed from the
air while one is quietly sunbathing in one's own backyard and those
images used for purposes to which one did not and would not consent.
The difference is that at least in the case of the latter one can avoid
being in that circumstance by being fully clothed when one is outside
the house. But there is no analogous remedy in relation to remote
sensing. The earth cannot be fully clothed!
One of the elements that has traditionally been viewed as
constitutive of sovereignty under international law and political
theory is the state's capacity to have control over the natural
resources found within its territorial jurisdiction. 122 As Philip Allott
aptly observed, "Our independence is a function of what we control
and what we do not control. ' 123 But to have full control over one's
resources also entails having access to the information about that
resource at least as early as others have access to the same
information. To lack access to information about natural resources in
one's own territory while others (say foreign corporations) have access
to that information is to be put at a great disadvantage if one were to
negotiate with the information-holders about the development of
those resources. A country may make decisions or enter into
agreements about its resources from this position of imbalance of
access to information.
The challenge that remote sensing poses to territorial
sovereignty is not only in relation to the capacity of a state to have
full control over the collection and dissemination of information about
its resources, but also in regard to its ability to protect the privacy of
its citizens. 124 Let me make it clear: The issue here is not the
usefulness or otherwise of the technology and the process of remote
sensing, but rather how it can be and often has been deployed to

122.
The principle is affirmed through numerous U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions. See generally GEORGE ELIAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES (1979).
123.
ALLOTT, supra note 40, at 404.
124.
Remote-sensing satellites are worrying to many, not only for what they can
do in terms of sensing natural resources and information, but also in terms of what
information they are capable of gathering about individuals, hence raising the issue of
individual privacy. As a newspaper article put it: "commercial spy satellites are about
to let anyone with a credit card peer down from the heavens into the compounds of
dictators or the backyards of neighbors with high fences." William J. Broad, Private
Ventures Hope for Profits on Spy Satellites, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at Al. These
new satellites, which started operating in mid-1977, "are designed to see objects on the
ground as small as a yard or so in diameter-cars and hot tubs, for example." Id.
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undermine the capacity of the territorial state to act as a sovereign
entity.
Even if a state is made aware of the fact that it has been an
object of sensing and that it is offered access to the data that have
been gathered about it, the effect on its national sovereignty is not
necessarily trivial. First, the data may be made available to others at
the same time as they are available to the sensed state which would,
of course, deny the latter whatever power exclusive access to
information may have provided it when negotiating with others.
Second, even if simultaneous release of the data to others is not per
se detrimental to the capacity of a nation to appropriate its resources
in the most desired way, the released data may be of such a nature
that the simultaneous release would effectively put the sensed nation
at a disadvantage in relation to other nations and private entities
that have access to the information.
Imagine the following. Country A was remotely sensed by
corporation B, which has a policy of selling the information to the
sensed country and to others who may have interest in the
information at a non-discriminatory price. Assume also that the data
that are being offered for sale are the raw (or even processed) data.
For many countries, especially developing countries, that is
essentially as bad as not having access to the information at all.
Many of those countries do not have technological and financial
capacity to process and interpret the data. Given that, the effect of
simultaneous release will be that other parties who possess the
capacity to process and interpret the data will be in possession of
information about the resources of a sensed state that the state itself
will be unable to have.
I shall explore later what the response of nation-states, more
precisely regional groupings, has been to the threat that remote
sensing poses to the notion of national sovereignty. For the moment it
is sufficient to conclude by noting that the challenge of satellites to
the notion of territorial sovereignty has two dimensions. It comes in
the form of satellites disseminating information into a country, say in
the form of television broadcast, as well as in relation to information
that satellites manage to get out of the country in the form of
information that those satellites have gathered about the country. In
each case, the flow of information across national boundaries
seriously challenges the notion that the territorial state has full
prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdictions over matters
within its territorial boundaries.
F. TransborderData Flow (TBDF) and National Sovereignty:
Challengesfrom Outgoing Information
Another area of information flow that has demonstrated the
limits of territorial sovereignty is what is referred to as transborder
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data flow (TBDF). TBDF refers to the process of computerized data
transfer across national boundaries. 12 5 The data transfer could be
between a parent company (say, a financial institution such as a
bank) and its subsidiaries in other countries, for the purpose of
improving managerial efficiency by moving data about the activities
of the institution from one country to another. Or, it could be between
a company that owned the data and a company from another country
that is hired to process the data, to put it in reasonably useable form.
The data transferred across national boundaries could be of a variety
of kinds. It could involve personnel data such as the health and
employment histories of employees, which might be transferred
between a parent company and its subsidiary in another country, or
between a credit bureau and another organization. Or it could be
economic data transferred between banks or insurance companies or
other entities whose business is one of trading on information. The
capacity of private entities to move large amounts of digitalized data
across national boundaries, often without the knowledge of the
authorities of the particular nation, has raised a number of issues
that the territorial state will find difficult to deal with absent the
cooperation of other states.
Although the data transferred across national boundaries could
range from economic to personnel data, here I shall only focus on the
transfer of personnel data, for that seems to be the most sensitive as
well as the best example to show how the information revolution is
undercutting the capacity of the nation-state to perform one of its
basic functions, that of protecting the welfare and privacy of its
citizens. Assume that Country A has a law that prohibited the
disclosure of the personal data on employees gathered as part of the
employment process. Suppose a company has gathered such
information and transferred it to its parent company in another
country, Country B, 1 2 6 a country that does not have a similarly

125.
Anne W. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of
TransborderDataFlow in Transition, 36 VAND. L. REV. 985, 985 (1983).
126.
Actually, Country B could be the United States. The United States does not
have general privacy laws that regulate the private sector. So, for example, if a
company transfers personal data about its employees to its parent company in the
United States from one of the countries that are members of the European Union,
those data will have no federal privacy protection and very inadequate protection from
some states. "American companies have ... shown little interest in conforming to other
countries' privacy laws. In most European countries, for example, companies are not
allowed to sell customers' names and other personal information without customers'
permission. In the United States, selling names without permission is legal and
commonly done." Guernsey, supra note 15, at D8; see also Edmund L Andrews,
European Law Aims to Protect Privacy of Data: Some Trade With U.S. Could be
Disrupted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at Al; John Markoff, Differences over Privacy on
the Internet: U.S. and Europe at Odds on How to Protect Users, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1998, at C1.
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generous data protection law. What is Country A to do if the personal
data of its citizens are disclosed in Country B pursuant to the request
of an individual or an entity and the law of Country B? Perhaps it can
do very little on its own other than, of course, closing down the office
of the subsidiary which may or may not be economically feasible but
will certainly not remedy the disclosure.
The problem gets even more complicated when one realizes that
even when the country to which the data are ultimately transferred
has privacy protection laws, other countries through which the data
go to get to that country might not. Unlike the regular mail,
electronic mail has no fixed route. Data from New York to Melbourne,
Australia, might go through Paris and Toronto one time and Oslo,
Norway, another time. It is impossible to tell in advance what route
the electronic transmission will take. From the point of view of
privacy, therefore, the degree of protection that the data get depends
not only on the protection that the receiving state affords those data
but also on whether the countries through which the data pass have
adopted equivalent, or at least adequate, privacy laws. This becomes
important given that the data will be stored, at least temporarily, in
the intermediate countries. To the extent that the conventional notion
of state sovereignty implied, at a minimum, the capacity of the
nation-state to act unilaterally to protect the welfare of its citizens,
then the failure to do so can only be understood as serious diminution
of the sovereign authority of the state.
As I shall explore later, nation-states have come to realize that
in relation to TBDF as in other areas of information flow (and indeed
in relation to any other area of globalization such as the
environment), unilateral action, assumed by the conventional notion
of sovereignty, will often be ineffective to enforce a country's data
protection laws, and are thus coming to deal with the issue on
regional or interregional basis. In Europe, for example, where the
issue of TBDF (especially the issue of privacy) has been seriously
considered and debated, trans-European efforts have accompanied
data protection laws of the several states. 127 The data protection laws
of many European nations provide that no data shall be transferred
out of their countries unless the country to which the transfer occurs
has adopted laws that provide an equivalent level of protection to
that provided by the data exporting country. 128 This principle is

127.
Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regards to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html1O8.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter Convention]. The Convention was based on the OECD voluntary
guidelines that were issued in 1980. See OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Oct. 1, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 422.
128.
See generally Data Protection Act: United Kingdom Law, at
http://www.dpalaw.info/uklaw.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2003).
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endorsed by the Council of Europe. 129 The Convention adopted by the
Council of Europe allows signatory states to prohibit the export of
certain categories of personal data to another member of the treaty if
30
that country does not have an equivalent level of protection.'
Although the Convention is not directly binding on signatory
states, it requires those states to adopt legislation that will give effect
to the principles of the Convention and to provide safeguards for the
processing of personal information that are common to member
states.1 3 1 Of course, any state can adopt a more generous form of
protection than provided for by the Convention. The core principles of
the Convention are that personal information should be "obtained
and processed fairly and lawfully;" that such personal information be
"stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way
incompatible with those purposes;" and that data processing be
limited to circumstances that are "adequate, relevant, and not
'132
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored.
The Council of Europe is not the only
European
intergovernmental entity that has attempted to deal with the privacy
issues raised by TBDF. The European Union has also adopted a
directive.' 33 The directive requires equivalency as a standard for data
processing within member states. 34 But outside the Union the
standard by which the transfer of data is to be measured is whether
the importing nation has "an adequate level of protection.' 1 35 There
have been criticisms of both the Convention and the Directive, 136 but

129.
See Convention, supra note 127; see generally PETER SWIRE & ROBERT
LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS (1998).
130.
Convention, supra note 127, art. 12(3)(a). By implication the Convention is
understood to authorize states to prohibit export to non-member states which do not
satisfy the equivalency standard as well.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
European Parliament and Council Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive]. The Directive
was in some sense inspired not only by the Council of Europe Data Protection
Convention, but also by the 1980 OECD Privacy Guideline.
134.
Id. art. 7.
135.
Article 25(1) provides that transfer of data is allowed only if "the third
country in question is ensures an adequate level of protection." Convention, supra note
127, art. 25(1); see also id. pmbl, para. 8 ("[I]n order to remove the obstacles to flows of
personal data, the level of protection of the rights of individuals with regard to the
processing of such data must be equivalent in all Member States .... "). Whether or not
there is adequate protection is generally to be made by member countries. And there
are exceptions to this general principle such as when the data subject has given
consent or the transfer is done at the request of the data subject or when it is done in
the vital interest of the data subject, and so on. Id. art. 26(1).
136.
Some have for example faulted the Directive for establishing an
incongruous position by requiring that there be merely adequate data protection if the
importing nation is a non-member while the standard for data movement between
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my purpose here is not to join that debate. Rather, the purpose of this
brief account of the attempt by Europeans to deal with data privacy
on a regional level is to support two propositions. First, just like
satellite broadcasting or remote sensing, the issues raised by TBDF
cannot be resolved by one nation alone by invoking its traditional
authority of territorial sovereignty. The conventional notion of
sovereignty is put under serious strain. Second, the multilateral
European approach to the privacy issue not only shows that states
are unable to deal unilaterally with issues raised by the
communication revolution, but, perhaps even more importantly, it
also suggests a way to conceive of sovereignty. In the information age,
national sovereignty is not simply, or even primarily, a case of the
state having "undivided and untrammeled power to make and
enforce" 137 laws, but one of being able to participate in the formation
of international institutions so as to provide collective protection of
interests. Perhaps it is more plausible to think of sovereignty in
procedural terms. I shall pursue this later in some detail.
G. National Sovereignty as "Speedbump"? The Case of the Internet
Perhaps no one mode of communication illustrates more clearly
than cyberspace 138 how the conventional notion of territorial
sovereignty is being challenged by the communication revolution. The
announcement on a masthead on the World Wide Web with which I
opened this article, proclaiming that "[n]ational borders are just
speedbumps
on the
information
superhighway," 139 though
exaggerated, has some truth in it. The ability of the nation-state to
restrict or prohibit the flow of information through the Internet is

member countries is the equivalency standard. This and other criticisms are detailed in

Paul Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on InternationalData
Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471, 485-88 (1995).
137.
Held, supra note 68, at 3.
138.
"Cyberspace" is used to refer to the interaction among people and among
businesses over computer networks, commercial online services and electronic bulletin
boards. A good example of cyberspace is the Internet. For the purposes of this Article, I
shall use the terms "cyberspace" and "the Internet" interchangeably. I mean to use the
term the "Internet" to refer to the globally linked and computer-generated (and
computer-sustained) network (to be precise, network of networks) which enables people
to have access to all sorts of information, to (virtually) meet all sorts of people and to
engage in all sorts of transactions. All computers connected to the Internet share a
common language or "protocol" which is known as TCP/IP (Transmission control
Protocol/Internet Protocol) which allows each computer on the network to be aware of
other computers on the network and to know exactly where on the "network map" each
of the computers is. For a good description of the Internet, see A. Michael Froomkin,
Habermas@Discourse.net:Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV.
751, 777 (2003). Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 615 (Kirby, J,
concurring). Justice Kirby cites a figure of 655 million of the number of estimated
Internet users at the end of 2002. Id. at 616.
139.
White & Lauria, supra note 1, at 2.
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becoming increasingly diminished. Take, for example, the case of an
Italian men's magazine called Playmen.140 Because the courts in the
United States determined that the publishers of the magazine
engaged in trademark infringement against Playboy, they were
prohibited from publishing, distributing or selling in the United
States. 141 While Playboy also managed to get the courts in England,
France, and West Germany to enjoin the use of the Playmen name in
those countries, the Italian courts ruled that Playboy was a weak
mark and hence not entitled to protection. 142 What Playmen did in
response to the injunction from the courts in the United States was
simply to make available two services on the World Wide Web-a free
service and a subscription service. 143 Although the site was located on
a machine in Italy, it was accessible worldwide.
U.S. citizens who had access to the Internet could, through the
free site, call up web pages and see the cover of Playmen magazine,
see images from the magazine, and see advertisements for the pay
service containing more of the magazine's content. If they liked what
they saw through the free service, they could subscribe. Subscription
would allow them to browse, or even print, the pages and pictures of
the magazine. The Playmen example indicates how cyberspace is
confounding the conventional law of territorial jurisdiction and
national borders. 144 Has Playmen been distributed and sold in the

140.
Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
141.
Id. at 1033.
142.
Id. at 1034.
143.
Id. at 1035. The free service was called "Playmen Lite" and what it did was
introduce potential subscribers to moderately explicit images so as to get them
interested in subscribing. The subscription service was called "Playmen Pro" and once
you subscribed you apparently got the entire deal. In order to access the Lite version a
person contacted the publisher who issued a temporary user name and password via email. To subscribe one filled out a form and sent it by fax to the publisher after which
the user received by e-mail a password and login name that would enable the user to
read the magazine.
144.
There are other examples that indicate how the notion of territorial
sovereignty is under strain. Consider, for example, the availability of Adolf Hitler's
book, Mein Kampf, in Germany. The government of one of the states of Germany, the
State of Bavaria, acquired the rights to the book as a consequence of Allied confiscation
order in 1948. Pursuant to that right, new editions of the book are banned in Germany.
An English version of the book could, however, still be published in the United States
or the United Kingdom, because the original publisher had sold the right in these
countries in 1933. The book was therefore available for purchase on the Internet at
sites such as amazon.com or Barnesandnoble.com. German citizens could order online
and get the material shipped to them. What they could not get in Germany they were
able to purchase from the United States or the United Kingdom and the law
enforcement authorities in Germany likely found it hard and expensive to keep tabs on
who was buying the book. This has led German authorities to ask online sellers such as
amazon.com not to take orders from German citizens. But the prospect of German
authorities stopping access to the book is unlikely, because Mein Kampf can now be
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United States in violation of the injunction? 145 If so, what can the
U.S. courts do to enforce the injunction?
The problem is that while sovereignty has traditionally been the
function of territoriality, the Internet (and indeed even satellite
communication) is not conducive to that paradigm. While territorial
sovereignty is premised on a world that is divided into states-those
"bright, bold blocks of colour" that divide "the entire land-surface of
the planet," as Daniele Archibugi calls them, 14 6 the Internet is based
on a world that is divided into networks, domains, and hosts. 14 7 In
this world of cyberspace even the communicators themselves, let
alone the authorities of the countries from which and to which the
communication is directed, may not know that their messages are
actually crossing territorial borders. 148 If more examples are needed

downloaded from the Internet, from a server located in the United States. As the
authorities freely admit, there is nothing they can do to stop that. Given the fact that
the First Amendment will surely be said to protect the provision of such material to
users, German authorities are not going to get help from U.S. authorities. See Paul
Geltner, Germans Fight Neo-Nazis Roosting in Cyberspace, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 17,
2000, at A3.
Consider another example. The Egyptian government censures the Cairo Times, a
feisty paper that is published out of Cyprus, when the paper comes into Egypt. The
government censors out portions of the paper it deems unacceptable before the printed
copies are distributed. To counter this, the paper now prints "in bright red letters on
the web site (cairotimes.com) everything the government takes out, in a section
entitled: 'The Forbidden File-See what the Censor has cut from our print edition...
These articles were chopped apart .
Thomas Friedman, Censors Beware, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2000, at A29.
Still another example: "[Sihadow media is growing exponentially along with
China's Internet, as articles from even the most obscure newspapers quickly find their
way onto web sites and into chat rooms." Elizabeth Rosenthal, China Struggles to Ride
Herd on Ever More Errant Media, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, at A3, cited in JOSEPH S.
NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN'T GO IT ALONE 49 (2002).
145.
The issue here is whether uploading pictorial images onto a computer
which may be accessed by people from a particular country constitutes a "distribution"
in that country. If the analogy is someone flying to Italy and purchasing the magazine
in Italy and reading it there, then, of course, U.S. territorial sovereignty has not been
invaded in any sense and there has been no distribution by the magazine in the United
States. The question is easily answered if the subscribers printed those images and
distributed them to others.
146.
Daniele Archibugi, CosmopoliticalDemocracy, 4 NEW LEFT REV. (2d ser.)
137, 137 (2000).
147.
Perhaps I should indicate here what is meant by "domain." Domain refers
to the name system which maps and identifies the many networks linked to the
Internet. Thus, for example, in aaddis@law.tulane.edu, which is my e-mail address, the
domain name is law.tulane.edu. Each portion of the domain name (law., tulane., edu) is
referred to as a domain, and in total become the site's domain name. In this particular
case the domain site tells me that the machine is located in the United States (because
there is no two-letter country code), that it belongs to an educational institution (edu),
the name of the institution is Tulane (tulane) and the machine is located in the law
school (law.) of Tulane University.
148.
This would be especially the case if a person is accessing a world wide web
site, for most of those addresses do not indicate the nationality of the site.
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of the inadequate nature of the territorial paradigm one need only
1 51
The
think of "cybertorts,"'1 49 "cybersmuts,"'150 and "cyberracism."'
last two examples show that not only does the Internet destabilize
our understanding of territorial (or conventional) sovereignty, but it
is also putting into confusion accepted legal norms which have been
developed to deal with issues of international dimension, in this case
the rules of conflict of laws.
Although I have argued earlier that it will be unwise to view the
Internet as being unique in its challenge to national sovereignty, as
earlier technologies of communication had also put pressure on the
idea of territorial sovereignty, I should not be understood to minimize
the fact that the nature of the challenge from the Internet is further
reaching than the impact of communication technologies that
preceded it. In the same way that earlier technologies of
communication posed a sharper challenge than those preceding them,
say satellite compared to radio broadcasts or radio broadcasts
compared to print, the Internet's challenge is more profound than
those technologies of communication that came before it such as

"Cybertorts" refers to the commission of a tortious act, such as defaming an
149.
individual, during the process of computer-based communication. See Rosalind
Resnick, Cybertors: The New Era, NAT'L L. J. July 18, 1994, at Al. Defamation could
take place under many circumstances. Assume the following: an Australian posts a
message on Usnet which defames a U.S. citizen. Suppose the newsgroup is moderated
by a New Zealander whose data are stored in an English computer. What can the
United States do to ensure that remedy is available to its citizens-assuming that
there are laws in the relevant United States jurisdiction that provide for remedies
under those sorts of circumstances? One lawyer is quoted as having said 'The Internet
created a universal jurisdiction, so that once you are on the Internet you are subject to
the laws of every country in the world." The lawyer was commenting on a number of
actions taken by government officials in Germany in an attempt to control access to
certain kinds of information available on the Internet. A few years ago German
authorities indicated that they will prosecute an activist university student for
violating government orders that bar access to a leftist magazine by providing an
Internet home page that provided a link to that magazine. Prior to this episode
German authorities in Munich had also indicted the head of CompuServe's German
subsidiary "on charges of aiding in the distribution of pornography and violent
computer games." This, simply because German citizens and residents could use
CompuServe to get access to the prohibited information in other countries, not that
CompuServe produced or promoted such information. See Edmund L. Andrews,
German's Efforts to Police Webb are Upsetting Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at
Al; Nathaniel Nash, Holding Compuserve Responsible, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, at
D4. And apparently, German officials are threatening "to file charges against more
than a dozen Internet access providers because they failed to block access" to a
particular Dutch Internet site which "carries home pages for about 6000 commercial
customers." Edmund L. Andrews, Germany's Internet BarriersFace a Court Test, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., June 6, 1997, at 13; see also Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210
C.L.R. 575.
This term refers to the process of sending and receiving through computer150.
based communication material that is defined as obscene or indecent.
151.
See, e.g., Canada's Criminal Law, supranote 75.
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satellite and shortwave radio communications. Put simply, to deny
the uniqueness of the Internet in its challenge of the conventional
notion of sovereignty is not to deny that its challenge may be more
deep-cutting.
Having made the observation that, although not unique, the
Internet has had a qualitatively different impact on the notion of
territorial sovereignty, let me now note briefly what those differences
are. First, as the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Reno v. ACLU, the
Internet is a world-wide phenomenon, accessible from all parts of the
globe. 152 Its decentralized character and the relatively cheap cost of
access to it make its global reach easier and its control rather
difficult. 15 3 Second, the Internet's capacity to unbundle information,
and hence to allow individuals to switch packets rather than circuits,
makes it more difficult to control the flow of information across
national boundaries. 154 Third, because the medium enables an
interactive and (almost instantaneous) participatory communication,
the challenge to the authority of the nation-state can be effectively
coordinated among those within and outside of the territorial border.
Fourth, as I shall argue later, not only does the Internet challenge
territorial sovereignty more profoundly than the media that preceded
it, but it also seems to indicate more clearly what an alternative
notion of sovereignty might look like. The Internet demonstrates the
deconstitutive and constitutive dimensions of the communication
revolution.
H. The Death of the Conventional Notion of Sovereignty?
To summarize, whether it is in relation to transborder television
broadcasting, or the collection, transfer, and distribution of
computerized data about a country (remote sensing) or its citizens
(personal data), or the Internet, the spectacular ease with which
information is now collected and disseminated across national
boundaries has started in earnest to undermine the conventional

152.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-53 (1997); see also Aschcroft v. ACLU, 535
U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
153.
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and the State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 155, 161 (1997).

All it takes to be an Internet publisher is a $2,000 personal computer and a
$12.95 per month subscription to an Internet service provider. All it takes to be
an Internet service provider is about $50,000, most of which goes for labor costs
and a high bandwidth connection between the terminal server and router into
the larger Internet.
Id. In fact, the cost is now considerably less than the 1997 figures quoted by Perritt.
154.
"Because of its packet switching rather than circuit switching character, it
is far more difficult to impose physical border controls on the Internet than on other
terrestrial wire-based or terrestrial micro-wave based technologies." Id.
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concept of sovereignty that has been central to our understanding of
international relations, international institutions, and public
international law itself for a considerable period of time.
The communication revolution, especially the Internet, has
facilitated the sharp challenge to state sovereignty in a number of
ways. First, it has curtailed the capacity of national authorities to
control the means of communication and hence the kind of
information their citizens get. What is not allowed to be printed or be
put on the air may be easily accessed either through the Internet or
received via satellite communication. Second, the communication
revolution allows the creation and cultivation of parallel communities
across national boundaries, on the basis of linguistic or other ethnic
characteristics or on other grounds, challenging the idea of the
territorial state as the highest point of political authority and loyalty.
Third, one of the consequences of the communication revolution has
been that while the authority of the nation-state is in decline, the
number and influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
have "grown spectacularly.' 155 These NGOs use communication
technologies to organize and coordinate their activities on an
international scale with reduced transaction costs. 1 56 But as profound
as the communication revolution's challenge to the conventional
notion of sovereignty is, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that we should therefore abandon the idea of sovereignty altogether.
Notwithstanding the counsel of many to the contrary, the lesson from
the communication revolution is not that we should dispense with it,
but rather that we should recast it.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL RESPONSES TO
CHALLENGES POSED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION
A. Introduction
What have been the responses to these technological
developments that appear to put great strain on the notion of state

155.
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 250 (1995). The

influence of NGOs has specially been evident in the human rights and environmental
areas. See generally, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental
Organizationsin the World Trade Organization,17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996);
Michael Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 269 (1994); A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizationsin the Development of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 61 (1992).
156.
Perritt, supra note 153, at 169-70.
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sovereignty? In actual fact, there have not been many sustained and
coherent intellectual and practical responses to the issues raised by
the communication revolution. Part of the reason for this may be that
legal scholars, political theorists, and policy makers have not yet fully
grasped the implication of the communication revolution to many of
our central and organizing concepts and institutions. As a
consequence, they are in no position to respond to the developments,
theoretically or institutionally. One must also mention the rapid
speed with which the changes have come about. To a large extent,
they have left people and institutions unprepared to respond sensibly
and coherently. There may also be what I shall call the "resignation
factor," the belief that given the speed with which communication
technologies are developing, responses, however appropriate at the
time, will soon appear obsolete. This is what a friend of mine calls the
"I can't win it" test. 157 That, in fact, is likely to be the case in many
situations.
To say that there have not been coherent and sustained
responses is not to claim that people have not reacted to these
developments and to what they see to be their implications. Many
have, in fact, responded in various ways. I shall, in this section,
attempt to group these views and responses into three categories, and
to explore what the notion of sovereignty means, and how it fares,
under each scheme. I shall refer to these as the statist (or the status
quo), proceduralist, and liberal internationalists (liberal sovereignist)
responses. I shall describe and critically examine each response to see
what version of sovereignty is implied by it and whether it is a
promising response. After I have explored the nature and reach of
these responses I shall set out what I believe to be a more defensible
response to the challenge of the communication revolution. By
"defensible" I mean to suggest that the response proposes a notion of
sovereignty that deals fully and coherently with the information
revolution.
B. Reasserting the Conventional Notion of Sovereignty: The Statist
Response (Or Thick-Statism in Action)
The status quo response, or the statist response, as I shall refer
to it from time to time, is perhaps the most familiar response, for it is
the most common position advanced in international meetings and
negotiations. 158 The statist assumes two things. He assumes the

157.
David Post makes a similar argument. See David Post, Anarchy, State and
the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3,
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/jol/post.html, cited in Lawrence Lessig, The
Zone of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1996) (referring to Post's argument
as "the futility argument").
158.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 169-87.
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validity and desirability of the conventional notion of sovereignty,
where governmental bodies or officers have an unsupervised and
irrevocable authority over people and resources in the particular
territorial unit. Second, he views the state as the unit that is prior to
international institutions, defining the identity and structure of those
institutions rather than being defined by them. For the statist,
international institutions are the creatures of autonomous states in
the same way that, for the social contract theorist, the state is the
creature of autonomous individuals. In each case the state or
individual is viewed as a unitary actor pursuing its interests through
the institutions that it has created with others.
With those two assumptions, the response of the statist to the
threat of sovereignty from the communication revolution is
straightforward. Believing that the state system is central to the
international system, and that the undivided and untrammeled
power to make and enforce the laws within the territorial unit is the
defining feature of the state, the statist argues that the transmission
of information into or out of the territory of a country without the
consent of the regime is an impermissible interference in the affairs
of the particular country and its capacity for self-determination.
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter and numerous declarations and
resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations are cited
as proscribing such interference and affirming that version of
sovereignty. 159 Although a great deal of the information that crosses
national borders is produced and moved by private entities rather
than states, which are prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter from
interfering with the "territorial integrity or political independence of
any state," for the statist that matters naught. 160 For the statist and
a great deal of traditional international law, the "state" is viewed as
an indivisible unit in charge of all entities within its borders, or at
16 l
least responsible for their actions.
The policy implication here from the point of view of the flow of
information is that a country (more correctly, the government of a
country) is within its sovereign right to regulate the flow of
information into or out of its territory. To be sure, the statist would
readily admit that such regulation has to be done within the limits of
what the regulating country has specifically agreed to under

159.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."). As numerous subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly
have reaffirmed, it is not only the use of force or the threat of the use of force that are
prohibited, but any action of a state that undermines or interferes with the territorial
integrity of another state.
Id. art. 2(4).
160.
161.
See supra, notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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international or regional documents, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of
16 2
Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights.
Those human rights instruments are, however, viewed not to restrict
the inherent right of the sovereign to regulate the flow of information
into and out of its territory to ensure that the territorial integrity and
political independence of the state is protected. 163 Radio jamming was
justified precisely on this ground. State sovereignty was put forward
by many Third World countries and the then Soviet Bloc countries as
the basis on which unwanted radio signals could be justifiably
jammed. 164 As the radio jamming example shows, for the statist,
unilateral action (or national framework) is regarded as the best way
of ensuring the restriction of the inflow of unwanted information.
Indeed, it is not only in relation to radio jamming, but in other fields
of information flow as well, that states have attempted to control and
165
regulate unilaterally the inflow of information.
And many of the "second-generation" communication scholars
argue that in many of the cases when the communication revolution
appears to make the nation-state unable to enforce its laws, such
impotence is apparent rather than real. 16 6 Thus, when a
communication entity-an Internet server, an entity that broadcasts
across territorial borders by the use of satellites, or a shortwave radio
communicator-sends messages across national boundaries that are
illegal in the country to which the messages are beamed, the recipient
state has a number of options unilaterally to enforce its laws against
the offending entity. One option, of course, is the attachment of any
property the offending party may have in the receiving state. Were
that to be the case, enforcement of law may not be a problem.

162.
See ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19(3)(b); UDHR, supra note 84, art. 29(2);
see also European Convention, supra note 127, art. 10(2).
163.
See ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19(3(b); UDHR, supra note 84, art. 29(2); see
also Convention, supra note 127, art. 10(2) (reciting a list of purposes for which states
are allowed to restrict the flow of information into and out of their territories).
164.
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
165.
In relation to the Internet, states have attempted to regulate numerous
activities conducted over that medium, from gambling to the transmission of 'indecent'
materials and from contractual relations to privacy norms. For gambling regulation
see, e.g., Interactive Gambling Act, 2001, §§ 3, 14 (Austl.), available at http://
scaleplus.law.gov.aulcgi-binldownload.pl?/scale/datalpasteact3/3465. See also Vacco ex
rel. People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 859-62 (N.Y. Sup.Ct.
1999). In relation to the regulation of the transmission of what is referred to as
"indecent" material, see, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
853-55 (1997). As an example of the regulation of contractual relations over the
Internet see Electronic Transaction Act, 1999 (Austl.). In terms of regulatory regimes
protecting privacy, see Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1).
166.
See generally, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, UnilateralRegulation of the Internet: A
Modest Defence, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 135 (2000). Goldsmith argues that even in relation
to the Internet unilateral regulation provides solution to the regulatory challenges that
transnational communication poses.
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However, the offending entity may often not have any assets in the
receiving state. That is likely to be the case in relation to interborder
satellite or radio communications and in relation to a great deal of
Internet communication.
As I indicated earlier, the statist may suggest resorting to
controlling the behaviors of the citizens of the receiving state as part
of a total strategy of excluding information or modes of
communication that have been made illegal in the country. 16 7 But
that seems as impractical as it is unattractive. Although countries
like China have attempted something like this, the cost of controlling
the consumption pattern of citizens will be prohibitive both in terms
of resources and developmental programs. 16 8 Closing down Internet
servers, monitoring satellite dishes, or trying to jam shortwave
broadcasts will not only be hugely expensive and almost impossible to
sustain but to the extent that those very means of communication are
needed for developmental purposes, especially in large and sparsely
populated countries with poor infrastructure, it would have negative
consequences.
What does the statist suggest when a country cannot protect
itself unilaterally against unwanted information, as is in fact the case
with a great deal of satellite, electronic, and computerized
information currently going across national boundaries? The statist
argues that the international community must adopt multilateral
agreements prohibiting the transmission of unwanted information
into the territory of a country. 16 9 The purpose of international
agreements and rules is viewed as being one of reinforcing and
protecting the conventional notion of state sovereignty that I outlined
earlier. 170 One could say that the statist response conceives of the
ideal world as one that approximates the condition where nationstates, more correctly governments, have total and unilateral control
over their territories and people, where states are the locus of power
and indivisible units of analysis.
A good example of such a position in relation to interstate flow of
information is what became known as the "prior consent" principle.
This is a principle that was advanced mainly by developing countries
and the then socialist world during negotiations over international
direct satellite broadcast (IDBS) in the 1970s and early 1980s. 17 1

167.
See Johnson & Post, supra note 80, at 1372.
168.
See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy: Is it a Time for a New
Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 116-17 (1989).
169.
Id. at 1034.
170.
See Sara Anne Hook, Allocation of the Radio Spectrum: Is the Sky the
Limit?, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 322 (1993).
171.
See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Abram Chayes, 114 HARV. L. REV.
682, 721-26 (2001).
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During that period IDBS issues were prominently placed on the
agenda of the United Nations and its agencies. 172 The question was
what the international community should do about transborder
satellite communication that was unwanted by, and did not get the
consent of, the relevant and legitimate authorities 173 of the particular
country to which the signals were beamed. The position of developing
countries and the then socialist world was that any international
agreement on the subject should embody the principle that there be
prior consent of receiving states before there could be any IDBS
transmission from another state or entity connected with that
state.17 4 Note how the prior consent regime attempts to reinforce and
protect two important characteristics of territorial sovereignty as
conventionally understood. The first characteristic is that the regime
of a country exercises an unreviewable authority-that is,
unreviewable by outsiders-over the political border over which it is
said to have jurisdiction. Having control over one's political border is
seen as not only maintaining control over one's land and air
boundaries, but also developing one's own social, political, economic,
and cultural systems. The second defining feature is that in
international relations (and international law) the state is an
indivisible unit of analysis. This latter point is made clear not only
through the insistence that citizens of a country should be spoken to
by outsiders only with the consent of the state, but also through the
requirement that the state be held responsible for the actions of
private entities within its borders or under its jurisdiction.
Although the prior consent principle was not explicitly adopted
by the United Nations, what finally came out of the negotiations-in
the form of Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth
Satellites for International
Direct
Television Broadcasting
(Principles) 1 765-seems to reaffirm the statist position. The Principles

172.
Id.
173.
By "legitimate authorities" I only mean to refer to governments that are
members of the United Nations and have secured recognition by the overwhelming
majority of members of that body.
174.
The "prior consent" principle could be invoked in all areas of cross-border
communication. The principle was invoked in a 1972 UNESCO resolution which
proclaimed that it was important to "reach or promote prior agreements concerning
direct satellite broadcasting to the population of countries other than the country of
origin of the transmission." UNESCO Res., U.N. Doc. AIAC/109,
14 (1973). The
position was restated in subsequent U.N. resolutions. See U.N. Doc. 105/117, Annex 3
(1973); U.N. Doc. A/AC, 105/WG. 3(v)/CRP.1; U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/107 Annex 2 (1974).
175.
G.A. Res. 37/92, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 98, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1982). The document was adopted by a General Assembly resolution on
December 10, 1982. The vote, although overwhelmingly positive-107 for, 13 against,
13 abstentions-was nevertheless regarded as a split vote. This is not only because in
such matters consensus is desired for the obvious reason of legitimacy, but also voting
against it were major Western developed countries in which most of the international
media and communications companies are located--countries such as the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany-and those
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which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly provides that
"States should bear international responsibility for the activities in
the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite
carried out by them or under their jurisdiction .... -176 According to
this principle, states will be required to assume responsibility for
IDBS activities carried out by private entities that are under their
jurisdiction, hence reaffirming the notion of the state as a spatial
phenomenon with indivisible authority over its territory and
population. It is important to note here that the notion of state
responsibility for the actions of private entities within its jurisdiction
is also found in other international agreements that deal with
177
communication.
Also, although the Principles does not enshrine the concept of
prior consent explicitly, it embodies an idea that is its functional
equivalent. It requires a state proposing or authorizing IDBS service
immediately to notify the proposed receiving state or states of its
intention and to "promptly enter into consultation with any of the
States which so requests."'178 An IDBS service is to be established
only on the condition that an agreement or arrangement has emerged
1 79
from such consultation.
The statist position as embodied in the prior consent rule or its
variation set out in the Principles reaffirms that territorial
sovereignty is indeed at the core of the state system and that the
protection of that system is essential to the pursuit of self-

abstaining were also important Western countries such as Canada, Australia, Sweden,
New Zealand, and France.
176.
Id.
177.
Thus, for example, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) provides that:
State Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out
in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
178.
See Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting, supra note 177 (particularly the principle
on "consultations and agreements between states' and the principle on 'duty and right
to consult," which requests states to enter into consultation over IDBS matters that are
likely to affect them).
179.
Id. For a comprehensive and helpful analysis of the process through which
the Principles was adopted by the United Nations see M. LESUEUR STEWART, TO SEE
THE WORLD: THE GLOBAL DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL DIRECT TELEVISION
BROADCASTING BY SATELLITE (1991). See also DAVID I. FISHER, PRIOR CONSENT TO
INTERNATIONAL DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING (1990).
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determination. 8 0 I think the statist position is as impractical as it is
unattractively conservative. It is impractical for a number of reasons.
First, it is not clear how either consultation or prior consent could be
arranged given the volume of communication across national
boundaries and the multiplicity of modes of communication through
which information is transferred. Second, in relation to some of the
newer forms of communication, such as the Internet and even remote
sensing, it is not even clear that the communicators always know that
they are, in fact, crossing borders. There would be numerous times
when a remote sensing satellite would, for various reasons, not be
able to recognize that it is crossing borders. In terms of the Internet,
a computer "address" (the domain name) may no longer correspond to
the physical location to which it was initially assigned because the
machine has moved from the territory but has retained the domain
name, or an individual may have asked for and received a domain
name that does not correspond to the physical location of the
computer, or because an individual is using a server with ".com'
domain name which may be physically located anywhere. 8 1
The position is also unattractively conservative. This is so for a
number of reasons. First, it is likely that the notion of prior consent,
or its equivalent, will simply be used by the elite, especially those
from the Third World who have assumed power and retain it by
means of force rather than democratically, to insulate themselves
from scrutiny and challenge. In the name of sovereignty, the power of
veto will actually be used to deny the people information they will
need to evaluate their leaders. Second, the notion of prior consent or
its equivalent, if it is enforced, may in fact have retarding effect on
the development of communication technologies since it would impose
substantial practical limits on the use of such technologies.
Third, it is not quite clear to me that the thick statism the statist
defends is normatively desirable. 8 2 Although territorial sovereignty

180.
As I noted earlier, it was not only at the U.N. General Assembly that the
concept of prior consent was debated. It was also a subject at other international bodies
such as ITU and UNESCO. Thus, a 1971 ITU conference concluded: "all technical
means available shall be used to reduce, to a maximum extent possible, the radiation
over the territory of other countries unless an agreement has been previously reached
with such countries." Savage & Zacher, supra note 89, at 358. And UNESCO's
seventeenth General Assembly meeting passed a resolution, with the United States
being the only dissenting party, supporting the principle of prior consent, at least in
relation to IBDS. Id.
181.
See Johnson & Post, The Rise of Law on the Global Network, supra note 80,
at 7.
182.
By "thick statism" I simply mean to refer to the traditional notion of
territorial sovereignty which is perhaps best exemplified by the Principles, the notion
that governmental bodies or officers of a territorial unit have an unsupervised or
irrevocable authority over the people and resources in the particular territorial unit.
This implies two things. First, outside the powers that the territorial unit has, through
agreements, located in international organizations or bodies, ultimate authority resides
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initially emerged as a progressive and liberating concept, just as the
notion of individual autonomy did, it has in recent times often acted
as an obstacle to forms of human flourishing. 8 3 In some sense, thick
statism in the international context is analogous to strong
individualism in the national context, each making it very difficult to
constitute a defensible form of communal life. In the national context
it is often argued that a polity that is committed to strong
individualism will be unable to engage in distributing efforts so as to
ensure equal opportunities to its citizens,1 8 4 Similarly, in the
international context strong statism makes it very difficult to
constitute an international community where every individual is the
focus of our moral concern. An individual is within the care and
jurisdiction of this or that state. My moral (and certainly legal)
commitment is informed and limited by the territorial boundary
within which I happen to be located.
In any case, it seems to me that not only is strong statism
normatively undesirable, but it also makes the same descriptive
mistake that strong individualism does. In the same way that the
strong individualist takes the individual as being prior to the
community in which she lives and the relation between communities
and individuals a one way process, so do statists view the relationship
between the state and the world as a one way street. The state is
viewed as prior to international institutions, and as giving rise to and
constituting the identities of those institutions. The state is never
viewed as partly a creature of those institutions and processes. Of
course, the reality is different. Just as the individual's identity is
defined partly by the national (regional or local) community in which
he lives, the identity of the state is partly a function of the
international institutions and processes within which the state
functions. The structuralists have made this point often enough. The
international institutional structures and norms not only constrain
and regulate the behavior of states, but they also constitute their very
identities.' 85 If the state is partly a construction of international

within the legitimate authorities of the territorial unit. Second, it is impermissible for
any external authority, be it imperial or international, to interfere with or undermine
with the internal or external affairs of a territorial unit.
183.
See generally James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional
Dynamics of InstitutionalPolitical Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943 (1998).
184. Id.
185.

See generally ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS (1999); Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in InternationalRelations
Theory, 50 WORLD POL. 324 (1998) (reviewing books that adopt constructivist
approaches); March & Olsen, supra note 183; Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992). See
also THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD
POLITICS 22 (Peter Katzenstein ed., 1966) ("Cultural-institutional contexts do not
merely constrain actors by changing the incentives that shape behavior. They also help
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institutions, then clearly it is the case that state sovereignty is also a
function of international institutions and processes. Sovereignty, like
identity, is a relational concept. It is developed in the process of
engaging others, whether the others are states or international
institutions. Perhaps this is what the Permanent Court of
International Justice meant when it famously observed that
sovereignty is "an essentially relative question."' 8 6 It is relative to, or
87
dependent on, "the development of international relations.'
Two things flow from the relational understanding of
sovereignty. First, it is not the freedom from external interference
that is central to sovereignty in the information age and generally in
the age of globalization, but rather the freedom to engage in the
constitution of, and participation in, international institutions and
norms. Second, the communication process has become the central
means through which the concept of international actors, as well as
the norms in the context of which such interaction takes place, are
constituted. Meaningful sovereignty in the age of globalization will be
one of having the opportunity to participate in the shaping
(imagining) of the international community within which culture and
norms are produced. And the communication revolution is playing a
central role in that process of imagining. In the same way that print
media played a crucial role in the imagining of the nation-state in an
earlier time, the new communication technologies have increasingly
allowed us to imagine new forms of associations and communities and
consequently new forms of legitimate authority.
C. The ProceduralistResponse: Sovereignty as a Process
The idea that sovereignty, just like individual and group
identity, is a relational and hence contingent concept and that it be
88
viewed and understood in terms of a process has been made before.'
Clearly, if identities are created in the course of engaging others, then
sovereignty, that important concept in interstate relations, cannot

to constitute the very actors whose conduct they see to regulate."). After quoting this
passage from Katzenstein approvingly, Christian Reus-Smit adds the following
"[Ilnternational institutions, it follows, define the identities of sovereign states." REUSSMIT, supranote 4, at 21-22. To some extent, Hans Kelsen's theory of international law
can also be viewed as structuralist. See generally, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert M. Tucker ed., 1966).
186.
Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 4, at 24 (Feb.
7) (advisory opinion).
187.
Id.
188.
For the proposition that individual and group identities are relational or
contingent in nature, they are created in the process of engaging other individuals and
groups, see generally CONNOLLY, supra note 23. See also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING
ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Adeno

Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV 615 (1992).
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but be formed in the process of states engaging one another. It cannot
but be contingent.
The nature and substance of sovereignty and the international
structure within which sovereignty is asserted and practiced are
defined in the course of states' interactions. If this is correct, then, as
I noted earlier, the most important claim of state sovereignty is not
the claim of freedom from external interference, but the right actively
to engage in international relations. 189 Unlike for the statist position,
the proceduralists approach does not aim to reinforce or re-establish
any substantive notion of sovereignty, but a fair process for making
international decisions. 190 Sovereignty here is seen as being tied to,
and being a result of, a fair procedure, in the same way that
procedural democrats on the domestic level view the legitimacy of a
decision on controversial moral and political issues as being the
function of a default procedure-quite often majority rule. 191 Once the
decision is made according to that procedure then all are expected to
support, or at least to comply with, the particular decision even
though this might not have been the preferred outcome from their
point of view. The power of veto that the statist response provides is
192
unavailable here.
In the same way that procedural democrats in the domestic
context view the fairness of the procedure in terms of whether it
allows each individual who has a stake in the outcome to participate
in the process as an equal member or citizen, so would the
international proceduralist view the fairness of the procedure in
terms of whether it allows each nation that has a stake in the
outcome, however small or poor it may be, to participate in the
international decision making process.
Here is where the idea of an international negotiation where
each nation-state is counted equally comes to play. The procedure
ensures neither substantive equality among nations, in terms of

189.
See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 155, at 27. For Abram and Antonina
Chayes the way to think about sovereignty in the era of globalization is as a right to
participate "in the regimes that make up the substance of international life ... to be an
actor within it." Id.
190.
See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1996).

191.
For a useful description of procedural democracy see id. at 26-33. Gutmann
and Thompson see procedural democracy as one of three ways through which
democracies deal with the unavoidable case of moral disagreements among citizens.
The other two they call constitutional democracy and, their preferred method,
deliberative democracy. For a skeptical view of the claim that deliberative democracy
will advance simultaneously the goals of community and democracy see Lynn
Anderson, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997). See also Iris Marion
Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. THEORY 670 (2001).
192.
See generally Young, supra note 191.
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negotiation and influence, nor an agreement at the end of negotiation.
It simply recognizes that each state is sovereign in that it will have
the right to be represented at international meetings and to seek to
induce other states to support its position through an "interactive
process of justification, discourse and persuasion. '193
In the same way that individuals in a majoritarian democracy
are simply accorded the right to participate in the political process
and to have their votes counted equally, but, of course, without the
assurance, or even pretension, that the issues they care about will
win at the end of the day, the nation-states, under the proceduralist
scheme, will only have the assurance that international conference
halls will be open to them to plead their cases and to attempt to
persuade other members of the virtue of their positions. International
meetings become the equivalent of the voting booth in the domestic
realm.
What is the implication of the proceduralists' response to the
communication revolution? There are strong and weak versions of the
response. The weak version would suggest that to the extent that
states are not able unilaterally to control or to regulate the flow of
information into or out of their territories, the only sovereign recourse
that they have is to participate in international institutions with the
purpose of developing an international framework that will ensure
the protection of their national interests both in terms of protecting
their jurisdiction as well as in persuading other states to exercise
their jurisdictions mindful of the interests of other states. This is
what I shall call procedural realism.
The strong version implies that even if a state is able
unilaterally to regulate or prohibit the flow of international
information, such action may not be properly within its sovereignty to
the extent that regulation of such information may affect many or all
other nations. The regulation of Internet material, especially the
World Wide Web, may be a good example. A regulation by one
country may have the effect of drastically altering the rights and
interests of other nations or entities located outside the physical
borders of the regulating state. In the information age and in the age
of globalization the fates of nations are so intertwined that a
unilateral assertion of rights will alter the rights of others so
drastically that only proceduralism will allow others to insure that
their interests are properly considered. The strong version may be
referred to as normative proceduralism.
The proceduralist's argument, in both of its versions, has some
merit. First, as a practical matter, in the information age sovereignty
depends on procedure, being able to plead one's case at an

193.
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2636 (1997).
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international meeting and hoping to win other nations, the jury of
peers, over to one's position. Even though a powerful nation may
often have been, and to some extent may still be, able to ensure the
protection of its sovereignty either by acting unilaterally or when it is
unable to do so, by pressuring others to act in its interest, it is
increasingly the case that in relation to the regulation of information
that crosses national boundaries, every nation needs the cooperation
of other nations for the protection of its interests. The degree may
differ, but the sovereignty of every nation has been made vulnerable
by the communication revolution. As we saw in the Playmen case,
even the United States, the most powerful nation on the face of the
earth, may need the cooperation of other countries to protect its
194
sovereignty and what it deems to be its interests.
Second, to the extent that the proceduralist starts with the
proposition that in the age of globalization it is connection rather
than isolation that is the defining feature of the international system,
it has an unassailable insight. This is especially the case in relation
to information. Unilateral regulation will transform, or at least affect,
the interest of others. It is, therefore, normatively desirable that all
those who are affected by such a decision have a say. That can only be
achieved through international interactions, negotiations, and
agreements. It is not the right to be let alone but rather the right to
participate in the processes and institutions through which "the
substance of international life" is made 195 that becomes central to a
meaningful notion of sovereignty.
Third, one could imply from the proceduralist's position a
normative proposition that may be expressed in the following way. It
is not only the recognition that in this globalized world of information
unilateral regulation by one state will often have effects on the
information policies and regulatory regimes of other states without
those states having a say in the matter. But to the extent that the
media (in the broadest sense of the term) have become the means
through which we have come to imagine what we refer to as the
international community, it would be important that there be a
procedure that would enable all members of that community (i.e.
nation-states) to participate in the development of policies that affect
the nature and. identity of that community. The communication
revolution has become the means through which we define both the
contours of legitimate and illegitimate exercise of state authority and
the nature and identity of the international community within which
such judgments are made.

194.
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1041
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
195.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 155, at 27.
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To recap, the proceduralist's position is useful for a number of
reasons. First, it highlights the fact that, in the information age,
"sovereignty is ... both contingent and constrained."1 9 6 In relation to
the communication revolution it is constrained in two senses. On one
hand, information technologies have curtailed the power of the state
to regulate the flow of information that has an effect on its territory
and citizens in the way that sovereignty is traditionally said to entitle
the state to do. On the other hand, even if a state were able to
regulate the flow of such information, such regulation may often have
a negative impact on many other states. The full assertion of one
state's sovereignty may be the negation of the sovereignty of many
other states. Regulating Internet service providers may be an
example of such a consequence. When the German state of Bavaria
required CompuServe to restrict access by Bavarians to certain
information that CompuServe made available to its wordwide
information consumers or when France demanded that Yahoo! deny
French citizens access to certain material that Yahoo! made available
to its worldwide audience, the effect of the demand could have been
the denial of access to that information by citizens of other countries
as well, countries where the relevant information was perfectly
permissible.
Sovereignty is contingent in the sense that given its constrained
nature, in the way that I described it in the proceeding paragraph, its
viability is going to depend on what the collectivity of states decides is
its substance and on the procedure by which such decision is made. In
other words, sovereignty has become "an essentially relative
question. ' 19 7 It is a question of procedure and process. The
proceduralist position is useful in that it alerts us that in the
information age where the world is looking like a network of
communication, it is participation not isolation that is going to be the
defining feature of sovereignty. Indeed, there cannot be any other
way.
While pointing us in the right direction, there are two problems
with the proceduralist position. First, to talk about a procedural
notion of sovereignty is to assume that there are distinct cultural and
national entities that will take part in that process. By what
institutional means would the existence of such communities be
ensured so that the notion of relational sovereignty would be viable?
Given the unequal distribution of economic and technological power
among national communities, to conceive of international life in
terms of one of simple procedure is to condemn the technologically
and economically weak to the fate of a procedure that may be

196.
Slaughter, supra note 171, at 686.
197.
Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 4, at 24 (Feb.
7) (advisory opinion).
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unwilling to protect their ways of life and identities. In the same way
that procedural democracy (majoritiarian democracy) in the domestic
context is not sufficiently sensitive to the needs and interests of
minorities, especially those which are economically and politically
weak, international proceduralism will be less than attentive or
protective of the identities and ways of life of economically and
technologically weak communities. Second, although process is
important here there is no indication as to what makes a process fair.
After all, if sovereignty is contingent on a process then the degree of
fairness in the process will determine the degree of legitimacy of the
idea of sovereignty that is derived from that process.
D. Liberal Sovereignty: The Dominant Paradigm
On the other end of the spectrum from the statist conception of
sovereignty is what can be referred to as liberal sovereignty. There
are a number of factors that define liberal sovereignty. First, and
perhaps most important, is the belief in and commitment to the idea
198
that external legitimacy is the outward face of internal legitimacy.
That is, the extent to which state sovereignty would be allowed as a
shield from external interference is the extent to which the state
provides a certain minimum of rights to its citizens. 199 External
legitimacy is, to a considerable degree, to correlate with internal
legitimacy. The internally legitimate state is one within the
territorial borders of which, at a minimum, exist institutionally
provided guarantees for the respect of human rights and for the
20 0
provision of democratic governance.
Second, the normative commitment to internal legitimacy is
informed by another commitment, the belief that "[a]t the deepest
level . . . the social world [is] composed of persons not collectivities
like societies or peoples" 20 1 and that "every human being has a global
stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern. '20 2 Indeed, liberal
sovereignty has a conceptual as well as a descriptive dimension to it.
Conceptually, it starts with the familiar proposition that the
individual is the ultimate agent of action and it is to that agent that a

198.

FERNANDO R. TES6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1998)

("A liberal conception of state sovereignty has to be congruent with the justification it
offers for the legitimacy of the state generally. I suggest that a state is sovereign when
it is internally legitimate.... Sovereignty is the outward face of legitimacy.").
199.
Id.
200.
Habermas believes that "popular sovereignty and [individual] human
rights go hand in hand." JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 127

(William Rehg trans., 1996).
201.
See Charles R. Beitz, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 669, 677 (2000).
202.
Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, in POLITICAL
RESTRUCTURING IN EUROPE: ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 90 (Chris Brown ed., 1994).
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moral right should attach. Unlike for the statists and proceduralists,
the starting point is not the state, but the individual. Descriptively,
the liberal sees state sovereignty as an instrumental value through
which other important values such as individual autonomy, human
20 3
rights, democracy, and the like are pursued and achieved.
Although liberal sovereignty is unlike procedural and statist
sovereignty in that it starts with the individual rather than the state
as the point of departure, it is similar to the statist position (and
unlike the proceduralist position) in that it assumes a substantive
20 4
notion of sovereignty.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that liberal sovereignty is the
dominant paradigm currently informing a great deal of international
legal scholarship and to an increasing degree legal practice as well.
Human rights and humanitarian law are examples of liberal
sovereignty in practice. The increasing willingness on the side of the
international community, including the U.N. Security Council, to
intervene in the affairs of countries which had long been thought to
be internal matters is premised on the proposition that state
20 5
sovereignty is to correlate with internal legitimacy.
What would the liberal's response to the communication
revolution and its effect on the traditional notion of sovereignty be?
First, to the extent that the regime of a state is organized in a way
that is aggressive externally and oppressive internally such that it is
violative of minimum rights that define individuals as agents, then
there is no sovereignty to respect. Such a regime cannot complain of
the violation of its sovereignty whenever and however information
flows in or out of its territory. Sovereignty is defined by certain
relationships that the state has or should have with its citizens and
the international community, and when those are lacking there is no
sovereignty that outsiders are compelled to respect.
Second, liberal sovereignty
would allow informational
intervention, if such information would minimize the oppressiveness
of the regime, and enhances the rights and autonomy of citizens that
live within that territorial unit. After all, under the liberal scheme,
all forms of intervention, including economic and military

203.
"[S]overeignty is an instrumental value supported by moral reasons linked
to human rights and respect for individual autonomy." TESON, supra note 198, at 40.
204.
There are differences among liberals as to what are the minimum
requirements in terms of individual rights and the provision of individual autonomy
before a state's sovereignty is recognized. Compare John Rawls who applies only what
he calls "a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom,
liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass
murder and genocide" with Tes6n and Beitz who seem to demand the full range of
rights that are provided for in a liberal democracy. Compare id., and Beitz, supra note
201, at 667, with RAWLS, supra note 51, at 79.
205.
See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at
http://www.un.org/icty/index.html.
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interventions, in the defense of individual rights is permitted. Given
the fact that adherents to liberal sovereignty may not be reluctant to
advocate military intervention to ensure respect for and protection of
human rights, unrestricted flow of information may in fact be viewed
as the least destructive, both from the point of view of the intervener
and that of the target of the intervention, and the most preferred
means of undermining the hold of repressive regimes. It seems
reasonable to conclude that if outsiders are permitted to intervene
militarily in the defense of certain rights of the citizens of other
countries, then informational intervention (public or private), which
might avert the need for military or economic intervention each of
which is likely to be more destructive, 20 6 is permissible as well. One
would be hard pressed not to conclude, for example, that the
international community would have had the legal right to intervene
militarily in Rwanda to avert the genocide that took place. Given
that, it clearly would not have been impermissible for states
individually or collectively to have intervened informationally, such
as by jamming the radio broadcasts that Hutu extremists used to
20 7
incite genocide against the Tutsi and the moderate Hutus.
How would the unrestricted flow of information undermine the
illegitimate state and create the conditions for transforming it into a
legitimate state? It could do that by heightening the vulnerability of
the government of the state and by providing citizens with
information that suggests alternative forms of social and political life
and the manner in which those alternative forms of life could be
organized. Political information (such as interborder radio and TV
transmissions and the Internet) may be the most obvious candidate
for such transformative task. But even other types of information
such as TBDF and remote sensing may be viewed as welcome means
of undermining the illegitimate state to the extent that such
information increases the vulnerability of the state authorities.

206.
For the destructive nature of economic sanctions by individual states or the
international community for the purpose of persuading or forcing the regime of the
target state to change the offending policy or behavior, see generally Adeno Addis,
Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2003).
207.
See generally Metzel, supra note 99, at 628 (examining the role of radio
broadcast in the Rwanda genocide). See also Joseph S Nye, Jr. & William A. Owens,
America's InformationEdge, FOREIGN AFF. Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 20, 32.
[An] information campaign to expose propaganda earlier in the Rwanda conflict
might have mitigated the tragedy. Rwanda has only 14,000 phones but some
500,000 radios. A few simple measures, such as suppressing extremist Hutu
radio broadcasts that called for attacks on civilians, or broadcasting Voice of
America (VOA) reports that exposed the true actions and goals of those who
sought to hijack the government and incite genocide, might have contained or
averted the killing.
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Transborder flow of information is, therefore, viewed as conducive to
the emergence of a legitimate state, and hence legitimate sovereignty,
because of its potential to erode the capacity of an illegitimate state to
control its citizens as well as its capacity to inform the citizens of such
a country about alternatives and possibilities.
Third, for those who adhere to the liberal notion of sovereignty,
the unrestricted flow of information, at least information of
consciousness, is not only essential for the achievement of other
values such as the sustenance of democratic life, but such information
is also a value in itself. The argument would go this way. To respect
the individual as an autonomous being is to respect him or her as a
communicating being. A state that does not recognize such a right is
not legitimately sovereign. Therefore, to the extent that the new
communication technologies have significantly reduced the state's
capacity to control the flow of information, it is not the death but the
affirmation of sovereignty.
To summarize, liberal sovereignty starts with the proposition
that internal legitimacy is to correlate with external legitimacy.
External sovereignty is to be defined in terms of legitimate internal
sovereignty. The legitimacy of such internal sovereignty is to be
defined by the institutional guarantees of individual rights and the
institutionalization of some version of accountability of the
government to citizens. 20 8 The flow of information across national
boundaries is defended both on instrumental and intrinsic grounds. It
is instrumental in ushering in the internally legitimate state and it is
an intrinsic value in that it affirms the communicative nature of
human beings. As is apparent from the discussion in the preceding
paragraphs, it is not the end of the state that adherents to liberal
sovereignty desire, but rather the end of the illegitimate state.
Indeed, the existence of the state is not merely tolerated but is viewed
favorably. Following Kant, defenders of liberal sovereignty argue that
the existence of separate states may be necessary to reduce what
Kant saw as the danger of a centralized government on a global scale
which he thought would lead either to despotism or anarchy. 20 9 It is

208.
The Security Council's intervention in Haiti to oust the generals and to
restore the government of Aristide is perhaps the clearest example of this requirement.
209.
To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch [1795], in PERPETUAL PEACE
AND OTHER ESSAYS 215 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983) [hereinafter PerpetualPeace].
[The existence of separate states] is rationally preferable to [a situation where
states are] overrun by superior power that melds [states] into a universal
monarchy. For laws invariably lose their impact with the expansion of their
domain of governance, and after it has uprooted the soul of good and a soulless
despotism finally degenerates into anarchy. [T]he state of peace must be
formally instituted.. .which can happen only in a lawful state.
Id. at 98.
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not a stateless world that is desired, but rather something like a
federation of liberal democracies.
Although liberal sovereignty is attractive in that, unlike the
statist position, it takes the individual seriously and attempts to
fashion legitimate governance on that basis, several major difficulties
and unanswered questions remain both in terms of the specific
understanding of sovereignty and in terms of the role that
information is supposed to play in the constitution of that specific
version of sovereignty. First, for proponents of liberal sovereignty
legitimate sovereignty appears to be a description of liberal
democracy. The spread of liberal democracy is viewed as providing
the optimal condition for a just and peaceful world. 210 Kant's work is
taken as having suggested that.211 This view of legitimate sovereignty
is problematic for a number of reasons. It neglects the important
insight of the proceduralists that a defensible notion of sovereignty,
just like a defensible notion of identity, is developed in the course of
the relevant actors (various communities) engaging one another
where communities grant one another the standing to participate in
that general conversation. The liberal democrat assumes one
212
historical version of organizing government as universally valid.
This takes me to my next reservation. The assumption of the
universality of liberal democracy is tied to another liberal
assumption, the universal individual as the primary addressee of
legal and political theory. This neglects two things: the importance of
groups in the lives and identities of individuals and the need to
endow those groups with certain rights as a way to protect the
autonomy of individuals. To say that individuals are partly defined by
the communities in which they live is to be somewhat skeptical about
the assertion of the abstract individual as the unit of analysis for
developing either the notion of autonomy or sovereignty.
Second, ironically, while liberal sovereignty has been in some
way liberating in that it eliminated or tamed the arrogance of

210.
There is of course some dissent from that view among some prominent
members of the liberal crowd. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 51. In that book, Rawls
develops his idea of a just and peaceful world in the context of diversity both in terms
of how people have organized themselves as well as the multiplicity of cultures and
traditions that exist in the world. Rawls' law of peoples (international law) would
provide the scheme of cooperation not only among politically liberal societies ("liberal
democracies"), but will include illiberal societies (which he call "decent peoples") that
treat their citizens as reasonable and rational "cooperating members." Id. at 64.
211.
See TES6N, supra note 198, at 3. Tes6n reads Kant as suggesting that the
legitimate sovereign state is one that is a liberal democracy. Tes6n's conclusion is
informed by Kant's observation that "the civil constitution of every nation should be
republican," which he reads as a liberal democracy, and that "the law of nations should
be based on a federation of free states," which Tes6n understands to mean "republican
states". Id.
212.
See id.
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autocracies both within and outside their territories, the claim of
liberal sovereignty to be the only defensible way of organizing the
global community seems to reenact some version of the same
arrogance. 2 13 Here comparison with the notion of the autonomous
individual is instructive. The idea of the autonomous individual
emerged as an emanicipatory concept, liberating the individual from
the supposed control of all sorts of powers-the family, tribe, clan,
unaccountable rulers, etc. 214 Over time, however, the notion of the
autonomous individual itself became constraining rather than
liberating. The individual increasingly became viewed as an abstract
entity unaffected by, and prior to, the community within which it was
located. 215 In the name of autonomy the individual was transformed
into an entity devoid of social depth. 216 Also, the abstract individual
(read: the liberal notion of the individual) became the standard by
which all other individuals were to be inscribed. 2 17 In the same way
the liberal individual became imperial, the liberal state is assuming
an imperial status as well. The legitimacy of sovereignty is to be
judged by how closely it resembled liberal sovereignty.
Third, proponents of liberal sovereignty do not make the
argument, at least not to my satisfaction, that internal liberalism will
always suggest a corresponding liberalism internationally. 218 In fact,
evidence in relation to the free flow of information seems to suggest
no necessary link. Some liberal democracies that embrace the free
flow of information within their polities are reluctant to allow the
2 19
inflow of information from outside sources for various reasons.
Thus, for example, France, a country that may properly be considered
a liberal state, often invokes cultural integrity as a reason for
restricting incoming information.22 0 So does Canada. 2 21 Indeed,
Canada and France are not the only liberal democracies that have
made the cultural integrity argument, mainly to resist the

213.

See Held, supra note 68, at 21.

214.

Id.

215.
Id.
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
It is interesting to note that the United States government apparently
sought the assistance of the Qatar government to discourage one of the few, if not only,
free medium in the Arab world, Al-Jazeera, from broadcasting statements from alQaida or Osama bin Laden. Ironically, the U.S. government was politely reminded by
the Qatar government that that would be an infringement on freedom of expression.
One might also note that either because of subtle pressure from the government or
perhaps because of public pressure or because of patriotic feeling on the side of owners
and editors, major U.S. broadcasting networks have been rather selective as to what
they will put on air in terms of information emanating from sources considered to be
the enemy.
219.
See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, 19 Nations See U.S. as a Threat to their
Cultures, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1998, at El.
220.
See infra text accompanying note 222.
221.
Id.
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importation of U.S. cultural items. 222 Others, including the United
States itself, exclude certain types of information on the ground of
national security, even when such information, if it were to be
produced within the country, could not be legitimately excluded on
such grounds. 223 The point is that internal liberalism and a
commitment to the free flow of information internally is not
necessarily an indication that there will be such a commitment in
relation to the inflow of information from other countries.
Fourth, it is not clear to me that proponents of liberal
sovereignty have defined the relationship between the communication
revolution and the version of sovereignty that they defend. On one
hand, they seem to view the communication revolution, at least
information of consciousness, as the instrument of making liberal
sovereignty available to the world. Under this account, defensible
globalization is simply the worldwide extension of liberal sovereignty.
On the other hand, there seems to be the suggestion that
globalization, including informational globalization, is increasingly
shaping, to borrow a phrase from David Held, 'overlapping
communities of fate.'2 2 4 How this overlap takes place and what the
role of the communication revolution is, if any, in the constitution of
this overlap is not clear.
Fifth, it is not only the constitutive dimension of communication
that seems to be unexplained, but also how a country that satisfies
the conditions of liberal sovereignty must respond to incoming
information that it believes undermines it and its institutions.
Suppose such a state adopts a law after going through a deliberative

222.
Many Latin American and European countries have made similar
arguments against the same target-what is viewed as U.S. cultural dominance. See
DePalma, supra note 219, at El.
Officials from . . . 19 countries, including Mexico, Britain, and Brazil, came to
Ottawa to discuss ways to distinguish culture from ordinary commerce, with
the goal of denying the American entertainment industry easy access to their
markets . . . [T]here was an outpouring of concern over a loss of a nation's
culture to the marketplace.
Id. Canada, perhaps more than any other country, feels overwhelmed by the inflow of
U.S. culture and the threat to its culture resulting from that inflow.
Sixty percent of all the books sold in Canada come from other countries,
primarily the United States. Three-quarters of the music played on Canadian
radio is not Canadian. Four of five magazines sold on newsstands in Canada
are foreign, primarily American. And when it comes to films, 96 percent of
what is shown on Canadian screens is foreign, the overwhelming majority of it
from Hollywood.

Id.
223.
See Adeno Addis, Who's Afraid of Foreigners?: The Restriction on Foreign
Ownership of the Electronic Media, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 133, 157 (2000).
224.
Held, supra note 68, at 21.
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process, prohibiting advertising of alcohol over electronic media.
Suppose a neighboring state does not have such a prohibition and
citizens of the liberal state have ways of receiving the broadcast from
the neighboring state easily. Is the liberal state within its sovereign
right to restrict the flow of information, if it can do so unilaterally?
Put simply, can the notion of sovereignty be properly used as a shield
to keep out such information? Does it matter that the information is
emanating from another liberal or a non-liberal state? And if it
cannot unilaterally keep out such information, what mechanisms are
appropriate to enable the state to exclude such information? Put
simply, what are the appropriate international institutional
structures that can protect liberal sovereignty (and transform nonliberal societies) in a globalized world where the communication
revolution links liberal as well as non-liberal polities?
E. In Defense of the Thin State: Sovereignty as a Network of
Communication
1. From the Thick State to the Thin State
I have explored three possible conceptions of sovereignty and
how those conceptions deal with the threat that the communication
revolution posed to the territorial state-its claim to be the highest
point of identification for citizens within the territorial unit. The
statist position is the position of thick statism. I argued thick statism
is neither descriptively accurate in the information age nor
normatively desirable. However, as I shall argue later, although the
concept of the thick state seems indefensible, the idea of the state as
the personification of the community that seems to be implied by the
statist's position has a great deal of merit to it. While rejecting thick
statism, therefore, I shall embrace and defend a version of the state
(and state sovereignty) that I call the thin state that would be
consistent with the communication revolution and globalization
generally.
The idea of procedural sovereignty is useful in that it captures
two important facts that the statist does not seem to capture in his
scheme. First, it understands that in the information age (and in the
age of globalization generally) sovereignty can only be understood as
being both "contingent and constrained." Second, the proceduralist
alerts us to the fact that in the information age, and in the age of
globalization where the world is looking like a network of
communication, it is participation, not isolation, that best defines real
sovereignty. It is freedom to participate, not freedom from
interference, that would be essential if territorial communities are to
survive and flourish.
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As I argued earlier, while the proceduralist notion of sovereignty
as contingent and relational is attractive both because it links the
notion of sovereignty to the idea of discursive engagement among the
territorial actors and because it suggests that sovereignty in the
information age is about the right to participate in international
institutions and processes, there are problems with the approach. It
does not tell us what a fair process through which sovereignty could
be negotiated and developed would look like. After all, if sovereignty
is contingent on a process, then clearly the degree of fairness of the
process will determine the degree of legitimacy of the idea of
sovereignty that is derived from that process. If the proceduralist
does not fully appreciate the importance of, and does not provide for,
a fair process, then the liberal sovereignist does not take communities
(in this case territorial communities) seriously as participants in that
process.
What I shall do in the following pages is therefore develop a
notion of sovereignty that appropriates the insight of the
proceduralist that sovereignty is developed relationally and
contingently. I shall argue that the communication revolution will
continue to play an important role in this process. The
communication process has been used to define what is possible or
acceptable; whose actions are human rights violations and whose are
necessary for legitimate security concerns; what is an important
cultural practice and what is a barbaric act; who is a terrorist and
who is a freedom fighter; which is a rogue or an outlaw state and
which is a state engaged in the transformation of international norms
in the service of the larger public good; what constitutes an internal
matter of a community and what should be a concern for outsiders.
If sovereignty is contingent on the nature of the interaction
among territorial communities and if these interactions are now
largely mediated through the communication revolution, as I claim to
be the case, then part of what would define a defensible notion of
sovereignty is a fair process both in terms of how communication
resources are distributed as well as how the structure of interaction is
arranged. I shall argue that the problem with the current structure is
that interaction among different territorial or historic communities is
often one-sided. Information is gathered, processed, and disseminated
often by the international media and multilateral corporations which
are, by and large, western-based. The consequence of this is that the
social and political world (including what constitutes legitimate
sovereignty) that is imagined through these "interactions" is partial
in two senses that are mutually reinforcing. It is constructed with
insufficient information, and that it is done from a specific tradition.
So part of what one has to do to construct a defensible structure
within which information flows across national boundaries is to
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realize that the current structure has differential impact on different
communities, a point that is not well understood.
Furthermore, if one is serious about interactions that would lead
to legitimate international institutions, one would have to take
historic communities (in our case territorial communities) seriously
(unlike what appears to be the position of the liberal sovereignists) as
units of cross-cultural dialogues, "negotiating cross-cultural
differences over time. '' 225 By and large, liberal sovereignists take the
individual as the primary, and often only, addressee of legality and
226
morality.
2. The Moral Purpose of the State: The Importance of Pluralism and
Diversity in the Age of Globalization and Uniformization
a. Why the State?
Aristotle wrote: "Observation tells us that every state is an
association, and that every association is formed with a view to some
good purpose."2 27 Different theories of the state offer different
purposes for which this "association" is established. The dominant
theory of the state is one that I labeled the liberal theory, which views
the purpose of the modern sovereign state as one of facilitating, or
providing a framework for, the achievement of individual ends and
purposes.2 2 8 This story conceives of the state as an organism, social
relationships or allegiances of autonomous self-directing individuals
instituted to pursue their particular interests.2 29 The state here is
seen simply as a set of arrangements, a framework, through which
individuals pursue their ends in the context of respecting the

225.
David Ingram, Between Political Liberalism and Postnational
Cosmopolitanism, 31 POL. THEORY 359, 360 (2003).
226. Id.
227.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1.i (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1981).
228.
As Reus-Smit put it: "The moral purpose of the modern state lies in the
augmentation of individuals' purposes and potentialities, in the cultivation of social,
economic and political order that enables individuals to engage in the self-directed
pursuit of their 'interests."' REUS-SMIT, supra note 4, at 123.
229.
The U.S. Declaration of Independence is cited as a good example of this
approach.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Even here, it can be
argued that the "we" is to refer to "the people" which is viewed as more than a
collection of individuals who happened to be in the same territory at the same time.
'The people" was bound by more than a territory.
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interests and ends of others. Under this view, the state is no different
from a whole host of associations which individuals organize to
pursue their ends.
I think that is an incomplete, even erroneous, view of the state.
As I shall indicate later, the state is also a framework of communal
life, "the arena within which self-determination is worked out,"230 an
institution through which historic communities define and protect
their identities and traditions. Michael Walzer made this point
eloquently long ago: "The moral standing of any particular state,"
Walzer observes, "depends upon the reality of the common life it
protects." 231 Defense of state sovereignty must therefore start with
the proposition that the state, as an institution, provides, at least
currently, the conditions for communal integrity for historic
communities.
An unregulated international informational market threatens an
important virtue that we may wish to preserve and cultivate: diverse
ways of life. The tendency of the international private informational
market (mainly western) is, of course, to uniformize individuals. The
extent to which the private informational market succeeds is the
degree to which every individual is transformed into a consumer of
the same or similar products. The state may be the only institution
that is capable of minimizing the international tendency to
uniformize cultures and individuals. That is, the fate of diverse
cultures and ways of life may in fact depend on the fate of the state.
The question is how one thinks of state sovereignty that provides this
needed counter to international private power while not allowing the
state to use that power to insulate itself from external and internal
scrutiny in relation to what it does to its citizens. Put simply, the
question is how to affirm and organize ourselves internationally so
that we will be able to affirm and cultivate diversity internally
(diversity within a nation state) and externally (diversity in the
world).
I shall argue that the notion of a thin state will allow us to do
just that. What does the idea of the thin state entail? In a general
sense, it is an attempt to reconcile globalism and statism by
suggesting that, in the information age, globalism (cosmopolitanism)
and statism (nationalism) are, to use a phrase Daniel A. Farber used
'23 2
in the environmental context, "both fundamentally incomplete.
They are fundamentally incomplete in the following sense: neither
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Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,
8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209, 210 (1980),
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MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH

HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 54 (2d ed. 1992); see also Walzer, supra note 230.
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the localist nor the globalist narrative is descriptively accurate. In the
information age, the distinction as to what counts as local or global is
rather blurred. On the other side of the story, what is often assumed
to be a global interest, norm, or institution is in fact locally and
partially defined. 233 The intensity of imperial intrusion is mistaken
for the universality of purpose.
But before I develop the argument for a notion of a thin state, let
me outline why a thin state needs defending. There are strong
cultural and political arguments. The first, and one that I have briefly
mentioned earlier and one that I have developed in earlier work, 234 is
an argument from cultural identity. Now, the issue of cultural
identity is rather complicated. There are few nation-states, if any,
that are defined by cultural homogeneity. Most states are constituted
by diverse cultural structures. There are three major reasons for this
diversity. First, there is the history of colonialism where borders were
drawn arbitrarily by colonial powers imposing geographic borders on
diverse ethnic groups who had never seen themselves as being in
235
communion with or related to their new countrymen and women.
Second, the colonial powers themselves, such as Britain and France,
are being made diverse as a result of descendants of people from the
former colonies who had been brought over by or had chosen to
immigrate to the centers of colonialism, the metropoli. 236 Third, some
countries such as the United States and Australia became diverse by
the very nature of their settlement and viewed themselves as
immigrant countries. 237 And, of course, one also has to mention the
impact of globalization that has made it easier for people to move
238
across national borders and to settle in new places.
So, when I say cultural identity, I should not be understood to
mean that there is complete uniformity of culture in territorial states
nor do I mean that cultures do not change. However, there is a sense
in which one could think and talk about national cultures even under
those circumstances. Rather than viewing a national culture in terms
of complete uniformity one could see it "as a set of overlapping
cultural characterstics-beliefs, practices and sensibilities-which
different members exhibit in different combinations and to different
degrees." 239 If one were to think of national culture this way, then it
may not be unreasonable to think and talk about the existence as well

233.
See MAJID TEHRANIAN, GLOBAL COMMUNICATION AND WORLD POLITICS:
DOMINATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DISCOURSE 61 (1999).
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See generally Addis, On Human Diversity, supra note 31; Addis, supra note
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as the importance of national cultures. Even in the most diverse of
nations such as the United States there are overlapping cultural
characterstics that define citizens as Americans rather than, say,
Germans. And here I am not even talking about political institutions,
though those political institutions do have a constituting impact on
those overlapping cultural characterstics.
Even if one were to agree with the proposition that a national
culture exists, why should one also agree that the continued existence
of such a culture is valuable? 240 There are a number of reasons for it.
First, culture provides a sense of identity, "a common life," to those
that share it.24 1 "[T]he story of my life," says Alasdair Maclntyre, "is
always embedded in the story of those communities from which I
derive my identity. '' 24 2 One of those defining communities is the
national community of which one is a member. That culture provides
individuals with the structure within which they can make choices
and make sense of the choices that they have made. 243 The argument
here is that individuals are always situated in particular cultures or
tradition, conditions which give meaning to the notion of individual
choice by specifying the content of, and providing inspiration for, the
individual's action. Unilaterally to undermine these structures is to
undermine an important aspect of what makes members of that
national group who they are. This is what can be referred to as the
identitarian argument. A nation-state becomes necessary to provide
the environment in which culture(s) can develop because it is the only
institution sufficiently strong to counteract the power of the
international informational market that threatens to transform
244
citizens of every country into standardized consumers.
Second, cultural diversity could be defended on what can be
referred to as the multiculturalist argument. While the identitarian
argument relies on the value of cultures to members of the cultural
group to advance the protection and defense of cultures, the
multiculturalist argument bases its defense of cultural diversity on
the value of such diversity for all of us, even those of us whose

240.
To the "question of whether some forms of culture and ways of life are good
in themselves" John Rawls's answer is: "I believe they are." RAWLS, supra note 51, at
61.
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Sohail H. Hashmi eds., 2001) (stating that nations-states "afford individuals a context
within which they are uniquely empowered to draw on resources that afford them the
ability to construct for themselves worthwhile, meaningful lives").
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cultures might not be threatened by the international private
information market.24 5 The multiculturalist argument has two
aspects to it. One aspect of the argument simply says that just like
our commitment to maintain the various aspects of the physical
(environmental and ecological) world as intact as possible it may be a
good thing to think of doing the same in relation to the cultural
world. 246 This aspect of the multiculturalist argument can only be
understood to suggest that cultures like the physical environment are
being defended on aesthetic grounds. I have argued elsewhere that
the aesthetic argument in defense of cultural pluralism is neither
plausible nor attractive. 24 7 There is a second dimension of the
multiculturalist argument that is more plausible and more attractive.
This is the argument that the existence of different national cultures
is a valuable thing for the international community, for the various
cultures "embody alternative life-styles that may provide models,
inspiration, and guidance in the essential work of world order
redesign. ' 24 8 The argument here is based on the sensible assumption
that a particular form of existence, or outlook on life, or
organizational setup may not necessarily represent the best or most
desirable way of organizing a community or designing institutions.
Third, I agree with John Rawls that in respecting the various
national cultures that define territorial states, an important creed of
liberalism-the idea of toleration-may in fact be affirmed. In the
same way that a liberal state must respect its citizens' comprehensive
doctrines-religious, philosophical, and moral-if it is to be faithful to
its organizing principles, it must also tolerate and respect the fact
that there are other legitimate ways of ordering social and political
life. 249 If members of different national communities are to employ
public reason in their dealings with one another, toleration is a
conceptual and practical necessity. Indeed, what William Connolly
has argued over the years in relation to domestic societies may be
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See Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (in particularIndigenous Peoples),
in THE RIGHTS OF TPEOPLES 23 (J. Crawford ed., 1988), cited in Juha Raikkii, The
Moral Relevance of Cultural Disadvantage,78 AUSTL. J. PHIL. 374, 382 (2000); see also
DANIEL NETTLE AND SUZANNE ROMAINE, VANISHING VOICES: THE EXTINCTION OF
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relevant to the sustenance of the international community of
communities. Connolly argues that what we need is a regulative ideal
wherein the diverse traditions and communities acknowledge the
contestability and contingency of their own deeply held convictions
and cultivate a respectful engagement with those that are different
from them. 2 50 Connolly's observation is particularly relevant for the
context of the international community, because such an attitude will
not only guard against the tendency of some cultures and traditions
to attempt to remake others in their image, but over time it may also,
ironically, be more conducive to changes and adjustments. A culture
or tradition that feels an imperial threat from another culture or
tradition is one that is likely to be visceral in its opposition to all
things that it associates with that imperial culture or tradition, and
hence be resistant to any change.2 5 1 Extremism is often the result of a
feeling of being besieged and unheard. 252 There are numerous
examples of that around us.
Perhaps more importantly, from the point of view of
international justice, by which the liberal sovereignist is motivated
when he or she urges us to treat the world as a single scheme of
cooperation, 253 it may be better to start with the world of nationstates, or peoples, as John Rawls call them, 254 rather than with
individuals. As I have argued earlier, the "common sympathies"
arising out of a shared history and culture are profoundly valuable to
individuals, and hence an adequate theory of global justice must
recognize and respect this fact perhaps as a primary good. Also, as a
practical matter, the individualism of the liberal sovereignist will not
lead to the sovereignty of the individual but rather either to the
despotism of the international market, or to a unified international
political regime which is likely to preside over a "fragile empire torn
by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples [try] to gain
255
political freedom and autonomy."
While the first value that we mean to protect by endorsing a
version of the state is cultural identity, the second is the viability of
democracy itself. Although there is much talk about the Internet
providing the condition for participatory model of politics, 2 56 real and
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long lasting participation occurs in real space among people with
mutual understanding and trust. Such understanding and trust
require some commonality or shared identity which national culture
such as a common language or history provides. John Stuart Mill
made that observation long ago: "Free institutions are next to
impossible ... [a]mong a people without fellow-feeling .... 257 Mill's
analysis is as relevant in the age of the Internet and satellite
communications as it was at the time he made it. Genuine democracy
is not just a matter of aggregating and counting votes. It is also a
deliberative and participatory process. Such a process requires a
sense of commonality or shared identity to sustain it. The nationstate provides that commonality or identity, either through a common
language or a shared history and culture.
Indeed, as Kymlicka and Straehle have argued, the nation-state
may be the most conducive institution for the achievement of the
three principles that are generally linked to (liberal) democracy:
258
I
social justice, deliberative democracy, and individual freedom.
have already noted how social justice is linked to the nation-state. To
repeat the argument, social and distributive justice will be facilitated
if there is fellow-feeling among members of the community. When
there is such a feeling of solidarity and collective identity, members
will be prepared to vote for distributive programs, not only because of
the common bond that unites donors and recipients but also because
'25 9
there is "a high level of trust that sacrifices will be reciprocated.
That will not be the case if people feel that they are making sacrifices
for anonymous others.
As to the issue of democracy, it is clear that, just like distributive
or social justice, democracy also requires a high level of trust among
participants such that people will be willing to consider the views and
interests of others as well as a willingness to abide by the results.
Such trust and willingness is a consequence of the common identity
that the nation-state cultivates and develops through a common
culture. Also, democracy, at least the deliberative and participatory
kind, is "feasible only if participants understand one another and this
seems to require a common language. '260 However much the
communication media may have linked the world and however much
the Internet may have enabled individuals to access all sorts of
information, they cannot provide the condition for a deliberative

257.

John Stuart Mill, Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative

Government, in
UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT:
SELECTIONS FROM AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSTIVISM 392 (H. B. Acton ed., 1972).

258.
Will Kymlicka & Christine Straehle, Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States and
Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature, 7 EUR. J. PHIL. 65, 68
(1999).
259.
Id. at 69.
260.
Id. at 70.

20041

SO VEREIGNTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

democracy where trust and common identity are essential
ingredients. Indeed, in relation to the Internet, Cass Sunstein may
well be right when he raises the question as to whether there is a
serious danger that the Internet may allow and even encourage a lack
of engagement among individuals by increasingly enabling them to
use filtering technologies to avoid engaging the view of those with
whom they disagree in ways that are not possible in the non-Internet
world. 26 1 If this were to happen it would likely lessen the possibility
of developing the shared experience necessary for deliberative
democracy.
Put simply, the argument is that for democracy to work
effectively certain conditions have to exist. There has to be "fellowfeeling" among participants. That "fellow-feeling" or trust is mainly a
question of a common identity. The common identity is partly forged
through a common culture. The territorial state provides the
condition for the flourishing of that culture. As I explained earlier,
some have argued recently that "cosmopolitan citizenship" is the
more defensible alternative to the territorial state. But the
cosmopolitan citizen will still need a local bounded community in
order to be a citizen at all. 262 "Democratic citizenship requires
commitment, commitment requires accountability and deepening of
attachments. ' 263 There cannot be accountability and deepening of
attachments in a global framework. Indeed, a great deal of the
current discontent about globalization stems precisely from the fact
that people believe that decisions that have enormous impact on their
lives are being made by people and institutions who are not
accountable to them.
As to the link between individual freedom and the nation-state,
as many have argued, the common culture that the nation-state
provides enables those members to have meaningful options as to
how they could lead their lives, 264 in the sense that "familiarity with

261.

See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM. (2001); see also Sunstein,

supra note 256, at 4. Sunstein argues that there are two ingredients that are required
for a successful deliberative democracy: a range of common experiences and unchosen
and unanticipated encounters with diverse views and topics. He then suggests that
because of its ability to allow individuals to custom-design their encounters the
Internet may seriously undermined the two values. To be sure, Sunstein does not have
the empirical evidence to conclude that that is in fact the case, but his argument seems
to indicate that he thinks that it is a real possibility. While not questioning his
assumption as to what values democracy requires, some have challenged the view that
the Internet may in fact undermine those values. See, e.g., Simson Garfinkel,
Mathematics of Growth, 26 BOSTON REV. 10 (Summer 2001).
262.

BENHABIB, supra note 5, at 183.

263.
Id.
264.
Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL.
439, 449 (1990).
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a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable." 265 The
communication revolution and the unrestrained or unregulated flow
of interborder information weaken those cultural structures within
which the individual makes choices and makes sense of those choices.
The weakening or decay of the cultural structure leads to the
shrinking of "the options and opportunities open to members" of the
culture. 266 Freedom in its robust sense does not define the transient
and rootless individual, the individual without commitments and
attachments, the individual who has shrunk "into [an] e-mail address
267
in space."
Despite the claim that the unimpeded flow of international
communications will be conducive to the development of democracy
and cosmopolitanism, the inverse may in fact be the case. The current
process of interborder communication could be said to undermine the
conditions for the development of democracy in a number of ways,
especially in the developing countries. First, quite often the
entertainment and news information that circulates around the world
originates mainly from the developed world. Indeed, a handful of
western agencies and electronic media dominate what is to be heard
and viewed. The world is defined unilaterally.
Some may argue that the Internet has no such constraint and
that every individual is a publisher as well as a consumer of
information. 268 There is no one big medium that acts as the
gatekeeper in terms of the information flow. 269 But that only tells
part of the story about the Internet. 270 A close study of news
information that circulates among Internet users shows that a great
deal of that information originates from one of the four major
international news agencies or any of the handful of electronic and
271
print media, all of which are Western.

265.
Id.
266.
Id.
267.
BENHABIB, supra note 5, at 182.
268.
The user of the Internet could be viewed simultaneously as a publisher and
a consumer to the extent that the user can send as well as receive mass messages.
269.
Individuals have various alternative sources of information-radio,
television, cable, Internet, etc.
270.
Jacques Attali, The Crash of Western Civilization: The Limits of the Market
and Democracy, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1997, at 54, 60. Jacques Attali observes that
free market (including unregulated information market) and democracy may be
inherently contradictory. And he believes that unregulated flow of information such as
the Internet "will continue to erode democratic institutions ....Eventually, democracy
will fade away, having been replaced by market mechanisms and corruption. We will
have a kind of market dictatorship, a 'lumpen market,' without strong democratic
institutions to serve as countervailing powers." Id.
271.
Take for example the Ethio.Eritrean war of the 1990s. The news items that
circulated among Internet users about the war came from the major news agencies,
The Associated Press (AP), Agence France Presse (AFP) and Reuters dominate the flow
of information. In the area of newspapers, major U.S. newspapers such as the New
York Times and the Washington Post as well as major European papers such as the
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Second, increasingly the media, both at the domestic and
international level, is being owned by fewer and fewer media
conglomerates which have their headquarters in the developed
Western world. 272 What can be read, heard, and viewed (and how it
will be heard and viewed) will be determined by fewer and fewer
institutions and entities if the international media market goes
unregulated. 273 Decisions about what information is to be collected
and for what purpose-generally why and by whom information is to
be collected and disseminated-are essentially being made in local
terms and from localist perspectives, rather than from a universalist
or gloabalist perspective, as it is often imagined. It is true that as a
result of the emergence of sophisticated communication technologies
people around the world will increasingly consume the same or
similar cultural products, hear or view the same or similar stories at
roughly the same time, and interact with people from different parts
of the globe. 274 That, however, does not make the globe a village, for
the entities (private or public) that collect, process, disseminate, or
appropriate information on the international level do so in the context
of particular cultures and political institutions. It is these political
and cultural institutions that enable the communication market to
decide how the world is to be described and understood-who the
virtuous and the villains are, what constitutes the good and the
right-both across borders and within borders.

London Times supplied the information. And in terms of the electronic media, The
Voice of America, CNN and the BBC were the sources of the information circulating in
the Internet. For a general observation about the phenomenon see CEES HAMELINK,
WORLD COMMUNICATIONS: DISEMPOWERMENT & SELF-EMPOWERMENT 43-44
(1995); Oliver Boyd-Barrett & Daya Kishan Thussu, NWICO Strategies and Media
Imperialism: The Case of Regional News Exchange, in BEYOND NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1990S, 177, 182 (Kaarle
Nordensteng & Herbert Schiller eds., 1993) ("Most of the world news flow emanates
from major transnational agencies (these include the 'big four' agencies-AP, UPI,
Reuters, and the AFP-and the world's larges television news enterprises ... many of
them Western-based)"). For an extended discussion of the phenomenon see Addis,
supra note 90, at 520-27; see also THUSSU, supra note 97, at 151-55.
272.
Boyd-Barrett & Thussu, supranote 271, at 177.
273.
Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation is a case in point. Liberalization and
deregulation have enabled the News Corporation, headquartered in Australia, to own
and control various media around the world and to integrate them vertically. In its
1999 annual report, News Corporation tells us that it is "vertically integrated ... on a
global scale [and that] in the course of 24 hours [it] reaches nearly half a billion people
in more than 70 countries." THUSSU, supra note 97, at 107. The report continues, "[w]e
are reaching people from the moment [people] wake up until they fall asleep." Id.
274.
See HAMELINK, supra note 271, at 83; CARLA BROOKS JOHNSTON,
WINNING THE GLOBAL TV NEWS GAME 22 (1995); THUSSU, supra note 97, at 159;
Richard Covington, Television Newscasters Vie for Global Audience: CNN and BBC Act
Locally to Conquer Viewers, INT'L HERALD*TRIB., Apr. 23, 1997, at 1; see also Claude
Moisy, Myths of the Global Information Village, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1997, at 78.
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Let me explain the point, taking international news as an
example. The dissemination of international news has a "localist"
character in two senses: on the level of what media institutions
choose to communicate, which correlatively informs what they
exclude from the act of communication; 275 or how what is selected for
communication gets communicated. In terms of the first, the evidence
seems to show that the international media (the Western media)
devotes most of its coverage to developed countries. 276 Quite often
developing countries or societies, where most of humanity lives, do
not even register in the radar of the international media, unless, of
course, the event implicates the interest of developed countries. The
U.S. media is a good example. The U.S. media rarely goes to places or
reports on events that are not viewed as implicating the interest of
the United States. 277 The first issue could, therefore, be described as
one of localism affecting the quantity of coverage: the more an event
looks to have a local dimension the more likely that it will be a news
event.
The second dimension of localism could be referred to as the
qualitative dimension. The issue here is that even when non-local (the
"Other") peoples and countries get covered as more than an extension
of the local, the coverage tends to be informed by a stereotypical view

275.
This argument is developed by Owen Fiss in relation to the media in this
country. See generally OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Owen M.
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, (1986); Owen M. Fiss,
Why the State? 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987). In relation to the international context
see generally Addis, supra note 90. The remarks in this paragraph track the argument
in this article.
276.
"The rich countries which represent some 30 percent of the world's
population, account for almost 80 percent of the world's press circulation, and the poor
countries with some 70 percent of the world's population have only 20 percent of the
total newspaper circulation." HAMELINK, supra note 271, at 41. "In the market-driven
media environment . . . the coverage of the South [developing world], already
'deplorably infrequent and misleading' may be further reduced." THUSSU, supra note
97, at 165, citing C. Patterson, Global Battlefields, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF NEWS
(0. Boyd-Barrett & T. Rantanen eds., 1992).
277.
An article shows that as people in the United States continue to talk about
the "global village," information about that "village" is actually declining.
As a percentage of all topics covered between 1970 and 1995 [by the major
networks] the share of foreign stories fell from 35 per cent to 23 per cent, and
the average length of those stories dropped from 1.7 minutes to 1.2 minutes.
Worse, while the networks devoted on average more than 40 percent of total
news time to foreign items in the 1970s, that share had been cut to 13.5 percent
of news by 1995.
Claude Moisy, supra note 274, at 82. I suspect as a general matter, the decline would
even be more pronounced in relation to news from developing countries. And that is
from an extremely low base to start with. See also Garrick Utley, The Shrinking of
ForeignNews: From Broadcast to Narrowcast, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 1-2.
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of these societies. 278 A developing country, for example, becomes of
interest to the international media when it offers strange
personalities 2 79 or when there is a national disaster such as famine or
a coup d' 6tat or at moments when the country is regarded as
280
stridently anti-West.
The complaint here is not that the international media reports
negative news about developing countries, though it does do that
disproportionately-with repect to the negative news that it reports
about developed countries even taking into account the possibility
that there are more negative events regarding the former. Nor is the
purpose to fault the media for practicing "journalism of
exceptions. '28 ' The international media is not alone in that. In fact,

278.
A 1987 study examined how eight prestigious U.S. newspapers covered the
three worlds-the First World, which consisted of the developed countries, the Second
World, which referred to the then communist world, and the Third World, which
referred to the developing countries-concluded that the coverage of the Third World
"is skewed to the sensational." W. James Potter, News from Three Worlds in Prestige
U.S. Newspapers, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 73, 78 (1987). As the authors of the study
observed: "News coverage about the Third World ... is much more likely to be
sensational in nature, while the coverage of Western events is more likely to display
balance between government stories and sensational stories." Id. at 276; see also
JOHAN GALTUNG & RICHARD C. VINCENT, GLOBAL GLASNOST: TOWARDS A NEW
WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER 8 (1992). ("[W]e cannot escape
the conclusion that reporting about the periphery countries [the Third World] will not
only be scant, but also highly negative, and even more so for news about the periphery
people in periphery countries."). The literary theorist Rey Chow has called the process
of reporting about the Third World as the "King Kong Syndrome" in which the Third
World becomes "the site of the material that is 'monstrosity,' is produced for the
surplus value of spectacle, entertainment ... for the 'First World."' Rey Chow, Violence
in the Other Country: China as Crisis, Spectacle, and Woman, in THIRD WORLD
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 81, 84 (Chandra Talpade Mohanty ed.,
1991), cited in Leti Volp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L REV. 1181,
1188-89 (2001); see also Beverly G. Hawk, African Politics and American Reporting, in
MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 157 (Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie, & Folu F.
Ogundimu eds., 2002).
279.
A good example is the coverage that the Western media devoted to Idi Amin
in the 1970s. Idi Amin was the notorious and comical dictator who ruled over
(tormented) Uganda from 1971 until 1978. Another dictator with whom the Western
media was obsessed was Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who ruled over the Central African
Republic from 1965 to 1979. Bokassa crowned himself as emperor of the "Republic."
Both of these personalities were simultaneously cruel and an embarrassment to their
people. The reason that the Western media was obsessed with these two figures was
not, however, because these two figures were cruel, for there were many other cruel
leaders both in the continent and elsewhere. Rather, it was because the Western media
found these personalities, especially Idi Amin, highly amusing and their stories salable
to its audience. The behavior and actions of these individuals reinforced the prejudices
that Western journalists have about that part of the world. For an extensive discussion
of Africa's media image internationally see generally a collection of essays in AFRICA'S
MEDIA IMAGE (Beverly G. Hawk ed., 1992).
280.
See generally Potter, supra note 278.
281.
For the notion of "journalism of exceptions" see Addis, supra note 90, 518;
Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2253, 2265 (1993). The phrase is used
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"journalism of exceptions" is, to one degree or another, a defining
feature of all media. Rather, the purpose is to point out that the
cosmopolitan assumption of an international market of information
unconstrained by the political and social culture of the community
from which it originates (or by which it is informed) is, for various
reasons, implausible. 28 2 How can one function, except within the
context of, and defined by, the social and political culture within
which one is primarily located? It is through the prism of the local
that the world is made sense of.
Furthermore, it is no argument to claim that it is the consumer,
rather than the media, who dictates what kind of information is to be
gathered and disseminated. To start with, when the world is divided
by cultural and political assumptions and commitments, as is the
case between developed and developing countries and indeed among
countries even within the particular grouping, and when the
international media generally relies on the audience of one section of
the international community for its economic survival and prosperity
(that is, the consumer from the developed countries), the argument of
"consumer sovereignty" begs the issue. Which consumer is sovereign?
Responding to the complaint of the audience from the developing
countries, that they rarely become of interest to the international
media unless an event fits within the stereotype held by the West
about the peoples, cultures, and institutions of these societies, by
invoking the rights of the audience from the West, is not a response
at all.
In addition, even as a general matter, the relationship between
consumer desires and institutional actions is not often, if at all,
causally one directional where the sovereign consumer dictates to the
powerless institution what the latter should provide the former. As
many have argued, the dynamic is quite different. Consumers' wants
and desires, even what pass as needs, are socially produced, and
institutions (such as the media) are part of what helps produce that
predisposition. 28 3 But the point here is that whatever the reasons, it
is clear that the actions of the international media are locally
constrained and hence the idea that an unregulated information
market will usher in the cosmopolitan society is consequently flawed.
To summarize, the idea that international private media will
help usher in the cosmopolitan society with a democratized
international civil society, misconceives the nature of the information
market generally and the international media specifically. Despite

to refer to the general practice of the mass media to view news in terms of unusual and
exceptional events. As a general matter, an event will be regarded as a news item if,
under the circumstances, it is seen to be an exceptional event.
282.
Addis, supra note 90, at 520-27.
283.
See generally WILLIAM LEISS, THE LIMITS TO SATISFACTION: AN ESSAY
ON THE PROBLEMS OF NEEDS AND COMMODITIES (1988).
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pretension to the contrary, the media views and reports issues and
events from a localist perspective: localist in what it chooses to report
and how it reports that which it has chosen as being news-worthy.
The implications of such reporting are that the world is imagined and
described from a particular tradition. Ironically, what the
international media is able to do is not only to incline people in the
West to think of other traditions and cultures in a particular and
often stereotypical way, but it also becomes the primary means by
which people in the non-western world form their own image. And
this is not just about image in the abstract sense. Those images have
policy consequences. They play a role in what policies governments
28 4
adopt towards those societies or cultures.
The third way in which democracy is undermined by the
unregulated flow of information across national boundaries is the
ability of corporations to move information out of territorial
communities without the community having much say in the
movement of such information. Good examples of this are TBDFs
(such as personal information) and remote sensing activities each of
which I have described in some detail in this paper. To the extent
that the outflow of such information cannot be unilaterally regulated
by the state, important functions of the state-protecting the privacy
interest of citizens and the natural resources of the country-are
undermined. If matters that have important effects on citizens and on
the resources of the country are made by outsiders, then one could
say that an important aspect of democracy is lacking. After all,
democracy is about running one's affairs.
However, for the reasons that I set out earlier, it is also the case
that in this global era a strongly autonomous state is neither
politically sustainable nor even attractive. To restate the argument,
the idea of the thick state is not sustainable because of the continuing
globalization of economic, social, cultural and political life powerfully
supported and facilitated by the communications revolution. It is not
attractive, because in the name of the thick state and external selfdetermination, governments of various countries have often denied
and will continue to deny their citizens the right of internal selfdetermination. 28 5 External self-determination is often invoked as an
excuse to restrict internal self-determination. To quote Russell
Hardin: "Nation-states are contingently morally good for what they

284.
U.S. media reports on Africa "tend to influence U.S. policy, especially since
so few policy-makers really have a good understanding of their own of what is
happening in Africa .... Policy toward that continent, therefore, becomes
superficial..." Hawk, supra note 279, at 157.
285.
Russell Hardin, Group Boundaries, Individual Barriers, in BOUNDARIES
AND JUSTICE: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 276, 277 (David Miller & Sohail H.

Hashmi eds., 2001).
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can achieve-although they are also contingently morally bad for
what they can achieve. 28 6
b. The Thin State: Plurality and Subsidiarity
i. Subsidiarity
I mentioned earlier that the idea of a thin state might enable us
to reconcile the demands of external and internal self-determinations
of localism and universalism. How would the idea of a thin state
institutionally manifest itself? There are two principles that organize
the institutions of a thin state (thin state sovereignty), at least in
relation to the interborder flow of information: the principle of
plurality (internal pluralism) and the idea of subsidiarity
28 7
(international pluralism).
The principle of plurality suggests that a legitimate state is one
that tolerates, even encourages, pluralism within its borders. 28 8 Here
I am in agreement with liberal sovereignists. If a state is to be viewed
in its international standing as fully representing its people then
there must be institutional structures in place to make the state
accountable to all segments of its population. To be more precise,
there must be the political and social space that ensures that citizens
have full and equal opportunity to make the state responsive to their

286.
Id. at 290.
287.
The notion (doctrine) of subsidiarity was recognized in Article 5 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, the Treaty of Amsterdam. Subsidiarity
is a principle that says that powers and tasks should be lodged in subunits unless a
larger and more comprehensive unit can achieve the particular goal in question. Article
5 provides:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall
within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community.
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. See also George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 338 (1994). The doctrine began to emerge from several
different venues in the early 1980s long before it was incorporated in the Basic Law of
the Community in 1992 as Article 5 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. See generally
Christian Timmermans, Subsidiarity and Transparency,22 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 106
(1999).
288.
See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF EQUALITY 1 (2000).
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needs and concerns. 28 9 Now, there are many conditions that will
facilitate the active participation of citizens and the responsiveness of
the state to those citizens. 290 One of those is an environment where
there is free flow of information, unimpeded either by the
(monopolistic) market or by the government itself. Indeed, many
international and regional human rights documents, including the
International Bill of Rights, 291 affirm the importance of free flow of
information for the decency of a society's political institutions. 292 Free
flow of information is among the necessary political incentives for the
regime to secure decent economic, social, and legal conditions for
citizens. 29 3 Not only that, but even in relation to culture, as Amartya

289.
On this point see id. ("No government is legitimate that does not show
equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion."). See also
Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 209, 214 ("[A] state is legitimate or not depending upon the 'fit' of
government and community, that is the degree to which the government actually
represents the political life of its people.").
290.
Ronald Dworkin, for example, has forcefully argued in several books,
including Sovereign Virtue, that an essential part of why it means to be treated by
government with equal concern and to have equal opportunity to make the state
responsive to one's needs is to be provided with equal resources. DWORKIN, supra note
288. Dworkin argues that equal concern requires government to equalize the resources
each of its citizens has for constructing a successful life. Id.
291.
The phrase "International Bill of Rights" refers to three international
human rights documents. See UDHR, supra note 84; ICCPR, supra note 66;
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
292.
In relation to international human rights documents see UDHR, supra note
84, art. 19; ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19. Regional human rights documents such as
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and the American Convention on Human Rights provide for the protection of
freedom of expression and free flow of information in similar terms as those provided
for by the international conventions. See European Convention, supranote 127, art. 10;
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 13, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9
I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
It is interesting to note that in his Law of Peoples, John Rawls does include
freedom of expression or freedom of speech in the list of basic human rights that are to
be respected internally if the external sovereignty of a people is to be respected.
RAWLS, supra note 51.
293.
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 147-48, 154-55
(1999):
[There exist] extensive interconnections between political freedoms [such as
freedom of expression] and the understanding and fulfillment of economic
needs. The connections are not only instrumental... but also constructive. Our
conceptualization of economic needs depends crucially on open public debates
and discussions. . . Furthermore, to express publicly what we value and to
demand that attention be paid to it, we need free speech and democratic choice.
Id. See also Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 46 (1992).
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Sen has sensibly concluded, without freedom of expression and other
democratic processes it may not be easy to tell which interpretation of
a particular culture is a mere imposition by an authoritarian power
holder and which is widely held and justifiable. 294 One may also add
that given the fact that cultures do get transformed, it is essential
that such transformation take place within the context where there
are opportunities for the widest possible participation of members of
the community. 295 To say this of course is to affirm the contingent
nature of culture.
Note, however, how the pluralism within may have an impact on
our other concern, the attempt at pluralization among nations and
peoples. If we value dialogue among members of a particular
territorial community as being an essential condition for developing a
more defensible and sustainable cultural practice (rather than one
dictated from above by a handful of people), then the same would
apply to intercultural and international engagements. The
defensibility of international practices and institutions resulting from
intercultural and international "interactions" would depend on
whether those interactions were a result of dialogues or monologues.
How does one deal with the threat of homogenization that the
monologic international communication process poses? Here is where
the idea of subsidiarity comes in. The notion of subsidiarity, the idea
that powers and tasks be vested in subunits (nation-states) unless
larger units (regional and international organizations) are sufficiently
equipped to achieve the particular goals at issue, acknowledges that
boundaries though historically drawn and contingent may indeed
serve the important purpose of ensuring pluralism on the
international level. How is international pluralism to be
institutionally provided in an age of globalization where the capacity
of the territorial unit to be "the ultimate agency of self-conscious
political action" 296 is being seriously challenged? It is only in terms of
international agreements and coordination that the notion of
subsidiarity could in fact be put in operation. Unlike in the European
Union context in which the notion of subsidiarity initially emerged,
the idea, as I use it here, is not only about restraining the larger unit
in some circumstances so that the smaller units can act without the
threat of review by the larger unit. It is also about the international

[The world is witnessing] the emergence of a community of expectation: that
those who seek the validation of their empowerment [must] govern with the
consent of the governed. Democracy, thus, is on the way to becoming a global
entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by the
collective international processes.

Id.
294.
295.
296.

SEN, supra note 293, at 227-48.
Id. at 142.
CONNOLLY, supra note 23, at 201.
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community concluding an agreement empowering the smaller units,
giving them the space, to develop "a scheme of social justice [and] to
protect [their] distinctive culture[s] ''297 that globalization generally
and the communication process specifically are increasingly making
difficult. So, subsidiarity has two dimensions: the right to be free
from imperial interference; and the right to participate in the life of
the international community and in the constitution of the common
world.
In terms of international flow of information, subsidiarity will be
ensured through two distinct but interrelated ways. The first would
be the adoption of a comprehensive international agreement on
interborder flow of information that should include four elements (the
first dimension of subsidiarity). Such an accord should affirm and
protect the flow of information over which there is an overlapping
international consensus that the unimpeded flow of such information
across national boundaries is important for a globalized and
increasingly interconnected international society and for the
cultivation of internal freedom. The free flow of news, I will suggest
later, is an example of this. Of course, the other aspect of this first
point is that the agreement could also prohibit the flow of information
about which there is a consensus that it merits no protection. Child
pornography is a good example of that. The Council of Europe has, for
298
example, taken that position.
The agreement should also provide a framework that will enable
territorial communities to exclude information about whose value
there is reasonable difference. Sexually explicit material directed at
adults as well as what is referred to as hate and racist speech are
good examples. Finally, the agreement must prescribe international
minimum standards to apply with regard to the outflow of certain
kinds of data. The movement of personal data is a good example. I
shall explore later in more detail the form that the agreement should
take.

297.
MILLER, supra note 239, at 104.
298.
See Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, art. 9,
E.T.S. No. 185 (adopted November 23, 2001).
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when
committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct: a. producing
child pornography for the purpose of its distribution through a computer
system; b. offering or making available child pornography through a computer
system; c. distributing or transmitting child pornography through a computer
system; d. procuring child pornography through a computer system for oneself
or for another person; e. possessing child pornography in a computer system or
on a computer-data storage medium.
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As I mentioned earlier, subsidiarity in relation to international
society has also another dimension, a positive dimension.
Subsidiarity is not simply one of the international community
allowing territorial states to do what they can do well without
restriction or interference from the top, but it is also about
affirmatively empowering nation-states to do certain things well. In
29 9
this sense, subsidiarity can be understood as "empowering right'
(the second dimension of subsidiarity). This second dimension of
subsidiarity is about the international community empowering local
communities in the various territorial states so that those
communities will have the resources to be active participants in the
creation and transformation of the common lifeworld that members of
30 0
the international community inhabit or wish to inhabit.
There are three reasons why this empowering right becomes
important. First, to the extent that the lifeworld is partly and
perhaps significantly constituted narratively, it becomes important
that the narratives of various cultures and systems (including those
from developing countries and communities) are able to interrogate
one another. 30 1 The legitimacy of the international order, the
legitimacy of the international community that is imagined, depends
not only on what the institutions that are put in place do and whether
they, in fact, do what they are meant to do, but also on how those
institutions, and the background (common) knowledge that made
their emergence and functioning possible or necessary, are created.
Second, not only would there be a fuller collective understanding
of international institutions and actions if the background world (the
lifeworld) were constituted with active participation of the various
cultures and systems in the world, but such networks of
communications also suggest that to be a full participant in the
constitution of the common lifeworld, to participate in the collective
imagining of the nature of the international community, is to be
recognized as an equal partner. The need to provide the framework

299.
300.

HELD, supra note 68, at 223.
The concept of "lifeworld" was first used and developed by Juirgen

Habermas. See JURGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM; A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 113-52 (Thomas

McCarthy ed., 1987). By "lifeworld" Habermas meant to refer to the taken-for-granted
world of the relevant society (national or international) that is experienced by actors as
one of commonsense and unproblematic. Id. at 130-35. The lifeworld is a supply of
collective interpretation of the world and of the actors that do the interpreting. It
comes in the form of common language, culture, common history and a common system
of norms that are perceived as legitimate. The lifeworld, therefore, is the common
knowledge that provides actors with the repertoire of collective understanding to which
they can refer when they make claims and assertions.
301.
I have made this point more fully in a recent article. See Addis, supra note
206, at 588-99, 616.
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for all nations and communities to be able to narrate their stories can
30 2
therefore be justified on both utilitarian and identitarian grounds.
Third, contrary to what critics may think, the empowering aspect
of subsidiarity is premised on the possibility of gradual "fusion of
horizons," to use a Gadamerian phrase, 30 3 rather than on the
presumption of incommensurability of values 30 4 and civilizations that
some have asserted define the world. 30 5 Informational empowerment
of different communities, and the ability of various communities to
participate in the naming and transforming of the world, is to prepare
the condition for the possibility of more and more overlapping
consensus of relatively disparate background traditions and
communities where there is more (unforced) consensus and that
consensus evolves into mutual understanding and perhaps fusion of
horizons. 30 6 Under this vision different traditions and cultures
mutually enlarge and elevate one another's views about various
things such as what constitutes legitimate sovereignty, individual
autonomy, the relationship between the individual and the
community (individual rights vs. individual responsibilities), and
democracy itself. 30 7 What otherwise may appear to be closed
traditions may be transformed in this way.
ii. IPDC as an Aspect of Subsidiarity
Let me give as an example (admittedly, not a robust or well
developed example) of this second aspect of subsidiarity an
international (intergovernmental) program in the area of
communication. The International Programme for Development of
Communication (IPDC) was established by the U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 30 8 in the aftermath
of an intense and truculent international debate about the
international communication process that developing countries saw
as biased in favor of developed countries, and as one in need of major

302.
For a fuller description of the identitarian and utilitarian views (in the
context of economic sanctions), see id.
303.
304.

See HANS-GEORG GADAMAR, TRUTH AND METHOD 273 (1975).
See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY

(1990).
305.
See generally SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND
THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).

306.

See Charles Taylor, Conditions of Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, in

THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 124 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel

Bell eds., 1999).
307.
Id.
308.
IPDC was established in 1980 by a resolution at the twenty-first session of
the General Conference of UNESCO. The Programme was placed within the
Communication and Information Sector of UNESCO. See UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res.
4/21 21st Sess. (1980).
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restructuring. 30 9 Interestingly, IPDC was sponsored and pushed by
the United States which was the strongest opponent of the attempt
by the developing world, assisted by the Soviet Bloc, to establish what
the proponents called a new world information and communication
order (NWICO). 310 The establishment of the IPDC indicated that
even though many developed countries thought that the idea of
NWICO was unacceptable to the extent that it envisioned
empowering governments to restrict the free flow of information
across national boundaries that there was in fact a legitimate
complaint that the current structure within which information flowed
across national boundaries was highly inequitable and very
unfavorable to developing societies. In other words, the international
communication process was monologic.
The premise of the IPDC was, therefore, that one way to reduce
that unfavorable condition was to help these societies develop their
indigenous media so that these societies would not rely on others to
tell their stories not only to others but to themselves as well. 31 1 Let
me emphasize at the outset that my purpose in invoking the IPDC as
an example is not to suggest the IPDC is the ideal or even the most
appropriate institutional setup for the purpose of pursuing the second

309.
The debate, which lasted from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, was about
whether there was a need to establish what the developing countries referred to as the
new world information and communication order (NWICO). From the developing
countries' point of view, the NWICO was needed, for the existing international
structure within which information flows across national boundaries was thought to
favor the developed world. The developed countries, on the other hand, defended the
status quo and charged that leaders of developing countries, many of whom had never
faced their citizens in open elections, simply wanted to control the communication
process so as to ensure that there were no alternative voices to the official propaganda
and that the idea of a NWICO was simply a code word for that authoritarian control.
The call for NWICO focused on three types of information raising overlapping, but also
distinct, issues: data processing and transmission (such as remote sensing and
transborder data flow), which among other things raises the issues of national
sovereignty and national security; entertainment, such as films and television
programs, raising the issue of cultural invasion and the loss of cultural identity; and
the structural imbalance in the gathering, selection and flow of international news.
NWICO as a political movement ran out of steam and collapsed under the pressure
of the private and public institutions from the developed countries, especially the
United States. The United States and Great Britain, for example, left UNESCO in
1984 and 1985, respectively, partly because of UNESCO's central role in the
development of and debate about the NWICO. For the intense criticism of NWICO by
the Western media, especially the U.S. media, see George Gerbner, Unesco in the U.S.
Press, in THE GLOBAL MEDIA DEBATE: ITS RISE, FALL, AND RENEWAL 111 (George
Gerbner et al. eds., 1993). Although NWICO as a political movement ran out of steam
and collapsed, one specific project emerged out of that divisive debate and process,
IPDC.
310.
As it turned out, the United States left UNESCO partly because of the
NWICO debate. The United States was to remain outside the UNESCO until its very
recent return to the organization.
311.
See MOWLANA, supra note 121, at 92-102, 179-81 (discussing community
values and the quest for a new world order).
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aspect of subsidiarity. Rather, the purpose is to indicate that if the
second aspect of subsidarity is to be pursued, one way would be
through intergovernmental institutions that empower less developed
countries with informational capacities. It is not the specific
institutional setup that is of interest here, but the idea of such an
institution.
But having made the above cautionary point, let me now briefly
explore what precisely the IPDC does to support the emergence of
multiple voices. The resolution establishing the IPDC declares that
the intention was "to increase co-operation and assistance for the
development of communication infrastructures and to reduce the gap
between various countries in the communication field."3 12 The gap
with which the resolution was concerned was that between developed
and developing countries. 313 The strategy by which this gap was to be
reduced, the resolution tells us, was by assisting developing countries
in the development and implementation of communication
infrastructure plans and the training of personnel so as to increase
the production of endogenous programs as well as to promote
improved exchange of international news.3 14 To that end, the Council
that heads the IPDC was charged to seek necessary resources from
Member States and other sources to assist programs that target the
development of communication infrastructures in (developing)
3 15
countries.
Over the years since its inception, the IPDC has financed
communication infrastructures in the developing countries in both
the public and private sectors, focusing on infrastructures that
improve the production, processing, and flow of information both
within a nation and among nations, especially nations within a
region.3 16 Although financial contributions to the Programme have

312.
See UNESCO Gen. Conf.Res. 4/21, supranote 308, pmbl.
313.
Id.
314.
The formation of the IPDC was seen as forming "part of the efforts for the
establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and
communication order." See id.
315.
See id. art. 5. The major element of the finance for the Programme comes
from voluntary contributions by countries that are members of UNESCO. International
and intergovernmental organizations and individuals make contributions as well. The
United States, which was the major mover for the establishment of the IPDC has been
rather half-hearted in its subsequent financial support for the Programme.
316.
From 1996 to 2001, 244 projects were financed from the IPDC Special
Account. The projects cost $11,094,000. Of this amount, $3,382,000 went to regional
and national projects from Africa. A total of $3,057,000 was spent on projects in Asia
and the Pacific. Latin America and the Caribbean received $2,369,000 for national and
regional projects. Projects from Arab states and Europe received $1,201,000 and
$602,000 respectively, while interregional projects were financed in the amount of
$483,000. See IPOC Report 31C/REP/17, 31st Sess. (1996-2001). The total amount of
money the Commission spent in funding projects between 1982 and 1996 was
$28,451,500. The sorts of projects funded, as I indicated earlier, are ones that are seen
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been less than satisfactory, the idea underlying the establishment of
the IPDC, I believe, is a good one. Indeed, the establishment and
development of similar programs in other intergovernmental and
international institutions dealing with international communications
such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) will be
most helpful. 317 The development of the capacity of peoples from the
developing countries to be participants in the market where the very
identities of communities, their agency, and the common lifeworld,
are constructed seems to me to be crucial. The IPDC is, therefore, an
example of what I have referred to as the second aspect of
subsidiarity, an attempt, to use the title of a high-profile if
controversial UNESCO report on the subject of international
communication to prepare the condition for "many voices, one
318
world."
iii. International Agreements and Subsidiarity
As I mentioned earlier, in terms of information flow, there is
another aspect of subsidiarity, what I have referred to as the first
aspect of subsidiarity. That is the idea that the international
community should adopt a comprehensive agreement on international
flow of information across national boundaries, something as
comprehensive as, say, the Outer Space Treaty. 319 The agreement, as
I indicated earlier, should be guided by four objectives. The first
objective would be to affirm and protect the free flow of information
about which there is an overlapping international consensus that the

to help develop a nation's indigenous capacity to produce programs and to promote
improved exchange of international news.
317.
ITU is the international organization that is primarily responsible for the
coordination and regulation of international telecommunication. It is the international
equivalent of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC). For the history of
the
ITU
see
GEORGE
ARTHUR
CODDING,
JR.,
THE
INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 131-79 (1952). Indeed, part of ITU's mission is to work

towards the goal of developing telecommunications networks and services in all
countries, especially developing countries by providing information and advice on
policy and structural options; by promoting the development and expansion of
telecommunication networks; by promoting and coordinating programs to accelerate
transfer of technologies to developing countries; and to "give special assistance to the
least developed countries." See International Communication Union, Final Act of the
Additional Plenipotentiary Conference 1992, art. 14.
318.
INT'L COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY
VOICES, ONE WORLD: TOWARDS A NEW MORE JUST AND MORE EFFICIENT WORLD
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER (1980). Recently, the ethics of

globalization, the idea of one world with many voices, was also explored by the noted
philosopher, Peter Singer. See generally PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF
GLOBALIZATION (2002).

319.
See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
supra note 177.
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unimpeded flow of such information across national boundaries is
important for a globalized and increasingly interconnected
international society and for the cultivation of internal freedom. To
some extent this will be incorporating the ideas found in the various
freedom of expression provisions of international and regional human
rights documents such as Article 19 of the Universal Declaration and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights.3 20 Those documents indicate that there is an overlapping
consensus about the value of unimpeded flow of international news
both for the cultivation of internal self-determination and for the
process of defining a common lifeworld on the international plane.
It seems clear why the unimpeded flow of international news is
important for the purpose of cultivating internal self-determination.
International news connects citizens to other countries and systems,
allowing them to see how others with similar problems and issues
deal with them. Put simply, citizens of a country may, due to
information that they have gotten through the international media,
realize that there are alternative ways of organizing government or
other institutions. The information may serve as the benchmark by
which citizens will judge the performance of those who govern them
and the institutions that they inhabit. Even if not a benchmark, it
certainly will serve as a frame of reference.
As to the importance of the free flow of international news for the
cultivation of a common lifeworld, such a state of affairs along with
the existence of indigenous communication structures in the less
developed countries (developed through programs such as the IPDC)
will make it likely that the common lifeworld that we will inhabit, the
international community that we will imagine and shape, will be
constituted through the narratives of various cultures, systems, and
regions. Indeed the point here is that the emergence of the common
lifeworld requires, paradoxically, the initial pluralization of that
lifeworld. In the same way that "cosmopolitan citizenship" in the
Kantian sense could be possible only against a background of "the
citizen's attachment to a specific republic," the development of a
multicultural common lifeworld will require the existence and
importance of local cultures to which individuals are attached.
The second objective of the agreement would be to prohibit the
flow of information about which there is overlapping consensus that
such information merits no protection. As I noted earlier, child
pornography is perhaps a good example of that, but there are others.

320.
See ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19; ECHR, supra note 66, art. 10. Article 13
of the American Convention on Human Rights provides for similar protection of
freedom of thought and expression. American Convention, supra note 292, art. 13.
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Of course, the consequence of adopting such prohibition is that
parties to the convention will be required to enact procedural
provisions necessary for implementing the relevant provisions of the
convention. The Convention on Cybercrime may provide a good
example. 321 The Convention, which was adopted in 2001 by members
of the Council of Europe, which includes the United States, requires a
signatory state to "adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish [certain acts] criminal offences under its
domestic law. '' 32 2 Indicating an overlapping consensus about the
excludability of child pornography, the Convention makes it a crime
to produce child pornography for purposes of distribution or making it
available for others to view.3 23 I think there is such a consensus
worldwide that an international convention could easily follow the
Cybercrime Convention in prohibiting the production and
3 24
international circulation of such information.
The third objective of a comprehensive international agreement
in this area is to provide for a framework that will enable the state,
consistent with the procedures in place within the state itself, to
exclude information about whose value there are reasonable
international differences. Sexually explicit material directed at
adults, or the gratuitously offensive portrayals of objects of religious
veneration, are good examples of that. This, of course, already
happens at the regional level. As the European Court of Human
Rights observed in Otto-Preminger-Institutv. Austria,325 the reason
why states should be provided a wide margin of appreciation in
relation to information of this sort is that "there is no uniform
'326
conception" of morality or of "the significance of religion in society.
If, as the European Human Rights Court observed, there is no
consensus within Europe about these matters, it is even more certain
and less puzzling that such consensus does not exist on the
international level. It goes without saying that the traditions and
cultures that define our world are more complex and varied than

321.

Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 298.

322.

See id; see also Jonathan Band, Convention Raises Issues for ISPs, NAT'L

L.J., July 15, 2002, at B16.
323.
See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 298, art. 9.
324.
Even in the United States, which is perhaps the most protective of free
speech, child pornography is generally said not to enjoy First Amendment protection.
To be sure, there is an outer limit to such prohibition. Thus, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition the U.S. Supreme Court held that a prohibition on nonobscene virtual child
pornography violated the First Amendment. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
325.
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 395 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994),
reprinted in 15 Hum. Rts. L.J. 371 (1994).
326.
Id. at 376. The ICCPR has limitations within it that could be said to allow
restriction of such information. But the point of course is that the ICCPR as it
currently exists only allows states to restrict materials for specified purposes only if the
state is capable of doing it unilaterally.
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those that define a region such as Europe. Thus, there is a need to
provide for an international framework to ensure that nations and
communities with differing comprehensive views of the world will not
be subjected to communication that they can reasonably view as
undermining a central aspect of their reasonable comprehensive
views, just because they are unable to restrict it unilaterally because
of the nature of new communication technologies.
Another example may be what can be referred to as racist or
hate speech.3 27 There is no international consensus as to how the
balance is to be struck between liberty and equality, although the
balance may favor equality.3 28 An international agreement should
therefore enable national communities to regulate such speech in a
manner consistent with how they would wish the balance between
liberty and equality to be struck. In a defamation case, involving the
Internet, before the High Court of Australia, Justice Michael Kirby,
in a concurring opinion made the point well.3 29 "The law in different
jurisdictions, reflecting local and legal cultural norms, commonly
strikes different balances," he concluded.3 30 Even more directly, the

327.
For a description of hate or racist speech see Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
CriticalRace Theory and Freedom of Speech, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
119-59 (Louis Menand ed., 1996). See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Robert C.
Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
267 (1991).
328.
For example, most European Countries prohibit racist speech and the
selling of Nazi memorabilia or other items that are sympathetic to Nazism or
constitute holocaust denial. France, for example, has such a law (Section R645-1 of the
French Criminal Code). Indeed, only a few years ago a French court (High Court of
Paris) relied on such a law to require Yahoo! to block access in France of all Yahoo!
auction sites that sell Nazi memorabilia or other items that are sympathetic to Nazism
or could be construed as holocaust denial. TGI (Tribunal de Grande Instance) de Paris,
Ordonnance de R6f6r6 le 22 mai 2000, (No. RG: 00/05308, 00/05309) available at
http://www.juriscom.netltxt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522-asg.htm. The interim, order of
May 2000 was affirmed by the court on November 20, 2000. Ordonnance de Rf~r6 le
20 Novembre 2000 (No. RG: 00/05308, 00/05308). In Canada, too, hate speech does not
receive constitutional protection. See Regina v. Keegstra, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1. In that
case a high school teacher was convicted of "communicating statements [that] willfully
promote hatred against any identifiable group." The individual was convicted for
conveying an anti-Semitic message to his students.
On the other hand, most of what is denominated as racist speech would be
protected speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Or, at least,
such a speech cannot be singled out for special burden. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 378 (1992). More to the point, a U.S. District Court declined to enforce
the decision of the French court against Yahoo! to which I have referred in this note on
the ground that to do so would violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
329.
Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 77 A.L.J.R. 255,
117 (Kirby, J.,
concurring).
330.
Id.

96

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37..1

ICCPR Committee made a similar point in relation to speech. 331 As
the Committee observed in Faurisson v. France,332 the negative
impact of unregulated hate speech is going to depend on the specific
333
history of the country and the conditions that prevail in the polity.
Whether the particular community can manage to deal with racist
speech is going to depend on a number of factors such as how
entrenched and widespread the hate for a particular group in the
community is, how widely available and effective the channels of
counterspeech are, and how vulnerable the disfavored group is. The
particular national community must be allowed to make the
judgment as to what procedure to follow given the particular history
334
of the country and the resources available for counterspeech.

331.
See Faurisson v. France, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 58th Sess., Annex,
at 84, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/58/01550/1993 (1996), reprinted in HENRY I. STEIGER &
PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS AND
MORALS 755-59 (2d ed. 2000).
332.
Id. In this case the Human Rights Committee affirmed the conviction of a
former literature professor under a French law for contesting that the Holocaust did in
fact occur. In a concurring opinion, Committee members Elizabeth Evatt and David
Kretzmer observed that "[tihe notion that in the conditions of present-day France,
Holocaust denial may constitute a form of incitement to anti-semitism cannot be
denied." Id.
6. One can disagree with the empirical assessment here, but I think the
general sentiment that the particular condition of the country may determine whether
such legislation is necessary or not is a valid and defensible sentiment.
333.
One could, however, reasonably disagree that the history of France or the
current condition that prevails in the country required the sorts of legislative response
from the French government that was challenged before the ICCPR Committee. But
the point is that the impact of such speech should not be considered in an abstract way
as if all communities and countries occupy the same environment and are subject to the
same conditions and are defined by similar tendencies.
334.
In this regard it seems to me that the decision of the federal district court
in California to refuse to enforce a French court order against Yahoo! on the account
that doing so would be violative of the First Amendment is rather problematic. See
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d. 1181,
1182 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In that case, the court concluded thus:
[T]he French order's content and viewpoint-based regulation of the web pages
and auction site on Yahoo.com, while entitled to great deference as an
articulation of French law, clearly would be inconsistent with the First
Amendment if mandated by a court in the United States .... Although France
has the sovereign right to regulate what speech is permissible in France, this
Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the protections of the
United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs
simultaneously within our borders.
Id. Essentially, this is an extraterritorial application of the First Amendment. To say
that courts in the United States will not enforce a judgment that violates the First
Amendment if the speech in question occurred simultaneously within the United
States is to virtually rule out any enforcement of any judgment from anywhere
regarding "speech" to the extent that the Internet is its source. This is so because there
are likely to be a U.S. audience physically located within the United States among the
recipients of such information. Perhaps the courts' reading of the First Amendment
should take note of the changed world in which we live. The notion of extraterritorial
application seems to be premised on the world that is quickly disappearing-the
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Interestingly, however there has been an attempt by the Council of
the
Europe to include the prohibition of "racist and hate speech from
3 35
Internet by adding a protocol.., to its cybercrime convention.
There is a procedural dimension to the substantive issue that I
have described in the last two paragraphs. Even if there is an
agreement on the substantive question, an agreement on what sorts
of issues are best left to the states to regulate, there is still the
difficult procedural question. Whose law would or should apply when
a particular transnational act raises the potential of the assertion of
multiple jurisdictions? 33 6 The obvious and yet not uncontroversial
answer might be that the multilateral agreement must contain a
choice of law regime 337 that can serve the twin goals of conflict of
laws: certainty and fairness. A multilateral conflict of law rule in the
area has precedent from which to draw. 338 The Hague Conference on
Private International Law and the Rome Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (UNIDROIT) might provide such precedent. 339 Just as
there are numerous accords on conflict of law rules governing a

prominence of physical borders. Also, it seems to me that the question should be asked
as to who should carry the cost-the server or the nation-state whose laws are being
violated by a product that the server provides-of ensuring that citizens of the United
States do not lose their First Amendment right. A strong argument could be made that
the entity that is benefiting from a business venture should carry the cost (it is the cost
of doing business) and that may encourage that entity to develop and employ
procedures that will enable it to conduct business without inflicting cost on others. See
Joel R. Redienberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261
(2002).
Paul Meller, Europe Moving Toward Ban On Internet Hate Speech, N.Y.
335.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at C3. Not surprisingly, the United States, which is a signatory
to the Convention, apparently resisted the move to include hate speech in the
categories of prohibited speech on the ground that that would be inconsistent with the
First Amendment.
336.
Think of the following defamation hypo that I gave earlier in this article.
Assume that an Australian posts a message on the Usnet that defamed a U.S. citizen.
The newsgroup to which the message was posted was moderated by a New Zealander
whose data are stored in an English computer. We could complicate the hypothetical
further by, for example, adding to the story that the communication was made while
the Australian was in France at the time accessing a French computer and the
American was on vacation in Spain and was accessing the news group through a
Spanish computer. For a less complicated version of the problem see Dow Jones & Co.
v. Gutnbick, 77 A.L.J.R. 255 (2002). See also Yahoo!, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1181. The
Yahoo! case is actually one of enforcement (recognition) of judgment rather than one of
choice of law. Id.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws sets the reasons as to why
337.
there is a need for choice of law rules: "The world is composed of territorial states
having separate and differing systems of law. Events and transactions occur, and
issues arise, that may have a significant relationship to more than one state, making
necessary a special body of rules and methods for their ordering and resolution."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.
338.
See Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in
TransnationalCyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 113 (1996).
See id.
339.
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variety of areas, such as traffic accidents among nationals of different
countries, an agreement could be reached to unify choice of law rules
340
to resolve disputes arising from transnational communication.
Now, the conventional choice of law approach may lead to
unfairness. This could happen in at least two circumstances: in
disputes in cyberspace where there is harm to non-cyber parties who
have no reason to suspect that the disputes will be governed in
account of cyberspace, and when there are data havens which
immunize the potential defendant from any action. 34 1 But I think
even with those concerns and shortcomings a reasonably workable
choice of law regime could be developed. Perhaps the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen342 could form the point of
departure for developing such a regime. In Lauritzen the issue was
which country's law should apply in a maritime dispute when there
343
are conflicts between the laws of the two countries on the subject.
The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances the Court
must balance a number of factors such as the place of the wrongful
act (lex loci delicti commissi), the law of the flag (the analogy in
cyberspace would be the law of the state in which the access provider
is located, its domicile), the allegiance or domicile of the plaintiff, the
allegiance of the defendant, the place of the contract, the
inaccessibility of the foreign forum and the law of the forum. 344 While
imperfect, this approach may provide the basis for constructing a
reasonable conflict of laws regime.
The fourth objective of such an agreement will be to prescribe
international minimum standards to apply with regard to the outflow
of certain kinds of information. The movement of personal data is a
good example of that. In the information age, the collection and
processing of data by private business entities have become important
(and lucrative) aspects of business. They have also become very

340.
Justice Michael Kirby, currently a member of the High Court of Australia,
the highest court in the country, suggested a similar approach a few years ago in a
report about transborder data flow among OECD countries. OECD countries, he
suggested, ought to "work towards the development of principles . . . to govern the
applicable law in the case of transborder (data) flows." Franoise Gilbert, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Recommendations of the Council
Concerning Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Data,

Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Handbook Series, PLI Order No.
B0-0102, July-Aug. 2003, at 333.
341.
Data havens are countries that provide favorable laws to Internet users or
data storers akin to flags of convenience in the admiralty context.
342.
Laruitzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
343.
Id. at 573.
344.
Id. at 583-93. A later Supreme Court case reaffirmed the Lauritzen decision
but by reading it as having established a general principle that could be characterized
as the "most significant relationship" test rather than for the exhaustiveness of the
factors listed in that case or for the proposition that those factors be applied
mechanically. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1970); see also
LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 480-85 (5th ed. 2001).
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inexpensive. 345 As part of their transborder business interests,
transnational companies move all sorts of data about their business
from one branch in one country to another in another country or to
the headquarter of the business entity which may be located in yet
another country. Indeed, the data may even be moved to a country
where there is no branch of the particular business. To take personal
data as an example, a multinational company may collect data about
its employees (health, financial, employment history, etc.) and either
move that data to its headquarters in another country as part of an
attempt to improve managerial efficiency, or the data may be moved
to a different country for purposes of processing it, to put it in a
reasonably readable form, or even simply for the purpose of selling
such data to another firm which seeks to sell its products or services
346
to people with certain charactersitcs.
There are good reasons why there should be a minimum
international standard concerning the movement of certain data,
such as personal data, across national boundaries. Take personal
data as an example. It is one of the most sensitive issues as well as
one that best exemplifies how the information revolution is
undercutting the capacity of the nation-state to perform one of its
most basic functions: protecting the welfare and privacy 347 of its
citizens, which may be damaged by the misuse or disclosure of such
data to third parties. Unilateral action by a state to provide
protection is unlikely to succeed. Given current technology,
transnational companies can move such data without the government
knowing that such has been the case. 348 Indeed, information is often
gathered and processed in a way that is invisible to the individual
concerned.

345.
See generally Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998) (discussing the problem of personal data specifically
generated in the course of executing a cyberspace transaction).
346.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NII: SAFEGUARDING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
PERSONAL INFORMATION
15-16 app. (1995)

(Marketing Profiles).
347.
Ethan Katsh defines "privacy" as the power to control what others may
know about you. See M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 228 (1995).
348.
Many multinational companies, mainly American, have argued that the
unimpeded flow of data is in fact already protected under international norms. They
cite the free flow of information provision of the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 66, art.
19. There are two responses to this claim. First, it is rather unpersuasive to argue that
commercial data is protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR. It is almost certain that
personal information was not contemplated to be part of the speech Article 19 was to
protect. Second, even if it could be argued that there is conceptual and historical
plausibility to such a contention, it seems clear that the presence of another article in
the same covenant pushes in a different direction, towards protection of privacy. Article
17 provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy" and that"[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks." Id. art. 17.
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Even if governments were aware of it, many of those
governments are likely to be reluctant to adopt stringent
requirements as to how such personal data may be collected,
processed, or transported outside the country. This may be because of
what Professor Michael Froomkin calls "regulatory arbitrage,"3 49 the
ability of a multinational to play one country against another so as to
ensure that the rules it prefers are adopted by the state within which
it is located or plans to locate its business. Put simply, the fear that
such requirement may simply lead to a transnational company
moving its business from the regulating country is likely to act as a
disincentive to adopting a more stringent regulatory regime. Given
the importance (and power) of multinationals in the lives of many
nations, the adoption of stringent regulatory structures may not be
risks that many countries are prepared to take.
If there isn't international minimum standard, there may be a
race to the bottom among nation-states in terms of the level of
protection afforded to such data. There is a risk that states will
compete with each other so as to provide the least restrictive rules
and hence attract the most commercial activity. 350 Indeed, this has
often been a problem with nation-states with federal structures
351
where the constituting units often compete in a race to the bottom.
Often, central governments have responded with a legislative or
judicial regulatory structure so as to ensure that such a race does not
have negative consequences on individual rights and welfare. 352 In
any case, in relation to federal structures even if there are no
interventions from central governments such a race may be tolerable
given the option (theoretical, as it may often be) that people have the
right to move from one federal unit to another in the event that they
did not agree with the level of welfare or protection that is afforded
them. There is no such option at the international level, at least one

349.
See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage,
in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129, 142 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
350.
Of course without international agreement or arrangement theoretically
there could also be a race to the top where there will be a contest among states as to
who can adopt the toughest rule that will form the basis of an international rule.
Although the idea of providing more protection for individuals is attractive and may
not be regarded as a problem, I think a race even to the top should be viewed with
suspicion. It is likely that under such circumstances such rules are going to be set by
economically powerful nations. Powerful nations will set the rules for other nations
even when the circumstances in other countries will require that the balance be struck
in a different way. From the point of view of national sovereignty, this should not be
any less troublesome. In the same way that a German state ought not to determine as
to what an Internet search engine is allowed to provide to its customers worldwide, it
should not be the case that one country determines as to what regulatory regime
applies to interborder flow of personal data.
351.
See generally Kirsten H. Engle, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a "Race"and Is It "To the Bottom'?, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 271 (1997).

352.

Id. at 367-74.
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cannot do it at will. One cannot immigrate to the country he or she
believes provides the best protection unless one is deemed desirable
and hence admissible by that country. Globalization may have made
territorial borders speedbumps for purposes of information and
capital flows, but the territorial gate is still intact when it comes to
the free movement of people, with certain exceptions, such as the
countries of Western Europe.
The international agreement should provide not only minimum
standards, but also prescribe an equivalency standard. By
"equivalency" standard I mean to refer to the idea that no data shall
be transferred out of one country unless the country to which the data
is transferred has laws that provide an equivalent level of protection
to that provided by the country of origin. Indeed, the Council of
Europe endorsed such an approach in a 1981 convention. 3 53 The
Council of Europe is not the only intergovernmental body that has
attempted to deal with privacy issues raised by transborder data
flow. 354 The European Union has also adopted a directive requiring
equivalency as a standard for data processing within member states
as well as "an adequate level of protection" if the data were
transferred outside the Union. 35 5 There have been criticisms about
one or another aspect of both the Convention and the Directive, but
the ideas of minimum and equivalency standards are regarded as
good ones, and I think such requirements on the international level
would be enormously helpful.
Indeed, in testimony before the U.S. Congress, Professor Stefan
RodotA, the Chairman of the Italian Data Protection Commission who
also serves as the Chairman of the Data Protection Working Group
established by the European Parliament, made the point that there is
"a case for an International instrument on data protection." 356

353.
See Convention, supra note 127. The Convention is not directly binding on
signatory states, but it requires those states to adopt legislation that will give effect to
the principles of the convention and to provide for safeguards for the processing of
personal information that are common to member states.
354.
E.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC of Oct. 24, 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 0. J. (L 281).
355.
See id. at 31 ("The Directive has been implemented in 11 out of the 15
European countries"); see also The EU Data Protection Directive: Implications for the
U.S. Privacy Debate: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 1, 12
(2001) [hereinafter Implications for the US Privacy Debate] (testimony of Professor
Stefano RodotA).
356.
Implications for the US Privacy Debate, supra note 355, at 13 ("In my
opinion, there is therefore, a case for an International instrument on data protection,
as recently stressed in the: Venice declaration' by all the colleagues convened at the
22nd International Conference on Privacy and Data Protection").
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Professor Joel Reidenberg made a similar point in his testimony
before the same congressional committee. 357 He observed, "[m]any of
the core differences among nations on the implementation of privacy
principles touch upon fundamental governance and sovereignty
questions. These types of problems will only be resolved at an
international treaty level like the WTO. ''358 Professors Reidenberg
and RodotA may settle for a more specialized and focused treaty than
the more comprehensive agreement that I have advocated in this
Article, but the important thing is that we are all agreed that the
only way to resolve many of the issues raised by the communication
revolution is through an international agreement.
Even if people agree with the contention in this article that the
idea of a comprehensive international agreement on the flow of
information is desirable as an abstract matter, they may think that it
is politically infeasible. It may be so. Given the multiplicity of
traditions, cultural outlooks, and economic and political systems, it
will not be easy to arrive at an agreement that will be acceptable to
all or even most. But that is always the case with any multilateral
agreement.
Yet
there
have
been
numerous
multilateral
agreements. 359 To be sure the process leading to such agreements is
often a tedious and slow process, but that is to be expected. 360 In any
case, the real risk of chaos and conflicts resulting from inconsistent
regulatory regimes should counsel us that we should not use failure
as an excuse not to try. To be sure, when co-existence among nationstates is organized through an international agreement, it does not
follow that conflict is therefore precluded. Rather, conflict is
patterned. And there is something to be said for that.
Even if a comprehensive and binding agreement appears to be
unattainable in the immediate future, the international community
could take steps towards that goal by advocating what the OECD has
been promoting for a few years in relation to various subjects. 361 The

At the international level, I think that it will be particularly important for us to
push toward an international treaty to deal with privacy. Privacy implicates
core democratic values and markets, market issues, and I think only a treaty
will enable us to resolve many of the conflicts that will go-that we will see in
the future.
Id. at 67 (testimony of Joel R. Reidenberg).
357.
Id.
358.
Id. at 76.
359.
I have referred to the Outer Space Treaty. See supra note 177. One could
also refer to many international agreements including those undertaken by WIPO and
the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
360.
For example the WIPO Copyright Treaty was adopted after almost a decade
of meetings. The Treaty adapted copyright rules to digital works. See Pamela
Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 375 (1997),
361.
See, e.g., OECD, Copyright Policy: The Guidelines and the Issues, The
OECD Cryptography Policy Guidelines And The Report On Background and Issues of
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international community could agree on general policy guidelines
such as those that I have advocated in this section with the purpose
of getting those guidelines to inform the rules that states adopt. It is
true that general guidelines might be ignored by states and hence
may not lead to uniform legal regimes, but I think four factors
suggest that it may in fact be worth adopting such guidelines.
First, there is a possibility that a sufficient number of states may
in fact implement those guidelines to make them effective. Second,
the implementation of those general guidelines by states may offer us
a chance to assess how those principles work in practice and what
adjustments might need to be made in the event that agreement on a
detailed and binding document becomes viable. Third, even if a
binding international document cannot be adopted even after the
implementation of the guidelines by various states, the actions of
these states may in fact provide the basis for the emergence of
customary law. Fourth, even if they are not legislatively or judicially
implemented by many states, the existence of the guidelines may in
fact provide the moral ground on which critics of the status quo can
stand and through which they can continue to challenge the current
regime. Indeed, in many ways this is similar to how international
human rights norms, by and large, work. Even though we are still
very far from having effective mechanisms of enforcement, that fact
has not stopped the burgeoning of human rights agreements. 362 Many
would suggest that the proliferation of such agreements has had
positive impact on the conditions of human rights worldwide. 36 3 This
is so, partly because the norms embodied in these agreements provide
critics and victims the vocabulary and moral standing to challenge
and criticize the actions of governments that are viewed as
inconsistent with those norms.
This last observation points to an important but often overlooked
function that the law performs. As many, and most prominently
Robert Cover, have argued, law is not merely an instrument of
coercion but also a system of narrative that enables us to imagine
alternative worlds. 3 64 Even when a norm is not (or would not be)
enforced by public authorities, it may still perform the role of

Cryptography Policy, OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(97)204 (1997); see also OECD,
Recommendations of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C8058 (Final) (Oct. 1,
1980), available at http://www.oecd.org (recognizing that countries, regardless of their
specific laws, have a common interest in protecting privacy).
362.
See MILLS, supra note 4, at 126-65 (discussing humanitarian access and
intervention in the emerging global order).
363.
See id.
364.
Robert M. Cover, The Foreword:Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
9-10 (1983).
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providing, often for the opposition and those on the margin, the
means of thinking about alternative worlds.
To summarize, in this section I have argued that the idea of a
thick state is no longer available because of increasing globalization
of economic, political, and social life. Nor is it attractive; for in the
name of a thick state and external self-determination, many regimes,
especially those from developing countries, have denied and will
continue to deny the right of internal self-determination. 365 Instead of
a thick state, I have advocated the notion of a thin state as a better
way of reconciling the demands of external and internal selfdetermination. I have suggested that, in relation to the international
flow of information, two principles may organize the institutions of a
thin state: the principle of plurality (the pluralism within) and the
idea of subsidiarity (international pluralism). The former suggests
that the legitimate state is one that is tolerant, and even
encouraging, of pluralism within its borders while the latter deals
with the threat of homogenization that may, paradoxically, be the
consequence of pluralization within the nation-state.
The institutional structures that I suggested in this section are
not by a long shot exhaustive. They are meant simply to give some
indication as to how the two principles-plurality and subsidiaritycould be worked out in practice. There are probably numerous other
ways of puzzling through the two principles in institutional terms.
The important thing is that we start thinking about concrete
proposals that will give practical dimension to the idea of a thin state
with which we have to reconcile ourselves in the era of the
communication revolution and globalization. Jurisdiction will
continue to become the rhetorical site within which the shifting
conceptions of community will be discussed in the age of globalization
that continues to be supported and accelerated by the communication
revolution.

V. CONCLUSION
The prominent international legal scholar, Thomas Franck,
opens one of his books with these words: "Never .. have notions of
sovereignty demanded as much cautious rethinking as now. ''366 Never
has any process made more contribution to the need for such
rethinking than the communication revolution. The communication
revolution is as big and as profound as any we have had in our

365.

See Addis, supra note 90, at 491.
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history. 367 It has far-reaching impacts on our lives and our
institutions. Time and distance, two phenomena that have defined
our view of ourselves and of our relationship with our environment,
are shrinking at an amazing speed. 368 One consequence of the impact
on time and distance has been on how we view communities and
which communities we think deserve our allegiance, cultivation, and
protection. The Internet, satellite, and other forms of communication
have increasingly allowed individuals to form, and be loyal to,
communities whose members are physically located in different
corners of the globe.
Even more to the point for our purpose, ethnic and linguistic
groups whose territories have been divided among neighboring
countries are now able to sustain ethnic and linguistic solidarity by
utilizing the new communication technologies. The Kurds, for
example, have been able to cultivate and sustain Kurdish nationalism
by using satellite communications that connects Kurds both within
the divided territories and with those in the Diaspora. 369 Of course,
the cultivation of Kurdish identity will be to some extent at the
expense of the supposed identities of territorial states such as Iraq or
Turkey, two countries that have sizable Kurdish groups. Indeed, the
Kurdish story could be repeated in relation to other ethnic and
linguistic groups in other parts of the world.
One of the most visible impacts of the communication revolution,
and for my purpose here the most important, has, therefore, been
that on the territorial state. The revolution in the development of
communication technologies and the unprecedented transnational
communication that it has made possible are seriously curtailing the
power of the territorial state, its claim that it has the final authority
to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce laws within its physical borders.
To be sure, there have always been limits to what the territorial state
could do in terms of adjudicating and enforcing its laws even in
relation to activities and events that have effects on it. 3 70 The state
had to persuade either the international community or other states

367.
Walter B. Wriston, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
Citicorp/Citibank, refers to the information revolution as "the third great revolution in
history" as big as the first two, the Agricultural Revolution and the Industrial
Revolution. See Walter B. Wriston, Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., SeptOct. 1997, at 172.
368.
"Distance is indeed irrelevant if a stock can be sold instantaneously in New
York or Hong Kong by an investor in Abidjan to one in Moscow." NYE, supra note 33,
at 90.
369.
See, e.g., Edip Yuksel, Yes, IAm a Kurd, 7 D.C.L.J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 359,
369 (1998).
370.
See Robert McCorquodale,
International Law, Boundaries, and
Imagination, in BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 136
(David Miller & Sohail H. Hashmi eds., 2001).
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through a bilateral agreement to give it assistance. This is especially
the case in terms of enforcement of judgment. What is different in the
information age is that the frequency with which the state would
need to rely on others to enforce its validly enacted and applied laws
is infinitely greater. What appeared to be the exception has now
become the ordinary, a common event.
For some, this loss of authority is to be viewed suspiciously and
even resisted strongly, for physical borders are seen as unambiguous
good that must be protected from the threat of unrestrained and
unauthorized flow of information across national boundaries. For
others, the possible demise of the state is to be welcomed and even
celebrated rather than mourned, for the state is viewed as a
stumbling block to the achievement of liberty and international
justice. State sovereignty is regarded as an undesirable speedbump
on the information superhighway. Under this view, the demise of the
state is seen as giving way to a democratized international civil
society where the world will be treated as one scheme of association.
This condition is thought to be much more conducive to the
cultivation of freedom and to the achievement of international justice.
I have, however, argued in this article that these two polar
opposite views misunderstand the ambiguous and even paradoxical
nature of territorial boundaries, how they can simultaneously foster
and inhibit freedom. William Connolly makes the point well in
371
relation to all forms of boundaries, including territorial boundaries.
He writes:
Boundaries form indispensable protection against violation and
violence; but the divisions they sustain also carry cruelty and violence.
Boundaries provide conditions of identity, individual agency, and
collective action; but they also close off possibilities of being that might
otherwise flourish. Boundaries both foster and inhibit freedom; they
372
both protect and violate life.

Once this ambiguity is recognized then the task becomes one of
imagining institutional arrangements that will minimize the
sacrifices and violence that are associated with territorial sovereignty
without sacrificing the advantages that territorially based
communities provide. In this regard I have suggested that in this era
of thick globalism the idea of a thin state may enable us to perform
that task.

371.
CONNOLLY, supra note 28, at 163.
372.
Id; see also McCorquodale, supra note 370, at 136 ("Boundaries are integral
to international law. They are a cause of conflict and reason for peace. They establish
order and lead to disorder. They provide a protection and a weapon. They include and
exclude. They define and divide. They are real and imagined.").
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The claim that the territorial state is on its final legs may be
exaggerated, 373 but it is not an exaggeration to say that the
traditional view of territorial sovereignty is seriously destabilized by
the communication revolution. The current paradigm whose
theoretical foundation is thick statism will not be able to support
international legal institutions in the twenty-first century. To
paraphrase George Orwell, there is a thin state inside every thick
state. 374 And perhaps the thin state will enable a reconciliation
between the two seemingly incompatible tendencies that are
encouraged by globalization generally and the communication
revolution specifically, the emergence of universalist commitments
and ideologies accompanied by intense pursuits of the politics of
difference. In any case, my hope is that this article will form part of
the conversation that will be needed to reimagine the notion of
sovereignty in the light of the challenges and opportunities presented
by the communication revolution.

373.
"If we pause to ask ourselves, at the dawn of the twenty-first century,
which political institutions constitute the world's major depositories of power, we would
have to reply: states. It is the same answer that any seasoned observer would have
given in 1815." Archibugi, supra note 146, at 137.
374.
"There is a thin man inside every fat man just as ...there's a statue inside
every block of stone." GEORGE ORWELL, COMING UP FOR AIR (1950), quoted in
MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD xi
(1994).
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